Lacanian Psychoanalytic Writings

THE LACANIAN SCHOOL

PAPERS OF
THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE
15
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Lacan dissolves his School, a dissolution not indifferent to the effects of institutionalisation, and indicates the following:

I expect nothing from individuals, and something from a functioning.

What do we understand by the failure of the functioning of Lacan’s School? The School had grown, Lacan’s Seminar was renowned, Lacanian theory was everywhere. It was not for the lack of diffusion of the theory that there was a failure of the functioning. Central to the failure of the functioning of Lacan’s School was the failure to form analysts who would be of the requisite level. A failure—perhaps an institutional regression—of his invention of the passe; an invention which joined others in the institutional inventory of Lacanianisms—patently diffused.

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If what Lacan invents and formalises in the *Proposition of October 1967* concerning the *passe* is fated to be more than an institutional procedure — yet another in a growing inventory — then what it conveys about the transmission of psychoanalysis, what it conveys about the possibilities of a functioning, must be rescued. This is to say, a test of the movement from transference to work as a testament of desire. In this way there exists the possibility of psychoanalytic discourse being sustained over and above that of the association or organisation — international or otherwise.

In privileging the desire of the analyst a School of psychoanalysis allows for the effects of that desire over and above the effects of knowledge and power. In this, it is the privileging of the desire of the analyst which differentiates a School of psychoanalysis from a psychoanalytic institution and/or university.

What is the knowledge that is implied by this?

For Lacan, the knowledge of psychoanalysis belongs to the realm between *episteme* (science in the Socratic sense) and *amathia* (ignorance). This is to say, of the field of truth as it displaces knowledge — but the truth in a way that the subject is incapable of accounting for it. He does not know why it is true. Therefore, as concerns this knowledge — it is a matter of the passage of a logos, of a knowledge, without having it, without possessing it. A dispossessed knowledge which we situate as the effect of a discourse. A knowledge, therefore, which is not owned or imported and administered, but which moves as a 'once-found.' In *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* Freud acknowledges three of his teachers as it were — Breuer, Charcot and Chrobak in the following way:

> These three men had communicated to me a piece of knowledge which, strictly speaking, they themselves did not possess.

In the Seminar *The Reverse of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan locates a possessed, filling knowledge as the enjoyment of the Other. This he places as a formula — knowledge is the enjoyment of the Other — something which sustains the existence of the Other as a site of knowledge — a university, psychoanalytic institution, or global Other, for example. The evidence of the Other’s enjoyment comes in the emblems of course credits and authorisations. What this impedes is an encounter with knowledge as an effect of a discourse which writes over or bars the Other and the formula: knowledge is the enjoyment of the Other. Such a knowledge has the effect of emptying. Here we have a knowledge which supports rather than supposes the Real; the horror of knowing that makes of the analyst an outcast. That knowledge that is constituted by a barring of the formula ‘knowledge is the enjoyment of the Other’, is also productive of an enjoyment: an enjoyment of lack, an enjoyment of the movement of desire.

Now, the present volume of the *Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne* is marked by such a desire and indeed its presence continues to be an effect of the overwriting of knowledge as the enjoyment, possession and privilege of the foreign Other. Such a barring or overwriting is essential to the representation of The Freudian School of Melbourne. As a consequence, the School does not represent something for someone. It does not represent Lacan or Freud for Australia and Australian analysts, scholars and students. This is to say that it does not put itself in the place of a sign. The School is re-presented in making present. Any Vorstellung is always only authorised by the Hegelian *Gegenwörtigung* — a representation as making present, a bringing to presence through the effects of discourse, the effects of its work.
Psychoanalysis and the Institution
Ethics and the Institution

Linda Clifton*

Psychoanalysis would allow you, of course, the hope of refining and clarifying the unconscious of which you're the subject. But everyone knows that I don't encourage anyone into it, anyone whose desire is not resolute.

Jacques Lacan

The Freudian School should not fall in with the tough and humourless psycho-analyst I met on my last trip to the United States. 'I will never attack the instituted forms', he told me, 'because they guarantee without a problem a routine that contributes to my comfort.'

Jacques Lacan

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When Jeffrey Masson, Professor of Sanskrit approached the Toronto Psychoanalytic Institute, which is affiliated with the International Psychoanalytical Association, for a psychoanalytic training, the first question he was asked was, ‘Have you been faithful to your wife?’

This surprising question has of course caused the undoing of many incumbents of or aspirants to public office. Transgression of the seventh commandment by would-be presidents and kings appears to cause more consternation than other concerns seemingly more crucial — the possibility of propelling the world to its destruction, for example. But what is its relevance to aspiring analysts? We know that the state regulates and supports the institution of marriage. Is the psychoanalytic institution adding its weight? Surely the only relationship that psychoanalysis can have to an institution such as marriage is one of analysis or critique, such as Freud engaged with in *Civilisation and its Discontents*.

In the question posed by the Toronto Institute perhaps it is possible to hear a demand or even a condition of loyalty or fidelity, not only to one’s wife but also to the Institute itself, loyalty to its rules, procedures and hierarchy.

As it happened the question of marital fidelity was one that was causing some anguish for Masson and one that he would (unsuccessfully) attempt to resolve in his analysis. However, sensing the moral weight of the question and fearing that he would be revealed as either a liar or a philanderer he made his first compromise in his endeavours to satisfy the demands of the Institute. ‘I’m struggling’, he said.

The importance of this first question is that it clearly places the discourse of this psychoanalytic institution in the sphere of morality. It leads to another question — what is the relationship of psychoanalysis to morality?

Lacan, speaking on French television in 1973 denounced the International Association of Psychoanalysis as ‘a professional insurance plan against analytic discourse.’ His extended critique of the psychoanalytic institution was a propelling force in his theoretical exegesis and was woven in and through his seminars and writing. In his famous seminar on Ethics Lacan produced an intricate working of the central notions of the good in the history of moral philosophy. Following a reading of Aristotle, Kant, Sade and Bentham in particular, in relation to the development of ethical thought, Lacan situated the birth of psychoanalysis as a radical moment in the history of man’s relation to the good. With Freud’s discovery of the unconscious and the accompanying formulations of unconscious desire and death drive in particular, man’s relation to himself as a moral agent is irretrievably disrupted. He can no longer see himself as the master of his desires but has to contemplate, if he can bear to, his fate as the subject of a desire of which he knows nothing. From the position of having traversed the domain of ethical inquiry, Lacan challenged post Freudian psychoanalysis as being wedded to a ‘traditional ethics’ from whence the incursion of morality into psychoanalysis comes. He analysed the notion of the good involved in this traditional ethics as it is exhibited in its multifarious forms — public or private good, laws, commandments, injunctions, even the circulation of another type of good — material goods — in capitalist society. Lacan saw modern man as being caught up in what he called a service of the goods:

Private goods, family goods, domestic goods, other goods that solicit us, the goods of our trade or our profession, the goods of the city, etc.

Lacan proposed a significant relationship between the good and power:

the domain of the good is the birth of power. The notion of control of the good is essential...to exercise control over one’s goods is to have the right to deprive others of them.

In contrast the good is the first barrier to the field of desire.
The movement that the world we live in is caught up in, of wanting to establish the universal spread of the service of goods as far as conceivably possible, implies an amputation, sacrifices, indeed a kind of puritanism in the relationship to desire...³


Jeffrey Masson's account of his training analysis in the Toronto Institute is marked by a certain vulgarity. Seemingly intended for the popular press, being rather gossipy and morally indignant in tone, it is a kind of expose. It portrays some rather vulgar people, Masson's analyst in particular who, in turn, vulgarised fundamental concepts in psychoanalysis to the point where Masson could write that:

The actual ideas I had heard in the six years of seminars could simply be reduced to a few dozen and could have been conveyed in a few short conversations: the unconscious, repression, the importance of childhood events...etc. etc.³

Perhaps one should just turn away from such vulgarity. After all Masson has certainly revealed himself to be a person with a great interest in finding the worm in the apple. Perhaps his veracity as a witness, his good faith, could be questioned.

However, no-one would question the veracity of Siegfried Bernfeld, a former pupil of Freud, who in 1952, in a paper given to the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society, a few months before his death, made a critique of the American psychoanalytic institution and the training analysis in particular. Bernfeld critically observed the way in which the institution, in its rules governing the selection and training of candidates, infantilised its candidates, leading to dependence and conformity, the quashing of individual desire.³ It was a general critique which Masson's particular account supports, being the testimony of one who actually underwent a training analysis. Masson's account shows what can happen to desire in an institution where power is exercised in the name of the good and the good becomes the exercise of power.

Masson dismissed Lacan's writings as incoherent but nevertheless, on the other side of the Atlantic, in an English-speaking milieu, he provides a case study of a psychoanalytic institution which gives evidence of the timely nature of Lacan's critique. It demonstrates, through the practices it exposes and their deadening effects, the necessity for a new ethics for psychoanalysis which could revitalise the psychoanalytic institution.

The first loyalty owed in the Toronto Institute was, according to Masson, to one's training analyst. Masson's analyst was the President of the Institute and was described to Masson as an 'analyst's analyst'. This analyst spoke and acted in the name of the love he had for Masson and the good he was doing him. He predicted that Masson would become not just a good but a great analyst on his couch. He occupied the position of a master, a model and the arbiter of a supposedly objective reality. In the name of this good there was ill-treatment in the analysis – unreliability about time, rudeness, verbal bullying, outbursts of temper and finally intimidatory threats on the part of the analyst when Masson, in despair, considered seeking a consultation with another analyst. There were also seductions in the form of flattery and confidential gossip about other patients and analysts in the Institute. Masson's analyst declared himself to be a law unto himself as regards his analytic practice and demanded submission.

Masson was troubled by his infidelity to his wife whom he nevertheless loved. His analyst had no difficulty in discerning the causes of this infidelity, seen more as a character flaw than a symptom. He had met Masson's wife and loathed her – she was, he confidently asserted, not a real woman, being far too concerned with the intellect. Also she was ugly. It was clear to this analyst that Masson lacked a good object for his investment of love. He
also lacked a good model – his father had been a ‘womaniser’ too. Masson’s analyst was more than willing to make up for this deficit and offered himself as a model. Masson’s desires needed to be normalised. An analysis was thus conducted on the basis of prejudice and identification. Whereas Lacan formulated the desire of the analyst as being to obtain an absolute difference between the ideal and the object, Masson’s analyst conducted an analysis where the ideal and the object coalesced in his own being. This conception of a treatment reinforces the strength of the super-ego, the moral agency in man. Freud points out that the more the super-ego is appeased the more it demands. Thus the analysis will result in the super-ego gaining in ascendance and domination of the subject as desire is repressed.

The good that Masson lacked, and which his analyst possessed was seen to be a healthy, non-promiscuous heterosexuality. Lacan pointed out that the good one offers another is always a good in one’s own image. Masson was not at all sure that he wanted his analyst’s goodness, that what was good for his analyst would necessarily be good for him. This is the perennial problem with the good which Lacan emphasised, the ‘benevolent fraud’, of wanting-to-do-one’s-best-for-the-subject. He warned that:

At every moment we need to know what our relationship is to the desire to do good, to the desire to cure. We have to deal with that as if it were something that is likely to lead us astray...one might be paradoxical...and designate our desire as a non-desire to cure.”

The good embodied by Masson’s analyst relates to an ideal of post Freudian psychoanalysis – the fulfilment of the genital stage, a maturation of the drive and object which sets the standard ‘for a right relationship to reality.’ Lacan criticised this ideal of a kind of harmony with one’s desires and of harmony between the sexes. He saw it as holding a false promise of happiness. Instead he asks:

...shouldn’t the true termination of an analysis – and by that I mean the kind that prepares you to become an

This reality is man’s relationship to his own death. At the end of a training analysis the subject ‘should know the domain and the level of the experience of absolute disarray,’ an experience of helplessness where he can expect help from no-one.

One sees clearly in Masson’s account the truth of Lacan’s assertion that the good is the birth of power, a power unquestionably exercised by Masson’s analyst by virtue of his position as training analyst, the one who determines the entry of a candidate into the ranks of the analysts in the institution.

Had I not been a candidate, had this been a regular therapeutic analysis...would things have turned out otherwise? I think so. I don’t think Schiffer [Masson’s analyst] or any other analyst could have allowed himself the kinds of liberties with a ‘normal’ patient that he could with a candidate. We were a captive audience...I did not hear of a single candidate changing analysts or quitting. A regular patient, if he doesn’t like what the analyst does, can quit...The ties that bind can no doubt be strong, but at least they are not accompanied by the same devastating power to make or break a career that every training analyst has over every candidate. The possibility of analysis in an institute is an illusion.”

It was just such impasses created by the training analysis and its relation to the institution that led Lacan to criticise and finally abandon the distinction between a therapeutic and a training analysis and to propose the procedure of the passe as a way of breaking the silence which had surrounded the experience of the training analysis. The effect of designating in advance an analysis as a training analysis is to severely compromise the possibility of anything emerging from the analysis except what is demanded by the institution. This surely will not be in the direction of a questioning of desire.
Lacan, in accordance with his own working of the notion of time as logical rather than chronological, proposed a kind of retroactive authorisation of an analysis in its training function by his development of the concept and procedure of the passe. The passe acknowledged an act of passage from analysand to analyst as the true end of an analysis, taken to its fullest extent. As it was envisaged the passe was an opportunity for those who wished to speak of their analysis to do so in a space beyond the analysis, in order to see what their telling might contribute to the theoretical development of psychoanalysis. Not all is known in advance. In his procedure of the passe Lacan privileged the analysis itself as that which could produce a new knowledge and he proposed that this knowledge could come from the mouths of those most recently analysed. Furthermore those undertaking the passe were to speak first not to those ‘in authority’ in the institution but to their peers. As Lacan puts it:

It is obvious that if he addresses himself to an older person, to one who is registered (titularise) or even to someone called a training analyst, you can be sure that his testimony will miss the point entirely. Because, first, he knows perfectly well that the poor idiot he is addressing has matured such that he, just like me, has absolutely no idea why he entered this profession of being an analyst. I myself can remember why a little, and I regret it. But on the whole they have completely forgotten. All they see is their position of authority, and in these conditions one tries to place oneself on the same footing as the authority – that is to say, one lies, quite simply. So I tried to ensure that they always address themselves to beginners like themselves.10

To return to the world of the Toronto Institute, there was disillusionment for Masson not only in his analysis but also in the theoretical preparation of candidates offered by the Institute. The second question asked of Masson when he approached the Institute was why he wanted to become a psychoanalyst. He revealed that he was fascinated by Freud’s work. No reading had ever absorbed him more. He could think of no better profession than one which would allow him to read Freud as part of his training. The interviewer he wrote, ‘winced almost imperceptibly and it suddenly occurred to me that he might not have read Freud in many years.’11

This wince was apparently shared by the other training analysts who were the only ones entitled to present seminars but who did so without preparation or enthusiasm. In a chapter entitled The Mens Club Masson describes the theoretical seminars:

The rooms at the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry were bleak and institutional. I always hoped...that we would sit around until the early hours talking with animation about the love of our life, psychoanalysis. Instead we carried a cup of weak institutional coffee...and sat around...distrustful of each other. In effect, the seminars were more of an acculturation, a socialising process than a genuine learning experience. Each candidate found himself, knowingly or not, defending theoretical positions that...were held by his training analyst...These theoretical orientations were overlaid and even superseded by old personal hatreds on the part of the various training analysts going back years...We inherited them, that is the hostility that actually existed among these training analysts was transferred on to the candidates.12

In other words, the psychology of the group replaced the possibility of learning. The text of Freud was subtly rendered obsolete. This is familiar enough (though still reprehensible) in some university departments allegedly teaching psychoanalysis where a Fenichel or Brenner substituted for Freud can effectively kill a students desire. In a psychoanalytic institute would we not expect the seminal texts to be read with vigour?

Instead Freud’s name only was retained to buttress the authority of the training analysts, especially if they could trace their analytic lineage back to Vienna. These analysts placed themselves as the focus in seminars where their analysands sat and fantasised about
their analysts' imaginary rivalries. Disengagement from intellectual inquiry became the model - access to the symbolic dimension of the text being blocked by the imaginary capture in the gaze of the analyst. While a transference to the works of Freud is no guarantee of an analytic vocation, it is surely not an unhappy beginning. We can hear in Masson's account that, along with the weak institutional coffee, desire was being reduced to its dregs.

This abandonment of the text of Freud contrasts sharply with Lacan's own homage to Freud which took the form of his rigorous re-working of the Freudian texts. John Rachman wrote that:

Lacan's authorisation of himself came through his relation - one might say his 'transference' - to Freud, the author. The incredible importance Lacan attached to close attention to the 'letter' of Freud is tied up with this fact. It seems more decisive than the relation Lacan has to Freud through his analysis with Lowenstein. As a founder of a School of Psychoanalysis...Lacan is distinguished in not following the pattern of filiation through training analyses which characterise the rest of psychoanalysis, at least for the first generation. In breaking with this sort of filiation, Lacan was free to try to transform the institution by transposing the place of Freud's writings in it.13

Perhaps as a corollary to the avoidance of the text little was written theoretically by the members of the Institute. Masson described what we might call the 'myth of the inverse correlation' often held to exist between clinical skill and theoretical exposition.

I was sceptical of the argument that the best analysts were the worst theorists. Usually this boiled down to a simple formula: if an analyst had published nothing and seemed in conversation to be unusually obtuse, this was only because he was a superb clinician. I learned that when somebody described a respected analyst as a fine clinician this only meant that he had never published anything.14

Not to read with some passion, not to write nor to publish, represent a kind of atrophy of the intellectual function and the failure of the institution to sustain a place for the analytic discourse, a place for the circulation of ideas and desire. The analytic discourse is not limited to the consulting room. Nor is the transference. Reading and writing are transferential acts which the institution should support, allowing a re-direction of transference in a space outside or beyond the clinical analysis. Psychoanalysis is a discourse and Lacan derived from that an ethic of the well-spoken, an ethic which holds that what is well spoken is clearly conceived - the reverse of common understanding. The importance of writing to a Lacanian practice can be seen to relate to the ethic of the well-spoken - a writing that attempts to give an account of the clinical practice, a writing which carries something of one's transference to psychoanalysis and is particular to the desire of each one.

Despite the disillusionment experienced in his analysis and theoretical seminars, there were still inducements to keep Masson in the world of psychoanalysis. Describing a psychoanalytic party, Masson wrote:

We were up in the hills of the little bayside resort of Sausalito, in a beautiful Spanish-style house with a magnificent pool set in a yard overlooking San Francisco Bay.

The older analyst told me, 'Look around you. Soon this will be your world and your life. It is a good one.'15

This promise of the good life was seen by Lacan as a prominent feature of American psychoanalysis. The pursuit of happiness linked to the service of the good. Analysts, he said, should not make themselves the guarantors of this bourgeois dream. The psychoanalytic institution, when it offers the rewards of respectability and prestige to its graduates in return for their unquestioning loyalty, aligns itself in so doing with the ideals of the larger society and requires that the desires of its candidates are suspended or relinquished. The loyalty demanded by the institution
is the loyalty that doesn't question the powers that be. Lacan asserted that the morality of power wherever it is exercised is always the same — it is the morality of the master.

What is Alexander's proclamation when he arrived in Persepolis or Hitler's when he arrived in Paris? The preamble isn't important. 'I have come to liberate you from this or that.' The essential point is 'Carry on working. Work must go on.' Which of course means: 'Let it be clear to everyone that this is on no account the moment to express the least surge of desire.' The morality of power, of the service of goods, is as follows, 'As far as desires are concerned, come back later. Make them wait.'

In proposing his ethics of desire Lacan designates the giving up on one's desire as the only thing one could be guilty of. The institution which aids and abets this giving up on desire in fact betrays its candidates. For Lacan giving ground relative to ones desire is always accompanied by a form of betrayal — self betrayal, betrayal by the other, betrayal in the name of the good.

What is the nature of this desire which founds the Lacanian ethic? It cannot be seen as a new kind of ideal or good. Lacan's reading of Sophocle's Antigone led him to propose Antigone as a paradigm of one who realises her desire in the ultimate sense. This desire, carried to its final and fatal conclusion is not one of which she is the master. It is one which inhabits her, marked by the tragic destiny of her lineage. It is inextricably bound to man's status as a being for death and it constitutes a movement towards this death, the particular death that awaits each subject. For Lacan the ethical question to be asked in an analysis is whether one has acted, not in accordance with the good, but in accordance with the desire that inhabits one, a desire which does not guarantee a good outcome, which may in fact produce an outcome antithetical to the good.

Masson, after working as a psychoanalyst in the clinical field for a short time and after his well documented adventures as a research officer with the Sigmund Freud Archives, finally abandoned psychoanalysis. He could now rail against it from another place. His failure to offer any serious analysis of the pathology in the institution of which he was so critical is surprising. Moral indignation is not enough. I have attempted to analyse the problems of the institution, described by Masson, as a reflection of the relationship between morality and power and the resultant strangulation of desire. Masson's moral indignation took him no further than to align the corruption of power and by power that he experienced in the Institute with a larger failing of psychoanalysis in general and of Freud in particular, a kind of fatal flaw. He came to believe that Freud, in order to have his theories accepted, failed in his pursuit of the truth, hiding his findings and thus deceiving future generations of analysts. It seemed that Freud and psychoanalysis came to represent a corrupt and deceiving Other for Masson, their totality preserved as he went off in search of other ideals.

Those who remain in psychoanalysis can be sure that an ethics proposed by a Lacan is not a protection against corruption or deceit. Power does exist in the institution. It is easy to act in error like a Creon, who identified himself with the law and proposed to act for the good of all. In one way Masson is correct — the sins of the fathers are surely visited on the sons. As analysts we are all implicated in the desires of our analytic forefathers. As speaking beings we are marked by a kind of original sin which results from the installation of desire, that henchman of the splitting of the subject.

However the ethics of desire can indicate a direction which may assist those bearing the heavy responsibility of a psychoanalytic school to sustain a place, not without sin, but with desire, supporting the discourse of psychoanalysis which is the realisation of the desire of the analyst. I propose that what follows from an ethic of desire is that such a place will support the central importance of a personal analysis, freely entered into and protected from the incursions of an institution. This analysis will allow the questioning of desire, making possible but not presupposing the
outcome with respect to analytic formation. Such a place will also support a transference of work beyond the analysis in the form of speaking, reading and writing psychoanalysis. In contrast to waiting for an authorisation from an institution as Other before one can speak in one's own name as an analyst, the authorisation of one's self from one's self will be made possible in a freedom of speech stifled elsewhere. Such a freedom however cannot be a free-for-all. This speech, for those who not only want to, but also can, speak well, may take the form of a passe, testifying to the passage from analysand to analyst in a first moment and in a possible second moment to the taking up of responsibility for the psychoanalytic direction of a school. 'Psychoanalysis teaches', wrote Lacan 'that in the end it is easier to accept interdiction than to run the risk of castration.' An ethic of desire implies that the analyst must face castration rather than accept interdiction and is thus obligated not by the demands of the institution but by the obligation imposed by his own desire.

Notes


Ethics and the Institution

13. Rachman, J.
Psychoanalysis and the Psychiatric Institution

Jane Hopper*

What is the psychiatric institution? It is an organisation established to place or keep persons needing care. The establishment of persons in a cure of souls. Particular laws, customs and practices are essential for the psychiatric institution to exist. Being subject to institutional life means for the patient the submission to the medical discourse of the institution.

In Foucault's paper The Birth of the Asylum he writes that 'from the end of the 18th century the medical certificate becomes almost obligatory for the confinement of madmen.' Within the asylum itself the doctor takes the preponderant place, but his power and intervention is not necessarily made by virtue of a particular medical skill that could be justified by a body of knowledge. He

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...goes on to argue that the medical profession is required in this place as a judicial and moral guarantee.

If the medical personage could isolate madness, it was not because he knew it, but because he mastered it...²

So what is the relationship between psychoanalysis and the psychiatric institution? All psychoanalysis is not the same. There have been many books and papers on this subject published by American psychoanalysts within the ego psychology school, and British psychoanalysts in the object relations tradition. It is clear that their approach is radically different from that of Lacanian psychoanalysis.

It seems to me that in order for psychoanalysis to be psychoanalysis it must ensure that it is working strictly in accordance with its meaning; that is, a listening to the unconscious of the patient – psychotic or otherwise. The psychotic patient in institutional psychiatry is an object to which a predigested learning is applied; there is always a closure, a systematic sewing up – it’s as though he or she is already known. New pharmaceutical treatment may be developed but there is nothing new to learn from the patient. It is not my place to criticise the discourse of institutional psychiatry, however it becomes a problem when psychoanalysis speaks the same language as psychiatry. Surely psychoanalysis should always avow the difference rather than allowing the two to converge.

In a book by the American analyst Thomas Freeman entitled The Psychoanalyst in Psychiatry, we find an argument for a synthesis of psychiatry and psychoanalysis.³ The psychotic’s symptoms are explained in a systematic way biologically and psychologically – he speaks as both a psychiatrist and a psychoanalyst. I would suggest one cannot be both. The American literature suggests a wish for psychoanalysis to become a branch of psychiatry. Perhaps it has already succeeded; the diagnostic categories that psychoanalysis uses seem very close to those of DSM IIIR. If there is an imaginary identification with institutional psychiatry in order to fill the lack and gaps of our knowledge, then presumably it is in order not to listen to the unconscious. For psychiatry that is quite legitimate but for psychoanalysis it is a problem. Freud in his paper On the Question of Lay Analysis wrote:

We do not consider it at all desirable for psychoanalysis to be swallowed up by medicine and to find its last resting place in a textbook of psychiatry.⁴

The object relations school does not identify with the discourse of institutional psychiatry and has a long history of endeavouring to work with psychotic patients in institutions. There is, however, a difficulty in the psychotic patient, who is usually not always the patient of the psychiatric institution, being treated in the way one would work with a neurotic or perverse patient. The psychotic, from the Lacanian point of view, situates himself in relation to language in a different way to the neurotic, which is to say a different structure. In his seminar The Psychoses Lacan says:

By hypothesis, whenever one deals with a disturbance regarded overall as immature, one refers to a linear developmental series derived from the immaturity of the object relation. Now, experience shows that this unilinearity leads to impasses, to inadequate, unmotivated explanations that super-impose themselves on one another in a way that does not enable cases to be differentiated and, first and foremost, obliterate the difference between neurosis and psychosis.⁵

It is not sufficient to listen only to the imaginary axis – that of the little other to ego, to the exclusion of the axis of the Other and the subject. Lacan tells us that:

...it is by proceeding from the subject’s relation to the signifier and to the Other, with the different levels of otherness, imaginary other and symbolic Other, that we can articulate this psychical intrusion, this invasion by the signifier, called psychosis.⁶
It is not enough to point out the failings of other schools of psychoanalysis in relation to the psychiatric institution and the psychotic. One has to say something in relation to one’s own position and address the question of how psychoanalysis can take up the challenge of working in a psychiatric institution and the particular challenge that the psychotic presents.

Psychoanalysis can perhaps represent a limit to the institution. There is no absolute Other – there are always holes, gaps and uncertainty. Psychoanalysis submits not to the Other of the institution but to the speech of the patient. Psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts are not the imperious masters of the unconscious – language belongs to everyone and no one. The known of the medical discourse is the transference of the institution, and the not knowing of the analyst presents a challenge and a limit to the ideal of that transference.

Where does this leave the individual analyst or the one who works in the field of psychoanalysis, in relation to the psychiatric institution? Let us try and see something of the way in which psychoanalysis allows us to pose a limit to knowing and to see the importance of this.

About three years ago, just before I was to leave a psychiatric hospital to take up employment elsewhere, I was asked to see a patient who had recently been admitted to the acute ward on which I worked. Briefly, Richard was a young man of 20, admitted for the first time after his father became increasingly alarmed at what he described as his son’s depression, withdrawal and suicidal thoughts. Richard had been experiencing hallucinations for a few weeks prior to his admission. I met with Richard once or twice a week over the ten week period he was on the ward. For the first seven weeks of his stay Richard had no leave from the ward and it struck me as most unusual for a patient to make no request for weekend leave. Richard had had an older brother much loved and hated by himself who had taken his own life while on weekend leave from the same institution 10 years before. The parents’ marriage dissolved after this son’s death but the battle continued over Richard. While the patient made no demand for leave his parents and staff members talked of nothing else. Which parent was best able to supervise him during the weekend, organise his activities, feed him good food, and watch his every activity? The charge nurse and registrar were preoccupied with watching Richard’s every move on the ward.

The question that seemed to occupy the patient was if there was an opportunity for living a life rather than a death like his brother. The talk by others of weekend leave continued and their words were not lost on this of all patients. It was heard I believe, as a command to follow his brother’s path. This question was formulated in discussions with him and after some time the patient himself made a request for weekend leave. At the ward round I was asked the following question by the charge nurse: ‘Will he be alright if we let him go?’ I replied that I did not know. I was then told that I had been working with Richard for two months – that I must know what would happen. I replied a second time that I thought that he would be okay but that I didn’t know. The psychiatrist agreed to Richard’s request for leave and he returned on the Sunday night after two days leave as planned. Later I wondered why I couldn’t give a firmer guarantee despite a strong demand for me to do so. I think at that moment I was being asked to give what Foucault called a moral guarantee – something I could not do.

What would it have meant for me to give a guarantee; or in other words to identify with the demand of the institution for the Other to be absolute? A way of answering this question is to suggest that the subject in psychosis has a chance as long as one does not give a guarantee. The psychotic comes to the psychiatric institution to escape a tyrannical Other, and is therefore dependent on how the institution situates itself. In the case I briefly outlined, perhaps the subject as being able to live on the weekend is contingent upon the other saying ‘I don’t know.’
Notes

2. Ibid., p. 272.
6. Ibid., p.221.

The Group as Psychic Structure and the Locus of the Symbolic

Rob Gordon*

An institution can be defined as a group whose existence is independent of its members and has vested its existence in forms giving it a status neither psychic nor social, but material. Matter is opaque and retains its nature, as opposed to the protean character of language having no fixed nature in itself under the restless movement of the signifier. Language gains form through a set of relations which reveal the presence of an inherent structuring. The matter of the institution may be in the form of a constitution, procedure, fees, bank account, routine, building, motto, regalia, or even dogma.

The investigation of the institution reveals the dialectic of group life confined and identified by its materiality and then restlessly

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breaking out of it. We begin the study in a non-cartesian place, with the conception that the apparent individual subject is in fact multiple. This dispenses with a unified subject and immediately breaks down the normal group/individual dichotomy. In turn, such a position undermines a positivist perspective of the group as an aggregate of individuals. If the subject is multiple, what then is the group? Not a multiple of unities. A multiple of multiples then? Or a unity of multiples? The apparent multiplicity of the group is at the same time also individual or singular, which contradicts conventional thought just as does the multiplicity of the individual subject. In the language of metaphysics, the group is recognised as an entity, where 'entity' is taken in its meaning as 'a thing's existence as opposed to its qualities or relations; thing that has real existence.' Let us begin with the not too outrageous notion that the group is itself something, and try to find out what sort of thing it is.

The word 'group' was only used with any frequency at the end of the 19th century. In the first half of this century it always indicated large social forms such as nations, classes or interest groups, and only obtained its current meaning of a small face-to-face collection after the Second World War. A 1933 psychological definition of 'group' is:

two or more persons interacting with one another, who share a set of common goals, and norms which direct their activities, and who develop a set of roles and a network of affective relations.

Mutual influence through interaction is emphasised and groups are distinguished from larger entities such as crowds, where reciprocal influence is not possible. Groups are generally viewed as less than 20 or 30 members, and 90 per cent of groups have five or less members. This meaning was unknown before the late 1940s.

However, there was a tradition viewing social forms as entities throughout the last century and into the first quarter of this. However, society itself was the subject of the investigation. This tradition can be broken into three schools.

The first began with Comte, following the catastrophe of the French Revolution, who conceived of society as an organism which, he said, 'is no more decomposable into individuals than a geometric surface is into lines, or a line into points.' The group for Comte was primary. Everything above the level of the purely physiological derived from society. He sought to institute a religion with society as its god, complete with ritual and liturgy.

Herbert Spencer made the organism a metaphor to investigate society as though it were a living being with organs, subject to evolution. This became orthodoxy until sociology became preoccupied with empiricism in the 1930s. The organism metamorphosed into the functionalism of Radcliff-Brown, elaborated by Merton and Parsons. Then the theory encountered General Systems Theory of von Bertalanffy, leading eventually to the speculations of Maturana and Verula on the specific self-creating character of living systems (autopoiesis).

The group in this tradition is part of a continuum of living structures with functionally differentiated parts (organs) and processes of exchange. It is a system in which a set of relations are preserved, giving it an identity and existence distinct from its members. Specialisation of function preserves the group.

The second tradition is crowd psychology, commencing from speculations of criminal psychologists intent on controlling the revolutionary crowds of the 19th century. Sighele, Tarde and Le Bon asserted that the crowd was a collective mind formed by the instinctive coalescence of the common emotions of aroused individuals whose intellect was swept aside by the emergence of the primitive unconscious substrate of their mind. More people were drawn into it by contagion and their passions were expressed in violent and unintelligent acts. The crowd was a primitive psychic creature. The moral undertone of this analysis was based on an elitist, conservative perspective.

Trotter postulated a herd instinct and developed a psychology of the group incorporating primitive crowd behaviour and general
social psychology. He analysed the herd characteristics of the nations involved in the First World War in 1917, and accurately predicted its outcome and the consequences for Europe of a peace involving punitive reparations on Germany. These still hold good to the present.

Crowd psychology lost scientific credibility under the onslaught of American behaviouristic empiricism, and fell into political disfavour. Mussolini travelled with a copy of Le Bon wherever he went, and Hitler used his terms and techniques in manipulating the masses. But some of the principles continue to be discussed including suggestion, imitation, and the dissociation of consciousness up to the present. The group as crowd is formed from a pervasive, unpredictable identification which responds to the image and prestige of its leaders in a subservient or domineering way. It is incapable of reasoning and always acts against some other to ensure its continued existence.

The third tradition derives from Hegel, who described Spirit as universal mind out of which individual mind was formed by the agency of family and nation. Spirit was a being, 'actual and alive' which preceded the individual. It was a continuity resolved into discrete elements, having a consciousness for itself. Individual activity rends this universal substance, dividing it and creating opposition between individual and universal. This formed the basis for a view of the existence of a social or group mind, in opposition to the individual mind.

First postulated by George Elliot's defacto Henry Lewes in 1879, the social mind was espoused in various forms by a succession of sociologists including Cooley, George Mead, McDougall and Durkheim. According to this thesis, the individual mind is created and maintained by a pervasive social mentality which supplies a common content to all members of a society, and is as essential to human existence as nature. The common content of language, sentiments, logical categories and values, and the burden of prejudice and superstition function as a coherent mental system allowing the individual mind to function within its framework, but imposing limitations on it. The social mind is added to by the individual's.

Cooley rejects Cartesianism to establish this idea: 'Most of our reflective consciousness...is social consciousness... self and society are twin born...the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion.' Mead emphasises the function of language constituting group structures and founding mentality. Consciousness itself has a social basis as the product of a universe of discourse within a group. The self is, 'an eddy in the social current...the 'I' and the 'me'...becomes then part of the whole social current.' Durkheim derives the categories of thought itself, such as space, time, number, from social reality as ritualised in collective social situations. Social form is the material presentation of collective mental structure. But unlike the crowd mentality formed by identification and the loss of already existing personal mentality, the social mind is the matrix for the formation and maintenance of the individual minds. It logically pre-exists it.

It was unfortunate that McDougall's more naive and moralistic account (whose purpose was to lift the morale of Britain after the First World War) became the most influential in psychology. He notes the role of language in forming a collective mentality which structures society. These ideas are dismissed as a historical curiosity unworthy of serious criticism, and in the 1940s and 1950s, the collective fell into disrepute because both communists and fascists had placed the group above the interests of the individual, who was readily sacrificed for the state.

Freud had a crucial role in demolishing these ideas in 'Group Psychology' (actually 'Mass Psychology'), demonstrating the bonds of identification and idealisation which bind the members of large groups together and the discovery of the superego. This re-centred the discussion and placed the focus firmly within the subject, as though explaining the 'internal processes' in a group situation, accounted for the social world. It defended the doctrine of the drive and demonstrated the futility of postulating new 'instincts' to solve conceptual problems. But Freud based his
description on the large institutional group (the army and the church), and his formulations account for the materiality of the institution, which was to be expressed as well as anywhere in his own international association. But this account, relying on the remoteness and love bond with the leader, does not do justice to the modern group with its small size and interactive process.

To summarise: The organism tradition defines a structure that gives the group a coherence of function which can be regarded as its corpus, and provides the basis for group process and interaction. The individual is subject to this system and can only be understood by reference to the whole organism. The crowd is constituted by imitation, suggestion, dissolution of individual consciousness and the eruption of unconscious drives. Its members are caught in an imaginary identification which orders all action in the same terms. Individuals are submerged in a collective mentality which designates them as anything other than particles of the crowd. The social mind theory describes a psychic continuity which is constituted by language and supports the individual as a differentiation within it and provides the social and cultural structures for a dialectic between the individual and the group.

The terms of an investigation into the nature of groups should be neither an opposition of entity-quality, nor of single-multiple. Nor should they rely too heavily on the materiality of the body as the key signifier, since it perpetrates the fiction that there is a psychic unit corresponding only to a corporeal unit. This reduces the group to a multiple of unities. We may do better replacing the preponderance of the individual with the materiality of the group as it becomes an institution, in which members may become the system’s ‘organs’, the ‘psychic flesh’ of the crowd, or constitute a culture of common psychic (social) representations.

Such a shift of emphasis means that the notion of unity-multiplicity disappears as the reference point and is replaced with a network of intersecting relations where the multiples (subjects) of the unity (group) find themselves organised by the image of the body as it exists in the group in the form of common identificatory elements

of an imaginary order, and by a symbolic system of cultural and psychic content. These, however, are always interrupted by the real as the intrusions of the surrounding world on the group, or of the individual acting in his or her own right as non-member. The body, as a term to define reality for the members and regulate their interactions, is at odds with the psychic order of the group, where boundaries are a function of something other than flesh. Thus the discussion of the actuality of a collective entity is related to where the body is placed, or how to signify it in its relation to the collective. It is a material aspect and forms a system of terms based largely upon its appearance and also its functions (not the least of which may be sexuality); fashion, ritual, etc. provide an imaginary structure for the group (but there can be fashions and rituals of the mind as well).

The group appears to itself when the members are assembled together and the multiplicity becomes an imaginary unit. The members are undifferentiated and crowd psychology emerges. The crowd as unity appears as metaphors of river, sea, crop, sand, as Canetti28 describes. Once differentiation occurs within the group, crowd psychology subsides, the imaginary unit is rent, and the body becomes the basis for group relations based on interaction between the members. The group then becomes a place where a tension between the personal/unique and the social/stereotypic is formed.

The body as personal/individual is marked by differences of shape, form, colour, movement, and forms the basis for personal identity. But it is also marked by the adornments and stigmata of stereotypes which reduce uniqueness and submit it to group prescriptions. These show the body is not just the member’s, but it also belongs to the group, as indicated by initiation rites, circumcision, fashion, etc. The body is at first only grasped in the imaginary of the group because it has no significance for it as a whole, rather as the bearer of signs related to the identity of the group.

The body can also be transposed into the institutional materiality of the group where this exists in the form of teachings or ideas about
corpoREAL persons, as a methodology or praxis which depends on the body, or as history in terms of what has been done. In either of these forms the body is constituted as imaginary, and in turn constitutes an imaginary group. At its extreme, the imaginary group presents a relation between the individual in his body and the rest of the group as an undifferentiated unit in which their separateness recedes and becomes evidence of the presence of the group. At moments of imaginary capture, each member can reveal a fantasy that he or she alone is opposed to the rest who constitute 'the group', yet no one feels a part of this mythical structure. The imaginary is the domain of group dynamics, where the changing relations and tensions of the interactions of the members is followed.

The body is also a signifier. But in order to be so, it is set aside in its materiality, and the signs of difference and similarity based on it become part of a system of terms that makes signifiers of them too. Then they are placed within the group structure, rather than posing a threat to it. The more the body recedes as object in itself and partakes in the arbitrariness of the signifier, the more it emerges from the imaginary. Each member in so far as he or she has a body, becomes a signifier which intersects multiple chains of associations. The members are like a battery of signifiers; and if a signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier, as Lacan has often said, then in the group perhaps the member represents the group for another member, and allows it to never be found. At this point a symbolic order is constituted for the group.

In the determination of the subject, it can easily be forgotten that everyone lives in multiple group memberships, and that the human subject is the creative product of these groups, rather than groups being formed by the association of ready-made, complete individuals who proceed to interact. We belong to multiple interlocking social structures which may be fluid, but are structures nonetheless. The person is like the signifier, which shifts, but still being linked by chains, is bound by laws. We do not create social structure, nor do we 'acquire socialisation' (in spite of the reassurances of empirical social psychology), rather we are born into society, are subject to it, move within it and use it, and stamp our own tiny signature on it before we depart leaving it intact without us. The subject is received into social structures which preexist him, permeate the position he will occupy with a set of relations before he attains it, and outlive him long after he has left it; he is inserted into a system and every part of his being is structured. In this way, we see the subject's relation to the group reveals itself to be the same as to language.

Lacan pointed out that language is Procrustean. It fits the subject to it. So is the group. Like language, which cannot be reduced to the aggregate of its speakers, group as psychic structure cannot be reduced to the individuals who are its members. Language is not the function of a dyadic relation. Although we know it as the structuring force of the human subject and the unconscious, it is also the unifying or constituting function of a group, which can be defined as a community of speakers. A dyadic language is no more signifying than a private language such as a celebrated pair of autistic twins had, or the verbal intercourse of the imaginary relation of lovers.

But what does this tell us of the relation of the group to language? Can we, as Freud was fond of saying, 'try our luck' with the formula: The group (or even society) is structured like a language. If we examine this in relation to a society and a language, both can be seen as formations existing for a time in human history, like stationary wave patterns, actualised by subjects moving in and out of them in a constant stream. The moment there is no one to speak a language or occupy a group, it ceases to exist except in the symbolic of history.

The group allows language to become speech. If language would never have become communicated speech, or speech would not become language, both would remain imaginary. The symbolic is not the same as speech or language, but access to it is gained through speech and within language. But where else could language exist if not in the group?

If there was no group, speech could have no independent life. The relation has to be grasped synchronically to avoid the stasis of
myth, which reduces structures to an event or narrative in an undefined past. The group provides the material support and boundaries for the language, while the language constitutes the group as a psychic structure. Any group spontaneously develops its own language or perhaps dialect of a language, identifying it to itself and other groups. But as a system of signifiers, language can embrace any or all the signifiers of the group including custom, fashion, history, ritual etc.

The symbolic as a network of signifying ideas allows for the development of what can best be described as culture. But this culture, on examination, becomes indistinguishable from the members' own minds, since it is the milieu in which they grasp themselves. The symbolic creates a mentality in which they can grasp themselves and their world. For that is the function of a group when all is said and done - a group is always a means of providing a mentality for the subject, even if in doing so, it restricts the kind of mentality possible to a particular one, not an abstract mentality, just as Lacan pointed out that there is no meta-language, only concrete languages.21 Language constitutes it as a tool -- the mind (as Mead showed) is bestowed by the group culture as represented in the specificity of a member (as organ). But the culture as described and as constituting a 'social mind' of the group is not the same as the symbolic, but rather its support. Could we perhaps say its material basis?

The locus of the symbolic is not 'inside the subject', because as Lacan describes, the subject is best represented by a crosscut plane in which one cut does not divide into two separate parts, inside and outside, but as in the Moebius strip, inside and outside are two places in a topology that maintains its form when cut.22 If there are only circumstances in which things are represented in different ways, there is no inside or outside for the symbolic, only continuities and gaps, by which the subject is constituted. They may be placed in a relation to the signifiers of the body, the social relation and the representation of things in the mind as different relations to the term 'I'. Or they may be imaginary constructions based on what can and cannot be seen or imagined by the subject.

Nor is the locus of the symbolic in the relations which bind the subject to other members into a corpus called group. These are imaginary structures -- identifications and idealisations -- which emerge from the real of social intercourse and constitute the content of 'group dynamics.' The interactions that actualise them have an imaginary power for the subjects engaged in them, but it is only for the group as a whole that they can be seen as something more.

The locus of the symbolic is integral to the existence of group since it is founded on the 'No' of the Law, which constitutes the primal boundary of the social structure and provides the context in which both subject, other and relationship are related to 'group' and take on the same integrity as 'member-ship' -- i.e. being part of something beyond me which confers meaning on me by virtue of my being a part of it. The first meaning of 'member' is part of the body, from the Latin 'membrum' -- limb.23

Hence the locus of the symbolic is the domain of the group itself. It is a place constituted by the symbolic in which relations can form, and makes possible 'a law' which is concrete, contingent and related to specific circumstances and specific others. The law of the signifier with its chaining relations, creates the possibility of language, and the law of language creates the possibility of the subject. This supports the symbolic and the imposition of the symbolic creates the subject. But the imaginary, although not actually breaking the law -- that would be chaos and meaninglessness -- moves outside it in its reliance on the mythical specificity of the image that can be framed in any sensory modality or in any domain of experience.

Thus the symbolic is a constitutive function. In the group, it creates a set of relations that are not uniquely bounded to the identity of the particular members. But as represented in the mind of each, it enables members to be situated as particular others who are different, heteronomous, yet belong, and from this bond a common other is constituted as a signifier. The formation of a group requires the creation of an other of the group -- a common other, confronting each member.
Whereas the social mind theories see mind as created by the group via the agency of language, Lacan sees the emergence of the subject occur just at the point where a lack is demonstrated. This lack is a rent in the fabric of the continuity of social mind, of spirit, to use Hegel’s term, which is the birth of the object a. While Hegel and Mead look for the creative production of the individual mind at the site of this rent, Lacan characteristically looks into the rent itself. He confronts the absence, which for him becomes something. It is the deformations and the holes of the social fabric which concern the formation of the subject.

The subject emerges to the extent that a symbolic order is attained. But in the group this is occluded by the materiality of the institution whose function is to take away exactly the chance of a hole or lack and therefore deprive the group of the opportunity to become a place in which subjects can come to be. Or the group may make a non-institutional flight from the lack which threatens the fabric of the social mind. Then it takes refuge in imaginary relations which maintain a mythical continuity and consistency at the price of expelling or ostracising its inconsistencies.

It is the relation of the group and the Other of the unconscious that define the subject. For the group, the Other in the first instance is not another group, because the group is inherently narcissistic; only members relate to another group. For the group, the Other is itself (perhaps the imaginary group when it is symbolic, and symbolic group when it is imaginary and perhaps always the real group). Mapping the group in the symbolic enables the relation with the Other to form. The institution materialises this Other as a demand which is implacable and masquerades under the form of the primal demand to keep the group alive, to expand it, to avoid it deteriorating and dying.

The starting point for this is always the question whether each member considers the others in a category of ‘self’ or ‘other’, where ‘other’ is seen as threat to the group. Lacan has said that the symbolic is founded in a binary relation which can be + or - presence or absence, same or different, accept or reject, in or out. This is a consistency which can define a law.

The binary relation in the group is self/other. Is a member identified as member and part of the organism by virtue of suffering a corresponding reduction in his own identity; or is he identified as alien, an intrusion disrupting the identity on which it is founded and hence exposes it as imaginary? If he is member, he is accepted and incorporated, if other, he is in danger of being rejected as scapegoat, to remain in the perpetual role of other in the vicinity of the group.

These terms structure the group as a collective scene and provide a set of logical positions through which members can move. They constitute a matrix describing the group in terms of the relation the member has to the defining characteristics of the group on one axis, and the relation to the group itself and other members on the other. This matrix can then be differentiated into two - one imaginary and one symbolic. Or rather the same set of relations can be constituted as imaginary terms based on the image of the body and the signs of similarity and differences, or they can be constituted as a set of signifiers which form a system locating members in relation to each other and the group.

Grasped at the level of the imaginary, the matrix concerns the identification of whether the crucial characteristics are present as body signs, or psychic representations. This determines whether the person is member or other and consequently is accepted or rejected by the group and it becomes crowd and mass psychology, leading to fused affect and group action aimed at eradicating the other. This matrix is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAVE</th>
<th>HAVE NOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCEPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REJECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1. The matrix of the imaginary group.
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If the group forms a symbolic order in terms that define location and difference, instead of provoking affects and antagonisms, the matrix of relations is defined in terms of sameness and difference on one axis, and inclusion or exclusion, belonging or not on the other axis. This matrix is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAME</th>
<th>DIFFERENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IN (belong)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUT (not belong)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| HOMONYMOUS | HETERONYMOUS |

Fig 2. The matrix of the symbolic group

This is a matrix of position in relation to the group and has the possibility of tolerance for difference in members without them having to be expelled. It constitutes a system in which lack and absence are incorporated and can lead to the development of a group culture which may allow the movement from imaginary to symbolic.

These sets of relations can constitute body, language and group either as image or as signifier. Yet when the group loses its innocence and, in the hope of ensuring its continuing life, becomes burdened with the materiality of being an institution, they cease to be synonymous with the relations of the members and become saturated with the 'otherness' of social matter. The group takes on a life independent of its members, which is the incorporation of death. The institution always runs the risk that it will institute a continuity to mask or expel the rent which allows the imaginary to be interrupted and forms the conditions for the group to live in the shifting uncertainty of the symbolic. Then the restlessness of the signifiers becomes the restless movement of the members and the inevitable rupture, leading to the formation of a new group where the members have another opportunity to become.

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**Notes**


2. Anzieu, Didier.  

3. Harre, Rom, and Lamb, Roger.  

4. Quoted in Nesbit, Robert A.  

5. Spencer, Herbert  


7. Maturana, Humberto R., and Verula, Francisco J.  

8. McLelland, J. S.  

9. Tarde, Gabriel.  

10. Le Bon, Gustave.  

11. Trotter, W.  


19. Freud, S. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, St. Ed., Vol. XVIII.*


22. Ibid., p.192.

23. Ibid.

Reverencing the Letter or the Stopping of the Lacanian Movement

Nati Sangiau*

Rudolph Panwitz in his work *The Crisis of European Culture* has the following to say about the art of translation – translation as a generic term, as I chose to read it, for all human endeavour which dares approach the limits which mark the starting line for invention, for creation, for putting a transference to work beyond the limits of an identification with an ideal. Rudolph Panwitz says:

Our translations (referring to translations into German) even the best ones, proceed from a wrong premise. They want to turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of turning German into Hindi, Greek, English. Our translators have a far greater reverence for the usage of their own language than for the spirit of the foreign

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works...The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be, instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue...He must expand and deepen his language by means of the foreign language.

It is not generally realised to what extent this is possible, to what extent any language can be transformed, how language differs from language almost the way dialect differs from dialect; however, this last is true only if one takes language seriously enough, not if one takes it lightly.'

The experience of working with the seminars of Jacques Lacan is an experience which, above all I think, inspires a taking of language seriously, very seriously.

Jacques Lacan was a polyglot of the highest order both literally in that he had a working knowledge of many languages, and also in his taste for all the languages of both the humanities and the sciences. It would seem that in this he did not bow down, did not reverence any language – for him there were no 'holy of holies', no untranslatables – he took what he found to be of service from wherever he ventured, and that was far and wide: from classical to modern literature, from linguistics, philosophy, mathematics, theology, the fine arts and the not so fine as well. He found and translated what was of service in his unrelenting engagement with psychoanalysis: psychoanalysis as a praxis – that is in practice and in theory. The one making the other, the other informing the one. Here we are not dealing with a praxis that makes perfect, but rather with a praxis which makes for more praxis.

The rhythm, the spirit, the structure of this relationship between a practice and a theory – where both parts are always in the making – brings to my mind what must be one of the great poems in the English language: John Donne's *A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning* – one might subtitle it: 'On how to come to enjoy an absence, a loss'.

Lacan makes a brief comment on the metaphysical poets, Donne being one of the most admired, in Seminar 17² – he says that he finds their poetry interesting, but that he cannot understand why they are called by that name: 'metaphysical'. This comment is just in that there is no 'meta' aspect to them – unless, I propose to you, the 'meta' is to stand for love – 'love' as the metaphor for movement – movement as conceived of around Lacan's postulation of the object little a – the object which is the measure of the potential of the entropy of the more to come.

A potential which is postulated as the surplus, or left over of the failed repetition which marks the divided subject. A left-over which may be harnessed towards the reverential bowing, as it were, to the object of identification, a reverencing which acts as plug, as cover, as a stop to a movement; or a left-over which may be directed towards translation, invention, love.

John Donne's poem reads as follows:

*A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning*

As virtuous men passe mildly away, and whisper to their soules, to goe, whilst some of their sad friends doe say, the breath goes now, and some say, no:

So let us melt, and make no noise, no teare-floods, nor sigh-tempests move, for t'were prophanation of our joyes to tell the luyete our love.

Moving of th' earth brings harms and feares, Men reckon what it did and meant, But trepidation of the spheres, Though greater farre, is innocent.

Dull sublunary lovers love (whose soule is sense) cannot admit Absence, because it doth remove Those things which elemented it.
But we by a love, so much refin’d, that our selves know not what it is, Inter-assured of the mind, Care lesse, eyes, lips, and hands to misse.

Our two soules therefore, which are one, Though I must goe, endure not yet A breach, but an expansion, Like gold to ayery thinnesse beate.

If they be two, they are two so as stiffe twin compasses are two, Thy soule the fixt foot, makes no show To move, but doth, if the ‘other doe.

And though it in the centre sit, Yet when the other far doth rome, It leans, and hearkens after it, And growes erect as that comes home.

Such wilt though be to mee, who must Like th’other foot, obliquely runne; Thy firmness drawes my circle just, And makes me end, where I begunne.

The argument of Donne’s poem is not a convincing one in its content, but it is convincing, very convincing in its movement. A movement which is a coming to pass of something other than mourning. The pass is through the interdiction and on into the movement of love, love such as Lacan defines it in writing that it is a giving of what one doesn’t have to someone who is not.

Such wilt thou be to mee, who must Like th’other foot, obliquely runne; Thy firmness drawes my circle just, And makes me end, where I begunne.

The end is in the beginning and the beginning is in the end. The movement of the poem enacts, as it were, the shattering of the phantasm of a possible union. It is the rendering impossible of this union which allows for the possibility of a ‘a leaning, and hearken’ after it. This is a poem about desire, but desire not of the mistress, but rather desire of desire; desire to ‘lean and hearken after it’, desire whose paradoxical trajectory in the poem begins with the enigma of death and ends with the enigma of love, love as a never-ending start.

The object little a begs the very question of translation of movement – we translate ‘objet petit’ to ‘object little’ – but the ‘a’ is written as ‘a’ be it in French or in English – it is the ‘a’ of algebra, it is a writing in the Real. Lacan works with this concept in multiple ways, the ‘a’ is defined or worked around in many different fields. Essentially, it is postulated as an effect of discourse, hence a product BUT a product which is also the cause of that product. In Seminar 16 ‘From One big Other to an other’ Lacan gives us a potted history as it were of his conceptualisation of the object little a. He points out that he owes a great deal to Marx and his postulation of the ‘value plus’ of work. Marx calls it, in German, ‘Ehrlust’. Lacan produces a somewhat cunningly punning translation of this and arrives at his ‘mère verte’ – that is ‘green mother’. ‘Mère’ – ‘mother’ because of the homophony between ‘mehr’ and ‘mère’ and then the ‘verte’ or ‘green’ because green is the colour which represents lust in the French tradition. A ludicrous, a most unorthodox translation one might well say – but one most apt in making a connection with Freud’s phallic mother. The mother who never was, but never stops to not be able to be written.

The ‘a’ is everywhere in Lacan’s work, it is never stopped. In topology it is there as the bottle of Klein. This being most intimately related to Lacan’s working or, to put it more aptly, to his translation, of the Names-of-the-Father. At the heart, or hole, of this working is the proposition, put forth on various occasions, Seminar 16 being but one, that the just translation of how the God of the Jews names himself is not the commonly accepted ‘I am who is’ BUT rather ‘I am what I is’. This, once it is translated in this way, is the pivotal opening for our questioning of the nature of the
subject. The subject as that which one signer signifies for another signer. Hence a subject which is never stopped, a subject always fading, always coming into doubt. A doubt which allows, which more than allows, which makes the question 'Does God Exist?' a question which takes on its full importance or weight when it is recognised to be supported by a more fundamental structure, 'to wit' Lacan asks 'there in the place of knowledge, can we say that somehow knowledge knows itself...or is it (the it referring to the question) opened from its very structure?' By way of answering his own question, Lacan leads us back towards the bottle of Klein again, again back to the object little a – he says 'it is here that the object a is the hole which is designated at the level of the big Other, that as such, is questioned by us in its relation with the subject'.

This can be translated, I propose to you, and to translate is not to simplify by any means, this can be translated into the proposition that translation pers se is possible; our only possibility one might say as divided subjects – divided and hence questioning, doubting. The question arises 'Does God Exist?' It is the object a that does the doing as it were, 'l'a cause' as Lacan puts. Equivocation is the name of the game – God exists by the very posing of the question – Does God exist? Equivocation sustained by doubt. Doubt, not knowledge. Lacan writes that 'Knowledge is the enjoyment of the Other'. But in translating this question 'Does God Exist', in working it ourselves, not by proxy, not by putting it in the hands of the experts, the ministers of knowledge, in working it ourselves – in theory and in practice – we experience the anguish and the enjoyment, and some pleasure too, in the movement which we never stop to not be able to write. A is a never ending start. A is the grace of the God which we never cease to not invent in a work whose rigour is sustained by its own grace.

The possible relations between the object a and the subject which Lacan writes as ($\circ a$) is what he calls the formula for the phantasm. The $\circ$ is the divided subject – the subject of discourse whose product, the object a, as object of reverence in its many semblances, or names, can act as a cover, a plug; OR the product which can pass into becoming a cause – its own cause in the making. If it is translated as object of reverence, semblance of a whole, it stops, it renders movement impossible, translation impossible – it is what it is – it lacks nothing, wants of nothing, cannot become other than what it is; but if the a is put to work as semblance of a hole then we are in business, then psychoanalysis in practice and in theory is rendered impossible and hence workable. An analysis can come to its end, and a theory can continue to not stop being able to not be written. And that is how it comes about that for an analyst the movement goes from theory to practice to theory, etc., that is how the word gets around! Around the a.

But there is not object a for everyone. This becomes most lucidly clear in the case of some whose structure is psychotic – that is for whom the difference between the one of identification 'L'Un' and what is left over, what is left to make the subject as divided, as desiring, as driven by the inertia of failed repetition, is very small. The repetition in the case of one patient who comes to mind, was a repetition which almost nearly made it. This man I speak of had been diagnosed as manic depressive – and that is how he spoke of himself – colouring - in the nature of his two possibilities by saying that when he was depressed he 'felt dead' and when manic was when he attempted death, suicide. Not much space, the trace of failed repetition, there. Rather a dramatic portrayal like a tightly choreographed dance in which the shadow of the object falls over the I, a shadow with but a hint of penumbra. This man had almost, almost nearly made it. In such a case, a case which invites translation – it being so close and yet so far from the language of the neurotic and hence as Panwitz suggests in his thesis, the sort of translation which is most fruitful in the enrichment of one's own language – in such a case, there is not enough failure to constitute a space for the subject – space for the subject to lose itself in order to then be able to set out in search of itself – a search which is both object and cause of desire, of movement.
Being in Love and Psychoanalysis: On Reading Lacan

David Pereira*

With an outline of what his style is not, in his Seminar, Transference, Lacan begins a reading of Plato's Symposium; a text which does more than flirt with the subject of love.

...we are going to have to proceed using a form which is obviously not the one that would be used in what could be called a university style commentary.

He continues:

On the other hand I do not object to, and I even believe that one must highlight a certain rawness, newness, in approaching a text like that of the Symposium...It seems to

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me that someone who reads the *Symposium* for the first time, if he is not absolutely dulled by the fact that it is a text belonging to a respectable tradition, can hardly fail to experience a feeling which can be described more or less as being stunned. I would say more: if he had a little historical imagination it seems to me that he must ask himself how such a thing could have been preserved for us throughout what I would be happy to call the generations of scribblers, of monks, of people who do not seem to have been destined to transmit something to us...²

What Lacan notes here concerning the *Symposium* is surely pertinent to the question of his own style and its transmission. This is quite important for us today as readers of Lacan grappling with established and un-established, published and un-published, translated and un-translated texts.

Let us address the question of what it means to read with style by exploring the relation between Lacan's style and the question of love. First, how might we conceive of this style?

Every return to Freud that occasions a teaching worthy of the name will be produced by way of a path by which the most hidden truth manifests itself in the revelations of culture. This path is the only training that we could claim to transmit to those who follow us. It is called: style.³

This is written by Lacan in *Psychoanalysis and its teaching* in *Ecrits*, that collection of writings which were made not to be read. Lacan's references to the question of style presents us with the problem of reading, and specifically of reading Lacan. The 'made not to be read' bears upon the question of a conventional reading as established, supported and authorised by the institution – a psychoanalytic movement for example. The 'made not to be read' is a defiance of a conventional reading.

Lacan, then, is 'made not to be read'...according to the conventions of reading. It is important to situate Lacan within this context if something of the importance of style is to be transmitted; if a reading of Lacan can continue to question the place of the reader and the subject of that reading. It is this that the teaching of Lacan, whether the writings or the seminars, provoke. Anyone who has attempted to read Lacan will be aware of this provocation. There is a difficulty with regard to the complexity of the concepts, yes, but more profoundly, a difficulty of the style. It is this style, however, which is of the utmost importance in relation to the Lacanian renovation of the Freudian discovery.

Now Lacan was more than aware of the obstacle to reading him; it was not simply a question of the density of his style. Indeed, we might see the density of his style as an attempt to deal with this particular and insidious obstacle; something he had seen, something he had read in the history of psychoanalysis – 'the thing called love.' Love as predicated upon, and productive of, a possession of and friendship with the text afforded by proximity to the master.

It is in the Seminar of 1973 – *Encore* – that Lacan complains that he is better read by his critics than by his students. What is implicated is this 'thing called love.'

> He whom I suppose to know, I love...When I say they hate me, what I mean is that they de-suppose me of knowledge.

> And why not indeed? Why not, if it transpires that it is the precondition of what I call a reading?...Such is the condition of a strict test of reading, and it is the one condition I do not let myself off.⁴

The problem of reading becomes a problem of love. Simple, we do as Lacan suggests – we renounce love and read with hate. Or, should be interrogate him on this point? This is, after all, the same Lacan who, in the same Seminar, raises the question of from where it might be possible to speak of love; the same Lacan who says that the only thing he can write with any seriousness is a love letter. In his criticism we, as Australian readers, might read the fact that...
when a love letter arrives from abroad – in this case from France – it can function as a contraceptive to transmission; this is to say, impede the fertility of the effects of a discourse.

There is then, a problem of love, but also an unconvincing suggestion regarding reading with hate. This notion of de-supposition needs to be taken further if one needs to be more than a hateful critic to qualify as a reader. We need not ponder this for very long to realise, in any case, that hate is the other side of the same coin; that whether with hate or with love, the reading is paid for with the same currency.

There is something to be worked here. If the writing made not to be read questions a conventional reading, then the love at play in the supposing of a knowledge, the love Lacan poses as an obstacle to reading, is a conventional, let us say, limited love which by no means exhausts the field of love.

Lacan’s concern about the ‘thing called love’ is already expressed by Freud in his study of Mass Psychology. In the chapter titled ‘Being in Love and Hypnosis’ Freud notes that in the state of being in love there is an over-valuation of the object which enjoys a certain freedom from criticism. The fate of the ego is linked with submission; the lover is mastered by the beloved through the vehicle of love. Freud notes that it is a short step from being in love to hypnosis which contains the additional element of paralysis which saps the subject’s initiative – ‘paralysis derived from the relation between someone with superior power and someone who is without power and helpless.’

Lacan’s concern is with the ‘hypnotic symptom’ in the psycho-analytic group; the love and loyalty attached to his person, the lack of criticism, the paralysis and lack of initiative, all of which contributed to his School being rendered an institution.

What is supported, then, by the function of this conventional or partial love is the function of a master who occupies the place of the ideal, paralysing the subject’s initiative and capacity for creativity – impeding a fertility of thought and action. I will remind you again, in all seriousness, of what we derived as the contraceptive implications of a love letter from abroad – France; implications which bear directly upon the problem of love in reading Lacan.

To set upon the track of something of what is beyond this limiting love, a love story; a love story told by Lacan in his Seminar, Transference.

...the little eros whose malice first struck the first, Breuer, with the suddenness of his surprise, forced him to flee, the little eros finds his master in the second, Freud...Over against Breuer, for whatever reason, Freud took the step that made him the master of the R-doubtable little god. He chooses, like Socrates, to serve him in order to make use of him. Here indeed is the point where problems are going to begin for all of us. Again it is indeed a question of underlining this ‘making use of eros.’ And to make use of it for what purpose?

Now, Breuer produces a conventional reading of love. His reading, quite likely – we are told – because of the prejudice introduced by his own love, attributes an object to this love; an object of partial love which keeps the whole thing at the level of demand. Convention then demands that Breuer flees. Despite his mobility, Breuer is paralysed in relation to his act. He is caught in the lure of love, in the lure of a reading, but is unable, unlike Freud, to make use of it, to take it further. He remains within the confines of a conventional, partial love, being reluctant to ‘sound the mystery too deeply’ thus obscuring an encounter with desire.

This partial love which we propose as an obstacle to an unconventional reading is seen at work here in the very origins of psychoanalysis. It is insofar as Freud was able to read love unconventionally, not so much impartially, but as transcending partial love, that psychoanalysis was able to advance; this is to say,
not to flee in the face of the horror of its own discovery. While Breuer takes flight, Freud submits himself to eros in such a way as to make use of it; a submission, then, different to that proposed in *Being in Love and Hypnosis*. A submission essential to the possibility of a reading that is worthy of the name.

It is in the direction of a love which de-supposes that we are being pointed, if we only know how to read it. The direction of a specific vicissitude of love as unconventional and not partial or limited.

In his Seminar, *Transference*, in a working of Plato’s *Symposium*, Lacan points to the discourse of Socrates as a means of moving to another register concerning the question of love; a means of exceeding the limits of a partial love. You may remember that Socrates is one who tells us that he knows nothing, except to be able to recognise what love is and tell us. Now, Socrates occupies a position – even if it is not a position – not unlike Freud and not unlike Lacan – which allows him to know and tell something of love. It is a position which is outside the constraints of convention – outside that which is endorsed by the establishment, by the institution. It is Socrates *atopia* – the fact that ‘in everything which assures the equilibrium of the city, not only does Socrates not have a place, he is nowhere.’ He is outside what is classifiable, what is taken inventory of.

The function of this *atopia* is vital to the movement of psychoanalysis; from Freud’s ‘splendid isolation’ through Lacan’s ‘excommunication’ from an international association, to the problem that any international association poses for both the future of Lacanian psychoanalysis and any reading of Lacan capable of exceeding the limits of a partial love and the ‘hypnotic symptom’.

In the *Symposium* there is noted to be a difficulty saying anything about love which accounts for itself. The Socratic discourse, at a certain point, finds a limit when it is a question of love as partial or conventional love. How does Socrates move his discourse beyond this limit of love? Let us start with Socrates’ refusal of Alcibiades’ demand for Socrates to reveal his desire as a sign – as a partial

love. In his refusal, Socrates allows a passage from love as partial to the metonymy of desire, and this is where the story of love begins – really begins – in throwing the whole thing onto the axis of desire. Socrates’ refusal to make of love a sign is surely a significant precedent for what is at play when Lacan criticises his students. Lacan’s style may be read, as noted earlier, as a refusal under the sway of the demand for love to offer a supposed knowledge as a sign, as a scrap to be satisfied with; a morsel of knowledge with which one might satsify oneself.

The shift Socrates introduces is essential to his method, to his discourse; a shift which allows a movement from the object as *epainos* (circumscribed) to *encomion* (eccentric) which allows Socrates to raise the question of whether love is a love of something or of nothing. What is at play is an *atopic* of desire as metonymic, presenting an infinite discourse as forever revealing. Such a desire is a necessary support for a reading.

In the encounter with the Other as the locus of a knowledge, a sign of that knowledge is demanded – a correlate of the demand for love. The refusal precipitates a movement from partial love or knolwedge as a sign, to the level of the signifier – a signifier which emerges in the place where a signifier lacks in the place of the Other as locus of the word, as text. So, the refusal pushes us to the point of an encounter with a lack in the text – the text as absolute Other – and produces a point of discordance.

On the emergence of this signifier hinges the birth of the subject of a reading in relation to the real presence of desire. This subject of a reading is not one which exists prior to a reading, but a subject produced in relation to such an encounter with the text. Lacan notes that his Seminar had effects, and that he himself was an effect of a discourse which subjected him in dispossessing him in the moment of its utterance. The colonisation, conquest and possession of the Lacanian teaching, impedes the effects of Lacan’s discourse.

We might derive from this the following conclusion. The subject of what we are calling a reading is contingent upon the emergence of
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towards an examination of the signifier of which a limitless love is the correlate and then 'interrogating the signifier about its consistency as signifier.' In the discourse of Socrates this is marked by a shift through which the eromenos (the beloved) becomes the eromenon (the one interrogated).

Now, I think we are drawing closer to this question of the love involved in a reading with, rather than against, style. A love founded upon the very consistency of the signifier as such.

In Lacan’s reading of the Symposium there is at issue a fundamental topology which prevents there being said about love anything which hangs together. There is something of a fundamental discordance. This topology, this discordance, is demonstrated in relation to the topology of the signifier in its primary instance – that which is its material support, if you will. The function of the signifier is presented in the topological figure of the inverted eight. This figure conceives of the paradox that a signifier insofar as it is used to signify itself has to be posed as different to itself. Such a presentation is intended by Lacan to impede any limiting usage of the signifier, insofar as through it, a limited field cannot be identified by the pure and simple One of the sphere. So, the signifier, in its primary instance, impedes that limiting usage which affords a self-possession. There is necessarily produced somewhere, from the fact that the signifier redoubles itself – is summoned to the function of signifying itself – a field which is one of exclusion – atopia – out of which the subject emerges.

Now, the style of Lacan’s text is one which supports such a tension and force of movement of the signifier. And, it is precisely such a movement which is impeded by the One of partial love – the Sphairos of eros as definitive of the unifying function of love.

Whilst the One of love produces a concordant and conventional reading as a dialect of partial love, the topology of the signifier is productive of a re-doubling of that love, which, in throwing the whole thing onto the axis of desire, founds a dialectic of limitless love. A dialectic in the sense in which it is underwritten by death...
drive as that which poses a limit to the unifying tendency of love; a dialectic, then, which sustains the effects of castration.

As distinct from the French letter – partial love as an impediment, supporting a text as possessed, established and legislated – here, in the field of limitless love, the text and reader are dispossessed in producing the subject of a reading. This is a reading which exceeds the partiality of conventional love in favour of a limitless love which supports and is supported by a reading with style. A limitless love constituting a dialectic of love which renders the proper name of love – style.

Notes


2. Ibid.


5. Freud, S. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), St.Ed., vol. XVIII.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


Note to the Reader

After I accepted the invitation by The Freudian School of Melbourne to write a commentary on Lacan’s 1973 *Note to the Italian Group*, Quintilian’s words came to my mind: ‘In writing readily it does not follow that you write well, but in writing well it follows that you write readily’. However, as a *lapsus calami*, the
words that I originally wrote were: In reading readily it does not follow that you read well, but in reading well it follows that you read readily. A lapsus calami well born from my having accepted to write the commentary.

Hence, Reader, when you finish reading you might return to this beginning once more, in which case you may realise why you have to make the Note yours, such that it becomes addressed, finally, Note to you.

Jacques Lacan’s Note to the Italian Group is a difficult and condensed text. I invite you, Reader, to open it. It borders the impossible, such that only reading it at your own risk, will allow you to make it yours. What follows is not the Note — but rather its impact on us, an impact that adds to the fact that we have always differentiated in our seminar a teaching from a transmission.

A note of caution

With the advance over the Real of a knowledge repeated as well as ignored, Freud opened and secured a new field; but with the unconscious, he conceptualised something different and problematic. The fragility of the unconscious consists precisely in the fictionalisation of a saying — l’inconscient n’est pas seul.

However much the unconscious is a fiction, it corresponds to the sufferings of a singular analysand. But when the analyst constructs always the same fiction, it is the old collective unconscious and not the symptom which the unconscious is, that is brought to the fore. In these instances repetition, indoctrination and ideological cliches prevail which condense what the analyst thinks the analysand ought to be, become, or believe.

Herein, to avoid confusing psychoanalysis and ideology, there is for us a useful distinction between Aristotle’s definition of politics as the science of the possible and Freud’s definition of psychoanalysis as impossible. To ignore this difference implies no more than its re-repression, whose symptom is the feedback of

sense, where the more it is common the better. The stability of religion sprang from this return.

The text

One of the main interests of this text is perhaps the fact that here Lacan sets out and makes suggestions regarding a possible psychoanalytic school other than the one founded by him in 1964.

It is fortuitous that the analysts to whom this Note was addressed did not carry out such suggestions since its value goes beyond its addressees and their destinies. We read it as a reflection based upon the functioning of his own school, l’Ecole freudiennne de Paris, the institution which he finally dissolved in 1980 for having failed to accomplish the tasks set forth, as he said.

The call for a decision to create or not a psychoanalytic school concerns the problematical ethics of psychoanalysis: If you can, you ought to, where the...‘voice for or against...tells us that the...feet mark time in discord.

As it is, the logical time of the act is invariably in discord with the chronology of the thought...it is the a-priori of the act of language that creates the after-word of thought. Only the act in its untimely moment of conclusion produces effects which preclude the statu quo ante, where only very few will ever dare crossing the Rubicon: Facta est alea.

Litera scripta manet

Although openly addressed as a suggestion to follow by the Italian Group (in actual fact three Italian analysts) this Note is more than simply recommendations for analysts to establish a psychoanalytic school. This is why there is neither replacement nor excuse for not reading the Note, and it is your responsibility Reader not to make of the Italian Note a French letter. We only allude to a way of reading it.
Our responsibility is the choice we make to link and to decipher this text. This is what we understand and name as a transference to the letter. The singular of the transference, which thereafter excludes all readymade interpretations, separates clearly the psychoanalytic act from *Dolus versatur in generalibus* - the generalities favoured by fraud.

Analysis moves from the singular to the singular of each analysand, and this singularity is so much at stake that it is fitting to use our own definition of the transference. In it there is no coincidence between the analyst to whom the analysand addresses his demands and the object to which his desire is directed. The analyst as semblance is invariably in the position of care of the addressee. In an analysis the letter that circulates always arrives to its destiny even when it may be in soufrance. Likewise this Note concerns us and apprehends us insofar as it is proposed to further the direction and transmission of psychoanalytic discourse, and its effect in the psychoanalytic school.

**Inexistence and discourse**

There is a fine distinction drawn in the Note that implies a tacit agreement with Freud: wherever there is existence of a group the word analyst has to be withheld. So, either group or psychoanalytic discourse, unless the clinical experience and the theory of psychoanalysis in intention and in extension is put to work and to the test. Only then the psychoanalytic discourse will arrive to a limit through which a new way of relating other than that pertaining to the artificial groups will prevail.

*Sociatates vinculum est ratio et oratio.* In artificial groups, such as the Church and the army, its members relate to each other via an identification with an ideal which maintains and ensures homogeneity, a psychology of the group that sustains itself in the existence of an uncastrated Other S(O). This Other, by authorising and recognising, regulates the *jouissance* of the group with the benefit of the perpetual avoidance of *Angst*. That many analysts have given in to this temptation of being authorised by the Other is not new. The question was well posed long before psychoanalysis. As Seneca said, 'Great part of truth lies concealed from him who wants discernment'.

**Discourse and language**

The abiding structure of language is only effectual and operational in the *subjectbody* by means of the action of the discourse of the *Otherbody* of desire. It is from this inaugural Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary fusion, that follows the separation between the Other and the subject, that the object *a* is produced and fixed for both as a residual loss, as *lost cause*.

From whence this lack in the *Otherbody* structures the *unconscious* in the *I* of the *subjectbody* driven by the drives. However, in order for the *infans* to go beyond language and into the web of discourse, such that he will be part of the social bond, it is necessary to have been marked by the *sine qua non* condition of the signer of the Name-of-the-Father.

Only then, the fundamental affirmation *(Behajung)* will take place and provide the anchorage of a signer around which all others are to be organised. This logical moment re-signifies the separation as lack in the *subjectbody*, a structural condition that concurs with the de-construction of the discourse of the *Otherbody* and it is in this way that it then permits the final transformation of language into mother-tongue *(lalangue)* when the destiny is not psychosis.

There are however instances where the destiny, for being prey to the discourse of the Other, results in the impoundment of the *subjectbody*. It is here that we have the beginning of an explanation for the complaint so commonly expressed by psychotics of the exteriority of language as the absolute imposed *jouissance* of the Other.

*Insanire parat certa ratione modoque* was also Freud's motto outlining the gist of truth in a delusion, to be captive in the reason of the Other: this Goethian feast is the way an inheritance is either imposed on or acquired by the one on whom it is bestowed.
Herein the proposition of a school of psychoanalysis: to work in accordance with a conceptualisation based upon the lack of the Other. This lack implies the effectiveness of castration on the subject (§). The incompleteness of both provokes want and this want translated as a loss is what the object a, as cause of desire, conceptualises.

This castration transmitted by language, is alluded to in the first paragraph of the Note: ‘...to think with his feet...as what is proper to the speaking-being...as soon as he utters his first wail’.

This is the stamp imprinted by the logos in its encounter with the body, personified by the swollen feet of Oedipus who, having been knotted for the first and last time, is doomed both to parricide and to be dispossessed of his mother by making her his wife and having children with her; half-brothers and half-sisters.

This incest prompted after parricide by the discourse of the Other becomes a psychoanalytic myth. But this myth, contrary to the much spoken ‘acting out’, ‘defiance of the father’, or even as I heard from a notorious analyst, ‘Oedipus turning a blind eye’, is something other. It is the structural moment in which the blindness of the gaze signals the passage from the alienation of being prey to the discourse of the Other to the separation in which the blind gaze will make semblance of the lost object. Thus the incest is the metaphor of the articulation that a knowledge which is not known keeps with the Real.

Therefore, the Symbolic inaugurates the first ‘wail’ of the speaking-being in the extreme malaise which ensues when the Other, for not being barred, condemns the subject not only to become ostracised outside the social bonds of discourse but also to pronounce the most terrible wail of all: to wish not to have been born.

**Authorisation and legitimisation**

The proposition the Note outlines is different from proposals of the traditional societies in that instead of pre/proscribing who will or not be an analyst, the suggestion of the Italian Note is to make the analysand responsible for his desire. There is no other meaning to the challenge that constrains the subject to know if he wants what he desires.

The ‘said analyst of the School’ is the subject who has taken responsibility, by having dared to attempt the pass. Nevertheless a possibility is not an obligation, since the School has a place for those who do not wish to submit themselves to the pass; the analyst members of the school.

However, the Note makes it clear for those who may desire to put themselves to the test of the pass, that taking the risk is necessary but never sufficient. To know that they may not be eligible at all excludes self-auto-ritualisation. But at any rate, there is as a matter of course, a bedrock of the psychoanalytic formation: The analyst only authorises himself from himself and by others, or, as a literal translation from the French would have it; the analyst does not authorise himself if not only from himself...and (is legitimised) by others. The English translation conceals the negation that is present in the French and which, as I have already explained elsewhere, puts forward the reasons for which an analyst is also restricted in keeping no friendship with his unconscious. When such an authorisation is possible it is because it takes place in one who by that act is already an analyst. No one can authorise another to be or not to be an analyst.

Having an analysis, thereafter, is never sufficient for someone to become an analyst. Something more is needed to become an analyst – a place organised by the psychoanalytic discourse to provide the guarantee for the formation of the analyst. As Lacan adds later: ‘The analyst only authorises himself from himself and from... others’. This addition marks, we think, two different moments: firstly, the authorisation of Lacan... ‘alone as I always was regarding the psychoanalytic cause’ and secondly, the authorisation of his School – a School of psychoanalysis which, apart from making possible the distribution of a transference, permitted a work that was accountable for its act. This is an ethic to consider.
The pass intends to elucidate a theory of the end of the analysis. The fact that later, according to Lacan himself, the pass was a failure does not allow us to relinquish our responsibilities. In fact, the pass was a way of making communicable the experience of the analysis of the analyst, of the moment in which he turns to pass from analysand to analyst.

But Reader, can you see the consequence of this? The authorisation is from the analyst who already is one for having passed from the working through of his own unconscious to the unconscious of another. This reference to the analysis of the analyst should be remarked since it implies that the way someone arrives to his analysis is not indifferent.

Real, truth, and knowledge

For science, and this is why there is foreclosure of the subject, the aim has always been a discourse without semblance, to deal not with truth, but with the Real. For psychoanalysis the re-introduction of that subject foreclosed by science is needed but it does not occur in the field of science, the aim being, through the subject's articulation, to subvert truth with knowledge. Otherwise psychoanalysis would be epistemology.

The re-entrance of the subject occurs in the new field of psychoanalysis. Much too often, the fields of science and psychoanalysis are confused, either by reproach or by praise. This confusion leads to another one: to make of the analyst the master cause rather than an effect of the transference. Of course this fiat lux sidesteps Lacan's lemma: 'I never said that the word creates, I said that the word is unconscious' (but the unlettered, willing as they are, like the poor of spirit, will be the first to follow suit the fiat lux).

The Borromean orders of the Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic that are fictionalised and produced by psychoanalytic knowledge have as a consequence the subversion of the truth as the only psychoanalytic access to the Real. It is from the experience produced by the incompleteness of knowledge that we are alerted to the consistency of what always, as a remainder, escapes under the emblem of truth, and constitutes the Real. The Real allows discourse to diverse but not to universe for the reason that not everything can be appraised by the Symbolic. Although there is a so-called universe outside discourse, we have to remember that outside the field of science, in our field, we conceptualise this as psychosis.

Notwithstanding that reality is an expansion of the fantasm, the fact that the Real limits it, rules out all trace of idealism from psychoanalysis. This Real should be considered if the psychoanalytic school is to function. And this is something the Note attends to: "There is some knowledge in the Real...", based as it is in an order of things for which the speaking-being is simply superfluous or not needed. But this proposition announces the same thing that it denounces: the symptomatic return of the 'stability of religion', its sense. Considering this the psychoanalytic act sustains '(that)...there is some knowledge in the Real, although it is up to the scientist, not the analyst, to house it'.

At this point it is pertinent to pose our question: can the Real of science be equated with the Real of psychoanalysis? We think it cannot, because while the Real of science forecloses the subject and the Other, the Real of psychoanalysis, via the re-introduction of the barred subject ($), grounds castration and the lack in the Other. Here dwell our theoretical and clinical bearings. This is the way we receive a transmission, working it in order to make it our own.

Let us therefore explore the point further. Although the analyst has to take into account the Real, there is a radical difference between him and the scientist. While believing he is dealing with the Real by means of knowledge, the scientist reinforces what has been foreclosed all along without needing to avow that he is being subjected to, and divided by, his desire.

We know something of the Spaltung of the desire of the analyst from our own work, but of the desire of the scientist, what do we
know? The analyst, seduced and duped by his unconscious, produces a knowledge which as a whirlpool takes him to the residue of his ruin.

It is between these different knowledges – of the psychoanalyst and the scientist – that the wails of the so-called humanity utter something other than any desire for knowledge. Humanity's desire is simply to sense religion.

**Transference, desire, and transmission**

The reasons that contributed to the birth of psychoanalysis were founded in an epistemological discontinuity. No precedent was available, and the early disputes concerning medical and lay analysts were in themselves like an allusive anticipation of what may well be at the base of the problems of the authorisation and legitimisation of the analyst today. Psychoanalysis, being neither a branch of medicine nor of psychology, situates itself outside given and recognised disciplines. This lack of a model lends itself to a negative definition of psychoanalysis, just as in Freud's postulation of the unconscious.

Lacan's discourse stems from the encounter of a limit with a Real other than Freud's, and from this viewpoint we think it can be easily shown that his work rather than being a *return to Freud* represents its subversion, the point of *no return*. This is why specifically we think, as we have already stated in other writings, that there is sufficient ground to affirm that while the field will remain Freudian there is a Lacanian unconscious – from the *formations of the unconscious* of Freud we arrive to Lacan's unconscious as a formation.

We cannot overstate the importance of the meaning of such a change for a new praxis of psychoanalysis. This is still another reason to establish a differentiation between our work and transmission of Lacanian psychoanalysis in Australia since 1977, and the most recent *vade mecum*.36 Between each, there is simply: *Toto caelo.*37

The *subject supposed to know* has two effects, the analyst on the one hand and the unconscious as the *unknown knowledge supposed subject*38 on the other. We have to be cautious with a concept of the desire of the analyst that does not take into account this two folded effect of the transference mentioned above, since it could be used in order not to avow that he, like anyone else, is prisoner of desire. He would show himself up to his task if he would follow Horatio’s advice: *Certum voto pete finem*, fix a certain end to your wishes, an end that well understood means to analyse, keeping a certain distance from the discourse which is addressed to him.

We can be certain that there is no analyst a-priori... 'this desire should come to him...’ And when this happens he will know, simply, for bearing the mark of an outcast, since the knowledge he brings and represents is exactly that from which the *humus* of humanity...its dust, takes flight. Nothing that resembles lack or failure is accepted by the *humus*. Even in the face of death they will still stick to sense to occlude the end.

He who bears the mark will be recognised by others only when, at least minimally, the following conditions are present and articulated by the psychoanalytic discourse:

1) a theory and a practice of the end of the analysis,
2) a clear separation between hierarchies and grades within the school, and
3) the procedure of the *pass* to give account of the analysis and its end from the side of the analysand.

The recognition of the analyst is clear from the moment in which he is apprehended and in a way created by the transference he receives. The challenge is to transmit that experience without exhausting it and to produce from the *learned ignorance* the re-invention of a knowledge which is not known.

**Psychoanalysts or masters**

It may be argued that science in its beginnings was the attempt to master nature, hence its debt to the discourse of those who assumed
mastery. But, in our field, dormant as it was for more than two thousand years, there is more debt with those who by renouncing mastery were able to extract knowledge—Socrates with his *Mayeutics* is sufficient to illustrate the point.

There was no shortage of masters to meet the demand of the hysterics, who, wanting masters, embellished their dens. The masters in Freud's time like the Charcots of La Salpetrière were so overwhelmed by the erotic demands of the hysteric, that they were herded in to incarnate an uncastrated Other. Only after Breuer’s retreat from the effects of the transference was it clear that this demand corresponded to the desire to prove impotence, which is the only outcome when the *care* of the transference is disavowed.

To unlock this desire of the hysteric, Freud kept his own, consummated elsewhere by means of his *Docta ignorantia*. Freud's *Neurotica*, by dismissing hypnosis, offered the only alternative. However, what we are witnessing nowadays amongst *some* is a return neither to the sources of the experience nor to the limits of the discovery but to the relapse of psychoanalytic discourse into the discourse of the master, who teaches that the analyst is in the position of the Master—*ignorantia Docta*. This is exactly the opposite of what Lacan, thinking perhaps of the destiny of his *Direction of the cure and the principles of its power*, explicitly warned against many times over. On the 19th April 1970 in his *Allocution* at the closure of the congress of l’Ecole freudienne de Paris he spoke of how teaching can function as an obstacle to psychoanalytic knowledge: 'What is important to accentuate, is that (in) what is offered to teaching the psychoanalytic discourse takes the analyst to the position of the analysand, that is to say, to not produce anything whatsoever of Master-izable, despite the appearance, except under the title of symptom ... (when) ... truth may not convince, the knowledge passes (it is transmitted) in the act'. The about-face among some of Lacan’s disciples proves how repression, in spite of how often it may be lifted, will remain irreducible. This supports our proposition that the unconscious is a formation allowed by transference.

### The horror of the analytic act

The order of things, the way night follows day, the seasons, life, death, etc., demanded and demands explanations. From the moment in which the gods, who governed everything from the foregrounds of heaven, retired, relinquishing their spheres of influence, science furthered knowledge by placing the cause in the Real. The novelty of the psychoanalytic knowledge was to introduce determination through the laws of the haphazardness of *Tyche*. A chance with laws was thus born out of the effects in which *Automaton is the* segment of life knotted with the *Tyche* of the Real. This Real (is) 'an order...which no reason ensures to be a stroke of good luck'.

This unquoted quote of Einstein, who said: 'God does not play die', leaves many problematic things untouched. Not being a stroke of good luck has as a consequence both for psychoanalysis and the contemporary sciences, the introduction of an overdetermining... first cause.

It is not surprising that even in the field of physics there is a search for something which of its very nature may not be far from God. You, Reader, may say that the cause is exactly what the unconscious consists of since Freud’s first incursions, and you would be right. But let me tell you Reader that it is exactly because you are right that we are in trouble. No, it is not your fault. It is that while we all too happily embraced the idea of the unconscious and its overdetermination, the joy of the moment hid from us its consequence. That is to say, that Freudian psychoanalysis, with its excess of *Automaton*, lack of *Tyche*, and love for the ‘primordial father’ as the end product of his killing, was doomed to retrieve the idea of the existence of a *design* in the Real.

This is the after-effect of the protection of the father, who as *killed/repressed* returns as a totemic God and as such facilitates psychoanalysis’ ‘turn towards sense’—thus becoming a religion. It is from our practice that we are confronted with the daily task of ‘drying out’ the analysands from the *Zuidersee of sense* in which their neurosis swims so well. This is our way of reading Freud’s dictum *Wo es war soll Ich werden*. This clinical problem divides
the waters between overdetermination as **Automaton** with its consequence of ever present sense and the **Tyche** of the symptom which irrupts in order to supply meaning beyond sense.

However, *not all* carries meaning. There is also enigma, **Aleph** in which the unconscious does not answer.

Therefore, I propose that the knowledge in the Real for psychoanalysis is the result of discourse, *in which the effects are the agents of the cause*. This is as I see it the only way of not abolishing the subversion posed by psychoanalysis in its radical insurmountable differentiation between truth as the *Vorstellung-Repräsentanz* of the Real and knowledge as fiction.

As a result of what is neither refutable nor irrefutable this proposition implies not only that God is Real by our discourse, but also very clearly why Lacan wrote in the *Note*: *...There is some knowledge in the Real; although it is up to the scientist, not the analyst, to house it*.30 When the so called analyst gives into the temptation to house it then the false idea that psychoanalysis is the discourse of science will follow suit, leading to the illusion and confusion of psychoanalysis as a *‘discourse without words’*, that is, transmissible without transference, as a pure matheme.

There could be a matheme of psychoanalysis but not without the transference of the Imaginary and the Real (of the body) and (the voice of) the Symbolic. To ignore this will only produce the relapse of transference into post-hypnotic suggestion. The dictum of Lacan quoted too often about the Real could be misused, unless we underline exactly what should not be blurred: the difference between psychoanalysis and science. To be precise, psychoanalysis is a discourse that, although tending towards science, does not deal with the Real if not through the intermediary of the (Imaginary) semblance of (Symbolic) discourse.

**The belief besets the analysis**

There is a return to religion despite Freud’s atheism and we see it as the effect of the return of the dead father through the mothertongue, as can be read in *Totem and Taboo*, where law and desire are interwoven with the thread of castration. This was Freud’s way of doing away with the father, and as a consequence he proposed an outcome for the theory and practice of the analysis where the father, being killed/repressed, was condemned to a perpetual return.

The problem today is not only that either one analyses or one believes. It is, rather, that due to this confusion there are many analysts, who locate themselves in the Imaginary consistency of the Real father as masters, in which case it is always better to ‘send the said subject to his beloved studies’31 because, we add, this reinstalls the analysand in his fixations without having resort to traverse any other fantasm than his analyst’s. This is always the outcome when the analyst, for imposing his will, recedes from his desire.

The symptom of the annihilation of the psychoanalytic act is always preceded by the strengthening of loyalties imposed on the analysand like a truss. He must follow the interpretation as a self-fulfilled prophecy. However, theism or atheism, like ‘the ga(r)s’ (young fellows, blokes) and the garce (term of abuse for a young woman: bitch, trollop, etc.) in question make a congruous relation here’,32

But psychoanalysis teaches us exactly the opposite. Regarding the congruity of theism or atheism, the whole question is elsewhere. It is how to dry out sense and allow meaning to go beyond the *Totem of the father*, to make use of him. Joyce’s failed attempts are exemplary. Listen to his words: ‘Be who, farther potential?...old Sykos...who have done our unsmilng bit on ‘alices, when they were yung and easily freudened...’33

The other congruity, the complementarity of the sexual relation, only exists at the level of rhetoric – it can be said but it cannot be written due to the limit logic imposes on it, Lacan dixit. This is a knowledge that the analyst has to arrive to in the analysis that is his own. The so-called sexual relation always falls short of producing effects of a logical writing.
Things being neither refutable nor irrefutable – and this is the reproach of Popper and the neo-positivists to psychoanalysis – they may become unsayable under the aegis of truth. Psychoanalysis, as I proposed it, contrary to Wittgenstein’s proposition, has to produce a writing of that half-truth. It is the truth itself that psychoanalysis summoned in order to subvert and grasp only the half. Thus psychoanalytic knowledge by displacement secures a half-truth (Symbolic), of which the other half is ineffable (Real), and this truth, half reachable by its semblance (Imaginary), is the product of a fictionalisation.

To be sure, the Real exists even if we do not, but it is from what remains within the domain of discourse that we can show what we cannot demonstrate, and this Real is unambiguously appraised from the Imaginary. It is here that for Lacan topology was the possibility of presentation of the impossibility of demonstration.

To outline or to determine the Real is what a change of discourse produces with a consequence: the birth of a new field. Psychoanalysis being neither inductive nor deductive, is proposed by us as a challenge to analysts: to re-invent, and not to experiment. Otherwise psychoanalysis would drown in the sea of sense. For, those who repeat ad nauseam ready made interpretations like ‘beneficium inventori’ will, by producing dependency, guarantee that nothing will ever change.

However, to take some respite, occasionally and at odd times the psychoanalytic discourse prevails upon the psychoanalytic group, a moment in which an analyst – resorting to what can only be presented: the Real and the Symbolic knotted by the Imaginary – may be worth listening to.

The object a

'There is the object a, it ex-sists now from my having constructed it' by means of the Symbolic. The Note takes for granted what it alludes to – that this object a can only be apprehended in the clinical work and certainly in the theorisation of that work throughout the four imaginary and consistent semblances in which it presents itself: the breast, faeces, gaze, and voice.

The reader has to keep in mind that the object a is the result of the operation that separates the subject ($) from the Other (Ø). Therefore, for being originally and perpetually lost, it becomes the fundamental fixation in which the cause of desire is constitutive of the fantasm ($) Ø a). Without being the same, similar characteristics are to be found in the primordial lost object of Freud’s Project for a scientific psychology. The four substances, as the Note called them, are also a reference to the four causes of Aristotle: formal, efficient, material, and final.

Our proposal and hypothesis is that the object a, for not being a signifier, in its inanity becomes an object that structures the Real of the It like drives. Whilst, and as a result of the separation mentioned above, the discourse of the Other is responsible for the effect of structuring the unconscious like a language, and not like a discourse. This given opens different alternatives: either to deconstruct or not this discourse of the Other. These alternatives are the destinies known as the structures of psychosis, neurosis and perversion. It is only in psychosis that there is no deconstruction. As a consequence, psychosis shows the jouissance of a body gotten ahold of by the discourse of the Other.

It is hardly surprising then, that all the difficulties in defining the obscure concept of sublimation, as the bibliography on the theme proved, refer to the ignorance of this object a. According to our definition of the It some lines above, there are only two ways by which one can sublimate the object of the drives in order to elevate it to the height of the Thing (das Ding): by not receding from one’s desire and by knowing what to do with one’s symptom.

Joyce illustrates well the point in The Portrait of the artist as a young man, in the dialogue in which Stephen is asked by Temple if a piece of art is still art when the appreciation is drifted by desire. We put this forward several years ago in our seminar The Ethics of Aesthetics. Beauty, paraphrasing Shakespeare, is in the subject
driven by the drives, who gives semblance to the irremediably lost object a.

The (famous) object a is certainly in the Real but, and this is the difference worth underlining, it is the most distant post of the hole the Symbolic has carved out from the Real. It cannot be outlined if not by the structure of the drives that it organises under its semblances; breast, faeces, voice, gaze.

The object a in its semblance is not far from what Abraham determined as the object of partial love in each libidinal stage and from what later became the partial object of Melanie Klein. For Freud and Lacan the difference resides in the place where cause is situated. For both we may say that it is from the present that the past is re-structured. The interpretation is not of the past but of its fictionalisation. Psychoanalytic knowledge (S2), whilst it is affected by the object a, cannot be united with truth. The latter, although subverted by that knowledge, remains always unassailable.

The discourse of the analyst is by definition of semblance. The analyst is in the semblance of the place of the object a. I have proposed elsewhere a logic that is a possible writing for the formation of analysts and for the place the analysis occupies in it. This object a is the cause that divides both, analysand and analyst, a place where the fantasms of congruity disintegrate, a place in which the signifiers faint.

Therefore, irrefutable as we have considered it, the so-called knowledge in the Real may be thought of as an expansion of discourse with which we apprehend a limit. Point in which we cannot give cause but only suffer its effects. The Real is ‘an order which has nothing to do with the one imagined previous to science’.37 A way to separate the chaff from the grain would be to see if ‘the said cast one’ can swim against the current of sense held as belief by the rest of the speaking-beings.

Hereafter, the horror of the analyst’s act, if there is one, is to know that, although nothing may be by chance, the cause still remains empty, that what his act unleashes is at the end constituent of effects of irrevocable consequence. ‘It is what his analyst has to do to him, or at least to make him feel’.38 But not everyone who undergoes an analysis and is confronted with this will necessarily become an analyst. This is why ‘there may indeed have been analysis, but of the analysts not at all’. It is at this point in the Note that the Pass is introduced as a structural part of the formation of analysts.

The Pass

This procedure, which failed as did l’Ecole freudienne de Paris, was an attempt to give an account of an analysis and by implication of the one who by ‘authorising himself only from himself’ was the analyst ‘passing his lack to the passers’...tainted nevertheless, by depression’.39 To know that the Other lacks, and its mourning, are part of the horror of the act. Yet to rediscover this in each analysis is to suffer again the lack as destiny of residue. The typical disavowal to avoid this mourning is achieved by proposing a supposed liquidation of the transference, with the result of perpetuating the analyst and the Other as indestructible. However, if one does not have illusions and is prepared to work against the current of sense, the application of behaviour modifications etc., the alternative, the psychoanalytic act, is a very dangerous and narrow path: to analyse.

To conclude, sicut palea

On December 1273 after a mystical experience saying mass St Thomas Aquinas suspended work on the third part of his Summa Theologica, telling his secretary that he had reached the end of his writing and giving as his reason the fact that ‘...all I have written seems to me like so much as chaff Sicut Palea, compared with what I have seen and with what has been revealed to me’. The allusion of the Note at the end, to the experience of Aquinas, through the Joycean litter of the letter, and to the limitations of Aristotle’s Organon, is a challenge.

Likewise, Reader we may ask whether the analyst avows that at the end of the analysis the analysand directs him, if he is worthy, to
become that *sic ut palea*. Such that the question then could read as follows: Analyst (if there is one who dares) do you hear? You may (if you are one) re-semble (just) the unavoidable chaff that you become if you succeed to carry out the analysis to the end.

Notes

1. In a Lacanian School, not anyone can be an analyst, and this runs contrary to common belief. Therefore the title of this paper: *Non Licet Omnibus* Psychoanalysts *Esse*. Not everyone is allowed to be an analyst.

2. We have made a translation of this text in 1985 for The Freudian School of Melbourne – School of Lacanian psychoanalysis. It is available for consultation in The Library of Psychoanalysis of The Freudian School of Melbourne, Janet Clark Hall, University of Melbourne. The note in question appeared for the first time in the Italian journal *Spirales* No. 9, p.60, 1981 and in *Ornicar?* No. 25, p.7, 1982, and in the *Lettre mensuelle de l'Ecole de la cause freudienne* 9, 1982, p.2. The fact that our article *La psychanalyse in Australie* was published with three years delay in the same issue of *Ornicar?* in page 188, is chance, what is not is our opening with Borges' *Histoire universelle de l'infamie*. The note has also another name: *Letter to three Italian analysts*. See: Jacques Lacan, *Esquisse d'une vie, histoire d'un système de pensée* by Elizabeth Roudinesco, p.647, Editorial Fayard, Paris 1993.


Conversation with Xavier Audouard, who told me the story of his son, who after three sessions with Lacan, decided not to pursue the analysis and told his father 'L'inconscient n'existe pas'. To which I replied: 'L'inconscient n'est pas seul'. My reply made us laugh for the truth it touched. Paris 1993.

For the meaning given in this paper to the concept of the impossible, see our article *Of psychoanalysis – what is transmitted is not taught*. Idem.


*Note to the Italian Group.*

The die is cast.

The written letter remains.


'Reason and speech are the bonds of human societies'.

13. The child before he speaks.

*From the Verneinung of Freud to the Foreclosure of Lacan*, in *Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne, Clinical psychoanalysis and the training of analysts*. Edited by Oscar Zentner, 1983/84.

As Horatio says 'He is preparing to show his madness with a certain degree of reason and method'.

*Note to the Italian Group.*
17. The way the unconscious presents itself in the analysis.


19. Zentner, O. From psychoanalysis — what is transmitted is not taught.


22. While repression produces return, foreclosure produces encounter, clearly, in another place.


24. Lacan, J. ‘I do not say that the word creates. I say something very different because my practice implies the following: I say that the word is unconscious, therefore misunderstood’. The seminar of June 10th, 1980, in Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne, Homage to Freud, On perversion, Edited by Oscar Zentner, 1980, p.98.


26. A work which from its portability is the companion of a businessman.

27. By the whole of heavens, signifying the greater possible difference.

28. This is the meaning of transference and not of the analyst.


33. Joyce, J. Finnegans Wake, Faber and Faber, p.115.


35. A very fine distinction made by Linda Clifton in a crucial moment for the future of Lacanian psychoanalysis in Australia.


Foreword to Moustapha Safouan’s
Jacques Lacan and the Question of the
Training of Analysts

Moustapha Safouan’s Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts is reprinted here after some ten years since its first publication in the Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne. Despite the passage of time, Safouan’s working of: the problems of institutionalisation which have accompanied the transmission of psychoanalysis and the question of the training of analysts; the problems of Lacan’s own School; and, in particular, the far-reaching significance of Lacan’s Proposition of October 1967 and its conception of the passe, remain more than relevant today.

Safouan reminds us that the theoretical innovations which Lacan introduced authentically extend to include the question of institutional practices. This is to say that a School of Lacanian Psychoanalysis is not constituted simply through the incorporation and dissemination of Lacanian theory, but through the working of the implications of this theory for its institutional practices. In this way, a Lacanian School might sustain itself out of the lessons learned from the failure of Lacan’s school.
Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts

Moustapha Safouan*

Lorsque son père, ou sa mère, est mort on le dit au Bouddha, mais lorsque le Bouddha est mort, à qui le dit-on?

Introduction

Jacques Lacan’s death, shortly after the dissolution of his school, leaves to those imbued with the conclusiveness of his teaching, no other choice but psychoanalysis itself, I mean in the first place the given question of the ‘training’ of the analyst.

Lacan, on the one hand, has brought to light what is at stake in this training: the analyst’s desire; on the other hand, he has offered institutional structures able to ensure it. His contribution remains unappreciated; many people even consider that the failure of the E.F.P. (Freudian School of Paris) is a fait accompli.

This conclusion, however, is hardly justified. For after all, the same structure which the most prominent people within the official societies hold responsible for the failure of the latter to reach their objectives, is also because of its bureaucratic nature which no one can grasp, the one which supports them; so that we can say that the E.F.P., for its part, was at least given a structure which allowed it to draw out the inferences of failure, instead of sinking into it.

We must therefore re-examine the question of the training of the analyst in his relations with the institutional structures that this training motivates: as it appears before Lacan and with him. It is then possible that the failure of the E.F.P. appears due to reasons which do not minimise Jacques Lacan’s contribution to receive the attention of the psychoanalytic community. Since, in what follows, we will examine the appreciation of the different modes of institutionalization, what are the criteria of this appreciation? This question arises all the more forcibly since we do not have at our disposal a paradigm, which in this case could guide the effort of the legislator, such as, for Plato, the soul, recalling the laws of the Republic or else for, Hobbes, the right of nature or the necessary order to universal mechanism.

Analysts would readily agree to three points:

a) that the training of the analyst has nothing to do with the reproduction of a model; there are families of doctors, lawyers, interior-decorators, while it is unthinkable that becoming an analyst ‘runs in the family’;

b) that neither has it anything to do with the transmission of a savoir-faire; an institution which aims to train teachers, researchers, scientists, technicians or skilled workers demands enrolment pre-requisites, but no one wonders whether this enrolment corresponds to what the subject really desires, a question, which on the contrary, is at the heart of any analysis;

c) that no one could practise analysis without having undergone a so-called ‘didactic’ analysis.

It is important to note, that as justifiable as it may be, this necessity of a didactic analysis could not be considered proven. Some analysts such as Abraham and Bernfeld, started practising analysis without having previously undergone a didactic analysis; and we think that an analyst using the Freudian notion of repression, because of his very status as listener, would be able to drive out the repressions which mark someone else’s words, but that by definition, his own repressions would escape him.

That is not all. We seldom question the actual results of the didactic analysis: an ability to analyse or, more simply, a desire to continue a translation of the unconscious with another. But, for lack of this questioning, despite the first two points previously agreed upon everything falls into place, as if it were a matter of professional training, in the common meaning of the word.

The different institutional structures are therefore finally judged according to the positive meaning they give, implicitly or explicitly, to the training of the analyst and particularly to didactic analysis, and according to whether they do or do not allow an evaluation of work meant to test their adequacy to their goal.
Before Lacan

The history of the psychoanalytic movement does not need to be retold. Those who have discussed the topic agree on this: the methods of analytic training still in use have been defined at the founding of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. But, we have at our disposal extremely significant evidence of this event, that of Bernfeld.

On January 10, 1950, Siegfried Bernfeld, who we know mainly through his work on Freud’s scientific training, delivered to his colleagues, members of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute Education Committee, a memorandum where he defined in fourteen points his conception of the free psychoanalytic institute. This conception was considered as utopian. Shortly after, he resigned from the Committee due to the sterility of the discussion with his peers and to free himself from the bond of silence required by his position: to be able to say publicly what he had to say. And he said it; in a lecture given to the Society and the San Francisco Institute on November 10, 1952, a few months before he died, on April 3, 1953. This lecture was at last published ten years later (Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1962, p.453-482): we are tempted to believe that death succeeds in achieving results where man has failed during his life. It was even felt necessary to precede the text of the lecture with an editorial introduction signed by Rudolph Erkstein. He states that, had Bernfeld had more time, he would certainly not have had his lecture published without completely reshaping it, in order to confer on it his usual objective form. As such, Erkstein goes on, this lecture is a document which shows Bernfeld’s troubled reactions in facing the problems of analytic training, ‘problems more intensely felt by a man whose primary identification would be made in relation to the process of teaching rather than to that of the organization of training (sic)’. No comments on these assertions. I would only like to emphasize the relationship between the distinction in question here (between those who identify with the process of teaching and those who identify with the organization of training) and the common distinction in the theory of management, between functionals and operators.

In fact, Bernfeld’s lecture is a priceless document which, indeed, reflects his troubled reactions (and with reason!), but also the most decisive turn in the history of the psychoanalytic movement.

Bernfeld notes that the idea of personal analysis is not very much younger than psychoanalysis itself. From the late 1890s students attending Freud’s classes at University, told him from time to time their dreams. Psychologists and doctors sometimes asked him for his help in the treatment of neurotic symptoms. According to Bernfeld, these early analyses were truly didactic.

Around 1905, Freud started with some analysts to conduct analyses which were much longer and had greater therapeutic ambitions. He varied the length of the analysis and the amount of theoretical teaching it included, according to the desires and circumstances of each student-analysand and according to the nature of the neurotic symptoms. In any case, he always kept his didactic analyses totally free from being subject to interference from administrative rules and political considerations. He continued in that manner long after the Institutes foundation, despite the fact that the authorities as he sometimes called them with a touch of irony, were appalled and embarrassed.

Bernfeld quotes his own experience as an example. In 1933, he discussed his project to start a practice in Vienna as an analyst, with Freud. The Berlin group encouraged analysts, especially beginners, to undergo a didactic analysis before starting to practise. Bernfeld asked Freud if he thought that this preparation would be desirable for him. Freud answered straight away: 'It is absurd. Go ahead. You will certainly encounter difficulties. But we shall see what we can do to help you.'

According to Bernfeld, the history of didactic psychoanalysis is divided into two perfectly distinctive periods. The first one, goes from the beginning of psychoanalysis until the winter of 1923-24. During this period, Freud conducted the analyses of practising analysts and of other people professionally interested in psychoanalysis, in the manner we have just described. He was soon
joined by Abraham, Ferenczi and Federn. As a matter of fact, anyone who knew a little bit more than the newcomer and had the desire and the ability to start working, did so, each in his own way. The lessons learnt from this first period are that anyone interested in psychoanalysis, either as a science or as a therapy, is very likely to realize in the end that self-analysis could neither satisfy one's curiosity nor help one's personal difficulties and therefore, one is led, of one's own accord, to ask somebody who seems both to know a little bit more and who can be trusted, for a personal analysis.

Towards the end of this period, the Berlin group took an important decision. Many members of this group felt the need for a personal analysis. But as they all knew each other, they invited Hans Sachs to come from Vienna to Berlin and to specialize in analysing analysts, those who were already well established as well as those who were starting out. Thereby, Sachs became the first didactic analyst. Sachs was not a medical doctor and at that time, only had very limited therapeutic experience. Very early, he felt that it was very difficult for him to conduct the analyses he had to, while also supervising the therapeutic work of his analysands and while discussing theoretical and technical questions with them. Very wisely, he omitted any teaching from his analyses and restricted it to his seminars held at the clinic. This is the origin of the procedure which all didactic analysts have followed till now.

The second period starts at the end of 1923-beginning of 1924, when the Berlin Society Education Committee decided to regulate its activities. The Committee offered a complete education programme to psychiatrists who, among other things, agreed to the following conditions: the committee irrevocably accepted or rejected the candidate according to the impression received during three successive interviews. To begin with, the candidate had to undergo a first personal analysis for at least six months; it was the same committee which appointed the didactic analyst. On the didactic analyst's advice, the Committee decided when the analysis could be considered sufficiently advanced to allow the candidate to participate in further stages of training; it was also the Committee's function to decide when the analysis could be considered finished; moreover, the candidate had to agree, in writing, not to call himself an analyst before his formal admission to the Society.

Everyone knows today, that all this became a habit. But then, says Bernfeld, the proclamation of this policy sounded like something unprecedented in the analytic world. A few analysts saw in it the solution to the fundamental problem. Others, on the contrary, were sceptical. Some others, like Bernfeld, felt that, far from resolving problems, the decision taken in Berlin would rather complicate their task.

From the description of these different reactions, it emerges that the proclamation of the Berlin group had not been seriously opposed. But this proclamation comprised a claim to legitimacy. The question then arises: why did this claim gain the support of analysts as well as those who wanted to become analysts? Bernfeld does not ask that question. He merely states, that after thirty years, one can better understand the factors which determined the policy of the Berlin group. What he says about it however, answers my question, in so far as he leads us to verify that it is not only in the common work that the cohesion of the groups rests, but also in libidinal energies.

This is indeed how Bernfeld explained the Berlin group's decision. Just after World War I he says in 1920 - Freud and psychoanalysis suddenly and quite unexpectedly became world famous. In Austria and Germany, psychoanalysis was everywhere (in the press, cafes, theatres, youth movements, unions etc...). This success, says Bernfeld, really frightened the old generation of analysts, who had to realize that the new situation required resources other than the simple heroism of early times. Analysis was everywhere...except within the medical profession, which looked down on it, despite the sympathy of young psychiatrists. Bernfeld also notes that, curiously, psychoanalysts themselves wished to gain respectability. They wanted to become part of the medical profession, and, to reach this goal, they felt that they should have their clinics, their professional schools and their corporative societies.

Actually, there were two tendencies regarding the question of how to adjust to the new situation.
In Vienna, close to Freud – Bernfeld writes – we preferred the idea of offering the new movement opportunities for serious study of psychoanalysis and for the application of analysis to all the fields of therapy and education. In Berlin, the tendency was rather to isolate the psychoanalytic societies clearly from the general analytic movement, and gradually to establish psychoanalysis as a speciality within the medical profession. As a compromise, the clinics in Vienna and Berlin decided to include in their training programme some provisions for the training of non-physicians. But with greater and greater intensity their purpose came to be the issuing of diplomas in psychoanalysis. In the long run, the Berlin tendency won out.

Why did that tendency win? Bernfeld does not ask the question and goes on:

Most important, however, for the development of those features of our training that I am discussing tonight was Freud’s illness. As you may remember, in the summer of 1923, Freud’s cancer was discovered, and everyone, including himself and his doctors, expected him to die within a few months. By the summer of the following year it was fairly well established that the cancer was under control, and that Freud could hope to live many years longer.

I need not explain in detail – Bernfeld goes on – what Freud’s ‘death and resurrection’ within this one year meant to the older psychoanalysts in Vienna and Berlin.

After alluding to Rank whose case he describes as an illustration of what he calls an ‘outburst of the id’, Bernfeld carries on:

Some of the others grew intensely anxious because of the threatened loss, and became very eager to establish

Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts

a solid dam against heterodoxy, as they now felt themselves responsible for the future of psychoanalysis. They determined to limit by rigid selection among the newcomers, and by the institution of a coercive, long drawn-out trial period of authoritarian training, any final admission to their societies. In fact, they punished their students for their own ambivalence. At the same time, they consolidated the one trend that Freud always had wanted to avoid: the shrinkage of psychoanalysis into an annex of psychiatry.

There is no doubt about the meaning of this statement: we could not have said better that the institutionalization of psychoanalysis was, on the part of those who promoted it, an acting out8 which displayed what, from their desire, was not signified otherwise: i.e. the essential link (not to say the effective identity) to that desire of a defence which forbids all and everyone a certain idea of jouissance, that which the position of the master ‘would promise’. The institutionalization of psychoanalysis was like a ‘repetition’ where staged, behind the back of the ‘actants’, was the myth promoted by Freud in Totem and Taboo, a ‘fraternal’ arrangement dictated by the murder not so much accomplished as un-admitted, or else, admissible though un-accomplished: it was the outcome of a convergence in repression. In the same way, the socialization of analysis, synonymous with its integration in ‘the medical order’, was a set back of the complicity on which the social link is based.

In a word, by institutionalizing psychoanalysis, it was precisely as if psychoanalysis never existed. Why so many fears, which turned the accomplishment of a duty into a police operation, if it were not because ‘to take Freud’s place’ was not only to take the place which would allow everyone to serve psychoanalysis at best? Why this conformity, this need for respectability or social recognition, if it were not to find in it the alibi of a deep, lonely and yet evident delinquency?

In those conditions, it is not surprising to learn, as Bernfeld points out, that the most zealous people to protect psychoanalysis from
heterodoxy, were called, among others, Alexander, Rado, Reich, K. Horney, Fromm, Reichman—Fromm. It is not surprising either, that a total lack of invention was displayed...since the void left by Freud had become a ‘place’ falsely and neurotically prohibitive.

For after all we cannot say, and Bernfeld emphasizes it, that as far as a training method is concerned, the Berliners had found something that people seriously interested in psychoanalysis had not found by themselves. Their ‘work’ only consisted in turning into an obligation what was a matter of choice. A move heavy with consequences. Because from that time on, the didactic analysis became, in Bernfeld’s words, an analysis ‘to take’, in the way one takes a course in preliminary anatomy to become a doctor. A state of things which is judged from its results, and which Bernfeld does emphasize: despite thirty years of experience (to which another thirty can be added today), we still do not know anything about the progress of the didactic, nor what it consists of.

And if it is true, as Bernfeld points out once more, that once an institution is set up it can survive for motives other than those which lead to its foundation, where should we look for those motives of survival but in the benefits of its hierarchical functioning?

However, the ignorance emphasized by Bernfeld, whom we are going to leave here, is a fact and it is attested to by the divergence of opinions between didacticians.

They all agree to say that a didactic analysis is different from a therapeutic analysis: it is an analysis which is ‘deeper’ or which ‘goes further’. What does it mean?

For Jeanne Lampl-De-Groot, a didactic analysis is an analysis which goes as far as a perfect knowledge of the self(sic) requires.

For Max Gitelson, who thinks in particular of the problem of ‘normal’ candidates, who were finally called ‘the normopaths’, a didactic analysis must be an analysis of character.

For Crete L. Bibring, a didactic analysis is aiming, beyond the lifting of symptoms, at realizing a balance and an inner elasticity which allow the future analyst to grasp without inhibition the unconscious conflicts in others and not to be disturbed by his patients’ acute neurotic fantasies.

The list could go on and on quite easily. What is serious is the collusion attested to by Balint in a 1947 article, between institutional hierarchy and ignorance.

In this essential article, Michael Balint intends to examine two symptoms. One is the reluctance of the experts to put their knowledge in writing (which is all the more extraordinary since those same experts, that is the didacticians, are otherwise rather prolific writers). The other one is, on the part of the same experts, a dogmatic attitude unknown to any other sphere of psychoanalysis.

Those are objective facts, he says, easily verifiable by anyone who would take the trouble to look through our periodicals. Indeed, in twenty-five years of existence, that is since the founding of the International Training Committee by Eitington in 1925, to 1947, the question of training has never been adequately examined in print. Addresses given within that Committee, by authors like Rado, Sachs, H. Deutsch, I. Hermann, never came into existence. Here there is, considers Balint, a ‘severe inhibition’, which constitutes for him the first suspicious symptom. As for the second symptom, dogmatism, Balint just gives two examples. (1) How it has been decided that the supervising analyst must be different from the analyst with whom one undergoes the didactic analysis. This decision was arbitrarily taken by the British Society in 1949, even though the debate never came to any conclusion and where the pros deserved at least as much consideration as the cons. (2) How the Institutes decided that the didactic analysis must last so many hours or years (four for the London Institute, for example), even though it has been established that nobody can foretell how long an analysis will take and that to yield to that kind of prevision, would be an elementary analytical mistake.
Balint writes:

I think that no analyst will have much difficulty in diagnosing the condition which caused those symptoms. The whole atmosphere strongly reminds one of the primitive initiation ceremonies. On the initiators' side - the training committee and the didactic analysts - we notice the secrecy which surrounds our esoteric knowledge, as well as the dogmatic enunciation of our rules and the use of authoritarian techniques. On the candidates' side, that is to say those who have to be initiated, we notice the quick acceptance of esoteric fables, the submission to a dogmatic and authoritarian treatment without much protestation and the reverential behaviour.

We shall easily admit with Balint that an ignorance which, for want of self-recognition, presents itself as esoteric knowledge, finds compensation in dogmatism. But it is interesting to note that dogmatism calls for an authoritarian institutional structure, whose benefit gives an incentive to protect ignorance.

A dogma is indeed not a simple belief. He who says 'I believe' (for example: 'I believe she loves me' or else: 'I believe in God') admits an incertitude in the very certitude he wants to express. A belief is a subjective act, which, as such, betrays the dependence of the object on the assertion which poses it, as it betrays, at least when the belief is derived from a desire, the dependence of the subject himself on the object thus posed. Dogma is something else. With it, we are dealing with an object which indeed requires a subject who poses it as an assertion, but who denies any dependence in relation to this assertion. A dogma takes itself for a truth which claims its recognition as such. This truth corresponds to what is called the 'Text' and the object asserting itself in it, includes a paradox with only one solution: that the subject disappears as subject of the enunciation to appear as mere interpreter of the Text. So that, if we admit that 'repression' is the operation by which the subject disappears as a subject knowing what it is all about, we are entitled to say that an institution based on a dogma is repression in persona. And we see that the setting up of such an institution goes together with the establishment of a cast whose members will differ from their privileged relation to the truth of the Text and whose function will be to organize 'primitive ceremonies'. In fact, this cast of 'initiators' or of 'supposed subjects of knowing' is the biggest possible screen which could stand between the subject and the truth, in the sense of the repressed.13

So, it is not surprising to note with Balint in a 1949 article on 'the termination of analysis',14 the fierce resistance of the didacticians to any attempt to enlighten the didactic analysis. After recalling Freud's pessimism about the end of analysis on the one hand, and Ferenczi's ambitions towards a didactic analysis which would be a 'super-therapy' on the other hand, he notes that Ferenczi did not imagine, however, that there were going to be as many 'super-therapies' as Institutes, leading to a repetition of the confusion of tongues. Since the thirties, the length of analysis started to be extended. Official training programmes generally mentioned four years. But everyone knows, insists Balint, that this period of time only refers to the end of the official stage of training and that, in most cases, the actual analysis continues without interruption and no one, except the two people concerned, knows for how long.

What is surprising, he writes, is that any inquiry on the part of a third person about what is actually taking place in those post-didactic analyses is immediately set aside, with proud indignation. Post-didactic analysis is a strictly private matter; any interference is unacceptable and intolerable. We obviously have here a case where part of the truth is used to disguise the whole truth. Either, post-didactic analysis is a continuation of didactic analysis that is a public matter or, the recently admitted analyst still needs analytical help, in which case both the procedure of original selection and the recent admission are suspected of inadequacy. Although a complete knowledge of the
facts would be of great importance in controlling some faults of our training system, a veil of secrecy and intimacy is carefully kept on all those facts.

So, it is not an accident if the International Psychoanalytic Association (I.P.A.), heir of the 'Prussian and somewhat melancholic [institutionalization] of psychoanalysis', in Bernfeld's words, showed the characteristics of an authoritarian and hierarchical structure which allowed the didactic analysts' resistance to become organized. However, we find the hierarchical structure in various types of social organizations. To which type of organization does the I.P.A. belong then?

According to the statutes written in English (official language of the International Psychoanalytic Association) and adopted in a work meeting, Business Meeting, at the International Conference held in London on July 23, 1979, the I.P.A. appears as a supranational institution which has the power to recognize the following organizations.

1. Regional associations,
2. Component societies and federations of component societies,
3. Provisional societies,
4. Study groups,
5. Affiliated organizations.

The differences between those categories lie in the extent of the responsibilities they carry out in relation to the criteria about the selection, qualification and promotion of analysts, as well as in the promulgation of training programmes.

1. The Regional Association is not only ultimately responsible in those domains, but also, it is its responsibility to recognize new societies within its 'geographical area'. Those societies are regarded as affiliated to the regional association, even though the I.P.A. can only recognize them indirectly. Hence it appears that 'the geographical area' constitutes in fact a 'private hunting ground' for the regional association.
A.P.A. as his beloved child, wanted to go to America in 1939. The encounter took place only after the war.

William Gillespie, who succeeded Hartman as the I.P.A. president in 1957, gave a colourful account of the encounter:

Shortly after the war I was attending a meeting (at Mansfield Gardens) between some of the most important members of our Society, led by Jones and a few prominent American analysts, not to say 'heavyweights'. This epithet refers particularly to Karl Menninger and Leo Bartemeier, as much for their aggressivity as for their stature. The subject of the meeting was: on the one hand the injustice prevailing in the International Association dominated by the Europeans (mainly by Jones) and on the other hand, the request made by the Americans to be able to protect their own rights, a request hardly obscured by the threat of secession. To my mind, as a young observer, it was obviously a repetition of the Boston Tea Party, with Jones as King George III. The discussion went on till 3 a.m. Jones' tact, his sense of humour, his patience were wonderful and we all parted good friends. Later, in 1948, there was a return match and we came to an agreement by which, in the future, the International Association presidency would be equally taken in turn by Europe and America, the American Association would be autonomous as for the questions of training – and there would no longer be an International Training Committee, as before the war.

This negotiation did not revolve – as far as we know – around a theoretical stake nor around different conceptions of training. Which leads us to believe that, under the cover of a share of 'responsibilities', it was a share of power. The agreement they reached gave all the advantages to the Americans, since the A.P.A. kept and even reinforced its influence within the I.P.A., whilst the latter gave up all authority (the term is not exaggerated after the reference to George III) in the North-American 'geographical area'.

Let us now proceed to:

2. The Component Societies and Federations of Component Societies

A Component Society is a society directly linked to the I.P.A. and not indirectly, that is through the Regional Association – in which case we talk about 'affiliated society'. The I.P.A. can also recognize, if a request has been lodged, a federation of component societies. This recognition does not prevent the societies from being ultimately responsible in regard to the training and qualification of analysts. The function of the federation – as is the case for the European Society whose head office is in Geneva – is limited to the organization of conferences or meetings between federated societies. They sometimes go further, of their own accord, for example when they unify their selection criteria and their training methods, as did the Federation of Brazilian Societies. The important fact is that no society can modify the composition of its members that is their hierarchy, nor its methods of training and qualification, without advising the I.P.A. beforehand: this is done to encourage the discussion with the other full I.P.A. members, in order to ask for their advice in case those modifications should diverge from the standard methods.

Then we have:

The Provisional Societies. This appellation means that a Society is admitted as an I.P.A. member only after a period of provisional recognition. During that time, the Provisional Society (which must be at least composed of 10 members, including six full members and four didactic analysts) is bound to submit to the I.P.A. Council regular reports on its training activities. On the basis of those reports the Council submits its conclusions to the Business Meeting, which meets at every I.P.A. conference, very two years.

As for:
4. The Study Groups; a decision of the I.P.A. Council granted them a status. This local group must include at least four full and associate members; when this condition is not fulfilled, the I.P.A. Council is able to give the title of full and associate member to those it chooses. The group is then authorized to train qualified students, either under a Component Society or under the I.P.A., or more precisely, under a committee appointed by its council to this end.

And finally:

5. The Associate Organization; this status is granted by the I.P.A. to a group, which even though it is not authorized to train or qualify analysts, wishes to keep in touch with the I.P.A.

Any associate or full member of a society belonging to the I.P.A., automatically becomes an I.P.A. member – however, a society is not bound to recognize as full member, a full member recognized by another, sister-society. This clause is probably due to the fact that many emigrant analysts were recognized as didactic analysts by their European Societies and were expecting to hold the same position in the American Societies, which they were very reluctant to do.

The difference between full and associate members lies on the fact that the latter can only attend the Business Meeting, whereas the former can vote and run for the key positions of command. As for the scientific meetings of the I.P.A. Congress, everyone can attend and make a speech, provided though that the membership fees are paid. There is also another difference worth mentioning and common among the societies: the didactic analysts, at the top of the pyramid, are always chosen from among the full members.

Let us now proceed to the administrative structure of the Association.

First the full members meeting, which meets at every congress: it is the Business Meeting, already mentioned many times. This meeting elects for two years, the president of the Association as well as the vice-president and the treasurer. They are nominated to those positions, either by ten full members or, as is more often the case, by a 'Nomination Committee' appointed by the president, with the other members of the Council.

This Council in question includes, besides those elected to the positions I have just mentioned, the past presidents during the four years following the end of their mandate plus a secretary nominated by the president and associate secretaries acting as regional secretaries.

The president and the Council have the power to act on behalf of the Association, to manage it and promote its objectives. They have a considerable power: they can deprive a member of his title – which does not prevent the expelled member from appearing in front of the Business Meeting and retaining his title if he obtains two thirds of the votes.

We have just seen that the promotion of the Association’s objectives is one of the tasks assigned to this 'statutory' council. According to Article 3 of the I.P.A. statutes, these objectives are:

a) to facilitate the communication between psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic organizations, by means of suitable publications, scientific Congresses and other meetings.

b) to continue the training and education criteria which ensure the continuous development of psychoanalysis.

c) to help with the training and development of analytical organizations.

An association that calls itself a Psychoanalytic Association (article 1) must define what is psychoanalysis. Here is this definition (article 3):

The term psychoanalysis refers to a theory and function of the personality and of the application of this theory to
other areas of knowledge and finally to therapeutic techniques. This body of knowledge is based on and is derived from Sigmund Freud's psychological discoveries.

The asepticized and academic nature of this definition, where there is no reference at all to the unconscious or desire, that is to the fundamental terms of Freudian experience, is obvious. What is no less obvious, is the connection between a definition of psychoanalysis which refers it to the notion of personality and a mode of institutionalization which, finally, is based on statutory authority.

In actual fact, the I.P.A. administrative structure as I have just explained it briefly, is not without reminding us of the bureaucratic model described by Max Weber, and of which the main characteristic features are: the organization of jobs into a hierarchy with each stratum representing a clearly defined sphere of legal competence; a recruitment made through a free contractual relation and based on the candidates' qualifications; a system of promotion – which implies a 'race', a maximal centralization of decisions, and above all, 'the government of men through the only abstract game of impersonal rules which no one at all can grasp'.

Let me remind you that it is with Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code), that the theory of bureaucracy found, in an almost completed form, its first expression. This theory includes at random apparently democratic or liberal elements (appointment to positions by election or competitive entrance examinations) and authoritarian elements (absolute obligation to obey).

All these contradictory elements find their common roots, as L.J. Hume judiciously showed it 'in the only theoretical structure of individualism and in the acceptance of individualism as an exact interpretation of the world'. Which means that if we want to understand Bentham as well, we must go back to Hobbes.

It is indeed in the latter that we find the most perfect expression of modern political theory, in so far as this theory claims the individual as the only initial element; the individual defined by his will; a highly selfish will. Consequently, in the absence of a sovereign who imposes his orders, men could not in any case issue a law or produce a social order. It is apparently a diametrically opposite doctrine to the Freudian myth of the primitive horde, according to which the order of the law would on the contrary become rooted in the murder of the sovereign. However, since the two conceptions are based on the idea of a natural man or state of nature, we might perhaps be tempted to find their common origin in the disintegration of the medieval conception, which did not question the existence, for each people, of a pre-established law and which, from there, considered the prince as the judge of his people, that is, someone who is empowered with the law and not the legislator who dictates it.

Bentham subscribes to Hobbes' individualism and his corollary, nominalism. But as precisely a doctrine which only sees reality in the concrete individual and his selfishness would not account for an order which rests on notions as abstract as those of right and duty, good and evil and many others, it led to the call for the theory of the 'fictitious entities', which exist through language and through it alone – a theory which is itself a fiction, because one cannot see how the notions of horse or fire would owe their existence to language less than those of just and unjust. This theory however, gave Bentham the means to fully exercise his legal rationalism. He only had to define the aim for which the law had to be put in order. Utilitarianism provided him with the answer; and it is therefore on utilitarianism in the meaning of the acceptance of 'maximal happiness for the greatest' as supreme value of social morality, that Bentham's endless efforts are based 'in the view of linking back the ends, of treating institutions and arrangements as means dependent on this supreme aim, of condemning and of rejecting inferior means, and of remodelling everything else, in order to serve it more efficiently'. (op.cit. p.9-11). This 'rationality' might have allowed the same author to state (p.257) that the key to the understanding of Bentham's cogitations on government is in Max Weber's famous remark, by which 'the purest model in exercising legal authority is the one which uses an administrative bureaucratic staff'.
But if there is an experience where we come very close to the limits of individualistic logic and utilitarianism as social morality, and to the limits of the legal rationalist devices based on that, it is indeed the psychoanalytic experience. An experience, where happiness, far from being the supreme aim, has in fact no other value but that of a fragile reference to the aim which the subject pursues without knowing and which he questions. This aim, the unconscious desire, appears to have the closest relation with a law as universal as language, the law of the prohibition of incest, but a relation whose paradox compared with legal order as well as morality is such that it sometimes throws the subject, in search of an impossible absolution, into crime. Since Aichorn, we know that the need for self-punishment motivates many delinquent acts; as we know that guilt is often a ploy readily used by the subject to escape anxiety.

At the most, we can subscribe, concerning this relation of the desire to the law, to Lacan's formula; 'where the subject yields to his desire, we are sure that there, there is guilt'. But we should also note that this formula does not assure us at all that where he does not give in, there is no guilt: there are many cases where the subject does not yield to a desire which takes him straight to his downfall. Therefore, in wanting a guarantee against the lack of landmarks in this field of the relation of the unconscious desire with the law, we can only appeal to arrangements whose only function is to do with appearances. It is precisely on such arrangements that the I.P.A. is based, regarding training.

This conclusion is verified at the level of the only two points on which, according to a report by Robert W. Wallerstein, the psychoanalytic societies agree:

a) The 'triple side' of the training of analysts (didactic analysis, supervised analysis and theoretical teaching), b) the selection of candidates. As for didactic analysis, we have seen that the obscurantism which prevails in that area and which makes the list of questions of the Studies Committee as well as the efforts to make psychoanalytic training 'more attractive', look ridiculous, is precisely what follows the I.P.A. current structure to remain.

As for supervised analyses, the weight of the administrative mentality is such that the reader who skims through the voluminous book by Robert Langs (The Supervisory Experience, Jason Aronson, New York – London 1979) ends up in front of a conception of 'contrôle' (supervision) which is not very different from Fayol's: 'The contrôle consists in making sure that everything is done according to the adopted programme, given orders and accepted principles'.22 We are dealing here with, really, an extreme caricatural point of view, but it only shows the logical consequence of a common attitude which sees in the supervisory analysis 'a helping and enabling process'23 and which implicitly aims at standardizing the criteria according to which we have to evaluate the candidate.24

On this matter, the embarrassment of the experts is shown through the results of a report which Albert J. Solnit wrote from the answers given to six questions asked to the presidents of the Studies Committees – out of the 49 institutes contacted, 28 answered.25 We find no agreement on selection criteria for supervisory analysts, nor on the methods used to qualify them for that task. We admit, with a few exceptions, that supervision is one of the functions of the didactic analysts and that, everywhere, the selection of supervisors is the same as the nomination of didactic analysts; but as we are not told according to which criteria they are nominated...we do not even know if supervision is a pedagogical or therapeutic activity; these answers seem to say26 that a supervisory analysis is something more than an education and less than a therapy (sic!). As for when to authorize a candidate to exercise supervision in his relations with the development of his didactic analysis, we have a whole range of possible answers.

It never occurred to anyone that a supervised analysis is not a supervision of the analyst (let alone of the analyst's analyst) but of analysis itself; which means that it is a place which allows the analyst in supervision to record what, from his interventions, constitutes a psychoanalytic act, which goes towards the unmasking of a repression and, from there towards making the analysand return over a certain blindness – as it can also be, as is often the case, the
place where the analyst can record the insufficiency of his analysis. Then, is it not surprising that instead of an answer, we find rules?

As for the theoretical teaching, the third 'side' of the training of the analyst, I will just mention for now Brian Bird's remark, 'Nothing stamps the mark of the profession on a group more indelibly than adoption of a school system. Standards, procedure, criteria, classes, curricula, these are not for education of scientists but for the education of members of a profession'.

It is on the second point of agreement, selection, that our conclusion about the transformation of the question of the training of analysts into a matter of arrangements intended for appearances is verified to the highest degree.

In his introductory speech at the symposium organized by the XXIIInd I.P.A. International Congress (Edinburgh) on the theme Selection criteria for the training of psychoanalytic students, Pieter J. van der Leeuw says: 'It is certainly easier to determine what makes a candidate totally inept or "improper" to psychoanalysis than to determine the criteria which, essentially, prove or make his attitude possible'. This statement – to which we could readily subscribe, if by that, it meant that it is easier to give an opinion on the reason to refuse a demand for a didactic analysis rather than on the reasons to accept it – does not prevent van der Leeuw from insisting on the required qualities of the analyst. He mentions about ten of them, which undoubtedly, he, himself, would be hesitant to pretend to have: the capacity of identification, integrity, affective warmth, the capacity of self-discipline, etc... It is clear that this type of speech has no other purpose but to consolidate what, in the terminology of the theory of bureaucracy, is called esprit de corps.

We are beyond hope if we think we can moderate such 'perfectionist zeal' by reducing the required qualities to one only: 'the love for the truth' as Franz Kohut did, in following Anna Freud. Besides, it is odd that analysts do not notice that it is precisely 'the love for the truth' which urges a subject to invent all sorts of 'truths', in order to satisfy this very love.

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During the same symposium, Maria Langer tried to approach the subject from a different angle: not from the angle of the required qualities to become an analyst but from that of the desire which would determine the analytic 'vocation'. For her, this vocation, (from Latin vocare = to call) would proceed not from a wish to help but from a need to do so. A need which, in her opinion, would lie finally, in the need to 'repair some parts of the infantile ego as well as the damaged internal objects'. We can only wonder, once more, at the fact that the author does not notice that, if it is a matter of unconscious 'need', the whole question would be to know what happens to the 'vocation' in question once this need has become conscious, that is, recognized as fantasmatic: this is why there is analysis.

This remark is important: in order to find one's bearing, it is not enough to shift the emphasis from the being of the analyst to his desire. We must also consider that desire as an addition and not as a first motive which could be determined in advance and which would be the source of some 'vocation' or other – a term whose mystifying nature is so obvious, when one knows that anybody and everybody comes to analysis driven, among other things, by the most prosaic personal reasons: to earn money, to pose in society as a Kennermenschen, not to be left behind compared with friends etc. Actually, not the least virtue of analysis is to lead the analysand into recognizing openly those motives, instead of enclosing him in his somehow denegatory, idealizing delusions.

American societies, more 'realistic', especially the Chicago Institute, initiated a 'job analysis' of the analytic profession, which recalls in every way Taylor's analyses of the baseball player and the construction worker's jobs. Far from assuring a one hundred per cent reliable 'predictability', which is the ideal admitted by all those who deal with the question of the selection, this method, on the contrary, led to 'unexpected' complications as the selectors' markings rarely agreed: hence the problem of 'how to select good selectors?' Hence in order to compare the different selectors' marks given to the same candidate, the method 'group interviews' with their protocols whose description I spare the
reader: it is enough to point out that to dissipate the traumatic effect these group interviews have on candidates, they are followed by an individual interview; and we did not notice that such an effect is not surprising when we do not hesitate to use ‘tricks’ to detect the reactions of the interviewed.34

Paula Heiman sees in the very expression of ‘job analysis’ obvious allusions to anality.35 A remark, which because of the sullied nature of psychoanalytic terms, asks for a commentary.

To this end, I will recall an episode taken from Peter Goodchild’s book, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Shatterer of Worlds.36 During World War II, the English received a reliable and very alarming piece of news about the advance of Hitler’s Germany in atomic research. So they sent one of their qualified scientists to the United States, to warn Ernest Lawrence who, in the field of experimental physics was, at Berkeley University, Oppenheimer’s rival in the field of theoretical physics. Alarmed by this news, Lawrence hastened to Washington with his English colleague, to meet the man in charge of the Pentagon Scientific Research, named Conant:

Conant found himself convinced... He turned to Lawrence: ‘Ernest, you say you are convinced of the importance of the fission bombs. Are you ready to commit the next few years of your life to have them made?’ Conant had put his finger on the point. The question took Lawrence by surprise. I still remember the expression in his eyes as he was sitting there, his mouth half open. He had to make a serious personal decision... His hesitation only lasted a moment: ‘If you say it is my job, I will do it.’

The use of the word ‘job’37 in this context shows that the ‘anality’, mentioned by Paula Heiman, denotes a precipitation of the subject bound to answer by ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in an identification with the Other as the Other of the power as a machine shouting orders; a position which induces in the ‘subordinate’ (or in the student who, because of his very identification, sees no objection in regarding himself as

a student in principle, and not because he chose the master on his own accord)38 a subjective demission inscribed in the institutional reality.

It is not surprising then, to find ourselves confronted with the problem of the analysis of the ‘normal’ candidate39 that is precisely the one who does not know what to do with his position as a subject... except bargain it.

But the methods of job analysis do no more than show with particular evidence that the main vices lie in the current situation of psychoanalysis: in the fact that to become an analyst has become a matter where the major decisions, about preliminary selection or later ‘stages’ (that is how we consider the three sides of analytic training), are the Institute’s responsibility.

We can here repeat what Max Weber tells the subject of the university system:

It would be unfair to impute to the petty characters in the faculties or the government departments, the responsibility of a situation through which so many mediocre people indubitably play a very important role in the universities. We should rather look for the answer in the very laws of the concerted action of men, especially in that of several organizations, in the collaboration between the faculties who propose candidates and the government department which appoints them.40

With Lacan

Apparently, the preceding pages put us in front of an insoluble dilemma: on the one hand, psychoanalysis seems rebellious to institutionalization, on the other hand, as the future of analysis is a matter which requires the co-operation of many, without institutionalization, there is no analyst, therefore no psychoanalysis either.
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A dilemma which compels us to choose between a revolt which speaks to the point (but without realizing it speaks the truth):

to talk about a psychoanalytic society is a contradiction in terms, and a compromise described by J.B. Pontalis as follows: 'There is no psychoanalytic institute in the world which has not been led to question its selection and training procedures, the modalities of the teaching it offers and what qualifies a 'candidate' to practise analysis. There is not one of them who, quite hypocritically, is not complaining about the fact that a Ferenczi, a Tausk would not have the slightest chance of reaching the end of the laborious obstacle course that the training of an analyst has become today. We deplore, here and there, the surrounding conformism; we look for creativity. We wonder: why do the curious-minded people, why do the young researchers who want to 'learn something new' (as Freud said of himself) not come to us? And we blame an excess of bureaucracy or an excess of laxity. After all, we cope.'

But, it is precisely because this dilemma imposes such a choice – as if the desire of the analyst were powerless to find an outlet between the refusal of the belle âme and the complicity with the disorder of the world – that it is suspicious, as much as the mistake which consists in changing the relation of the two words between which it is true that the choice is sometimes necessary (analysis and analysts) into an opposition which makes them mutually exclusive – in return for which the first available idiot will only have to spit on the analysts to be convinced that it is analysis, itself, that he loves.

In actual fact, he who finds himself locked in this dilemma, forgets to ask a question: is it not possible to invent 'a new mode of becoming grouped in an institution' a mode which would escape what Jacques Chevalier calls:

the process of 'institutionalization' bound to a repetition he assimilates to the return of the repressed and which

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implies that the forces of the institution are under pressure to reproduce the same model of institutional power they fight? 44

This question is precisely Lacan's, who put it as follows at a meeting held in the days following the 'excommunication'.45

If the society of masters is possible, it must be on the side of the analysts, which implies of course that the desire of the analyst is not as silly as that of the ancient master.

Although in other respects they correspond to the traditional usage, the statute of the S.P.P. (Société psychanalytique de Paris), already written by Jacques Lacan in 1949, comprise a major innovation, which surprisingly enough, nobody noticed, while we remember the public protest raised by a technical innovation (short sessions) of which the least we can say is that it was relying on a theoretical conception far more valid than Ralph Greensons's very 'classical' technique, based on the idea of 'therapeutic alliance with the healthy part of the self.'46

I refer to the following paragraph: 'From now on, the student is put entirely under the wing of his psychoanalyst, who invites him at the appropriate time to attend the theoretical courses and seminars recommended by the Committee, and who is the only one to judge, by authorizing him to undertake an analysis under supervision, when to make him return in comparison with it.'

It is possible that the extent of 'powers' thus granted to the analyst, creates even today, some sort of fear of abuse. However it is only what F.A. Hayek,47 quoting Montesquieu, calls a 'descriptive rule' (as opposed to a 'normative rule'); it only reflects the actual responsibility of the analyst, as Lacan understood it as early as that period. There is here a point which deserves more attention; for as long as the responsibility of the analyst is not clearly defined, it
runs the risk of being assimilated to a power, a confusion which leads to the most disastrous consequences in so far as it implies the assimilation of the analytic relation with a social relation, an outstanding area where men exercise their power (whether on the market-place or in social gatherings, in sporting competitions or in scientific discussions and conference rooms, not to mention in charitable or erotic relations).

The responsibility of the analyst rests on a distinction introduced by Lacan in his work on *Les variantes de la cure-type* (1954), between two truths: that of the spoken word and that of the discourse. The spoken word is articulated in a discourse which *means* (*veut dire*) something and this *means* (*veut dire*) says enough that it does not say it. More precisely, this *means* (*veut dire*) has a double meaning and

it depends on the listener that it is one or the other: either what the speaker wants to tell him through his discourse, or what this discourse teaches him about the condition of the speaker.

That is how it is permissible for the listener to consider as a liar the one who, however, holds a true discourse: ‘Why are you telling me that you are going to Cracow... etc.? ’ (*Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*). In other words, the answer to the question: who is speaking? depends on the listener. And that is where the responsibility of the analyst resides: it is him, really, who as listener or hearer founds the subject who talks to him.

Until now, we have only dealt with a rather simple distinction which tends to make us aware of the subject who speaks as the one to whom we impute good or bad faith. (It is quite interesting to note that we find in a language like Arabic a rather close distinction between the truth of the spoken word and that of the thing or the being in general: to say that God is true, one does not use the word which is used when one wants to attribute the truth to one’s spoken word). This very simple distinction was necessary to avoid the damages of objectivation into which psychoanalytic practice has

slipped and to establish a healthy practice such as shown in Theodor Reik’s book *Ecouter avec la troisième oreille*, especially in the chapter called ‘Who am I?’

But Lacan, as we know, went further. In *La Chose freudienne*, he turns the truth not into an attribute of the spoken word, in opposition to the truth of the discourse, but into the very thing which speaks or more precisely, signifies itself in the spoken word: the Thing appears, in the discourse where it is articulated as an incongruity, a lie, a sophism, a pretense, a grotesque pun, etc... At the same time, we discover that not only the truth falls on the subject’s side — that was already clear with the first distinction — but also that the spoken word is itself liable to trial — and that is where the responsibility of the analysand is found, not from the adequacy to the Thing traditionally used to define the truth, but from an adequacy to the truth itself, to the *Freudian Thing* or to the symbolic debt.

Compared with this Freudian Thing, the responsibility of the analyst could not be found anywhere else, according to Lacan, but in his ability to ignore, to ignore what he knows or what he managed to know. Lacan has already emphasized this point in *Les Variantes de la cure type*. But, as the required adequacy to the horizon of the spoken word has appeared, in this work, as an adequacy to the being for death, correlative of the disintegration of the ideal of mastership induced by the specular image, the duty not to ignore — ignorance has no need to be erected in a duty — but to be able to ignore, was simply based on the denunciation of the intimate link between knowledge and power.

Lacan’s next work, *Situation de la psychanalyse en 1956*, shows mainly that the *mécognition* of the dimension of the truth which ‘speaks’ or, of the *Dritte Person* (third person), resulted in that the relation between analysts could not be organized otherwise than in the form of a social relation, based on power, or which only acknowledges one grade: between the strongest and the weakest, superiors and inferiors, masters and apprentices, etc.
If it took about ten years (proposal of 1967) to put forward the idea of substituting hierarchy by grades — which is supposed to realize itself in the course of a didactic analysis — leading from the subjective position of the analysand to the position of analyst, it is probably because of the necessity of restructuring the concept of transference which pulls it away from the centering where it was bogged around the person of the analyst with the ontological perspective which the idea of the person drained behind it. Another reason, no less important, is that, in between, another institutional experience, that of the S.F.P. (Société française de psychanalyse) was created and we were awaiting its promises.

In fact, the S.F.P. did not make many changes. Aspiring to reintegrate the International Association, it 'was still living' as I. Roubleff noted in a conference held at the Freudian School of Paris, 'on the model of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, with its board of directors, its study committee, its didactic analysts, its full, associate, corresponding, trainee and guest members'. The only positive point to its credit was the suppression of the scholastic and academic patterns which the Paris Institute, like the other Institutes affiliated to the International Association wanted to impose upon the theoretical teaching of psychoanalysis.

Those methods produced the most sterilizing effects ever. It was proved, at the same time as two different conceptions of teaching were opposed regarding the foundation of the Paris Institute, when a report called ‘Current conditions of the organization of Psychoanalysis in the United States’ was published, and gave the statements made in December 1952, by Dr. F.P. Knight in his presidential address to the American Psychoanalytic Association.60 Knight points out, among the factors tending ‘to alter the role of analytic training’, besides the increasing number of candidates in training, ‘the more structured form of teaching’ in the institutes which offer it, opposing it to ‘the earlier preceptorship type of training’. A diagnosis which Lacan, who takes this report into account in Variantes de la cure type, comments as follows:

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We see well enough, in this rather public speech, how serious the disease is and how little perhaps not at all, it is understood. The remedy is not that the institutes should be less structured, but that a predigested knowledge should not be taught there, even if it summarizes the data of analytic experience.31

In fact, Knight is not entirely wrong: he is sure that a teaching linked to the curriculum is mainly used, as it has been said over and over again since, to leave one's professional mark. It remains that Lacan is also right when he declares, with the metaphor of ‘predigested knowledge’, that a teaching which meets the demands to learn, in the meaning of acquiring a common knowledge is a teaching which deceives ignorance instead of using it (according to Lacan’s previous words) as a frame around which knowledge (le savoir) is arranged: this is what we are doing when we try for example, to reduce the data of a problem to an equation which will enable us to find the unknown. Teaching without questioning allows the progress of accumulation. However, the efficiency of teaching according to Lacan’s conception is only measured by the efforts of the restarting that this teaching creates elsewhere. We are looking here at an idea which will later be the main idea of the Foundation Act of the Freudian School of Paris:32 that of the transference of work, an idea itself inseparable from the idea of the cartel, as the latter represents not only the proper place for this transference or this restart, but also the standard unit for an original mode of social organization.

About this original plan of the cartel, we have at our disposal, fortunately, a priceless document; I refer here to the discussion in Issue 18 of Lettres de L'Ecole freudienne, was continued for the Journées de cartels, in April 1975. This discussion published in Issue 18 of Lettres de L'Ecole freudienne, was continued for three half-days; on Saturday afternoon April 12, 1978, on Sunday April 13, in the morning and the afternoon.

On Sunday morning April 13, Lacan, bringing out an introductory remark by David Nasio, said:
We have nevertheless suggested that this person (the Plus One), who is in a way the echo of the group, exists in any functioning of a group except that nobody is aware of it and it would be advisable for the analysts not to disregard it, because it appears clearly that all this starts very early. Tres fasciunt ecclesiam, says the wisdom of nations, and that goes far; why is there this arising of three?

That is the question.

Let us suppose two subjects. Either they kill each other and for that, do not need the spoken word; or they reach an agreement, which could not do without a spoken word in which their action expresses itself and decides itself, as well as the rule of this action. But it is clear that in order to carry out this spoken word, a true third word, neither of them has at his disposal only his own voice; as it is clear that this voice could not be sufficient to grant him the necessary power so that it is accepted with one accord. That is why he who enunciates this word, even if he does no more than enunciate a 'universal' law, that is to which he submits himself (for example: Honour they Father and Mother), could establish it as the object of an agreement, only on condition of presenting it, and I shall say presenting it for lack of recognizing it, as a spoken word received from elsewhere. So the figure of the Other of the Other takes shape and the powers of enunciation are in a way handed over to it: he is The One who speaks. The demands, addressed to him are different from the common demands, those we address to others who are real, in the fact that we call them prayers.

The Other of the Other or The One who speaks, constitutes the root or the manifested or more precisely, revealed source of Authority.

Revealed by whom? By someone who isolates himself from the group and 'who is in a way the echo of the group', that is, the leader, whose force lies, we know it, in that he serves for those who follow him, that is the rest of the group, their own pre-judgments; he is in a way the incarnation of the latter. That is how the social order is a fundamentally paranoid order: it is, all things considered, based on this law of the spoken word, where we can indeed drive out the hidden source of authority, namely the law by which it is from the receiver that the sender receives his own message in an inverted form. The leader or the 'mis-leader' (le 'mé-chef') as Lacan liked to call him, represents the manifest, incarnate form of the plus one.

Does it mean that it is possible, as the quoted passage from Lacan suggests it, that this 'plus one person' takes another more discreet shape, if not absent, than the one we have just denounced? It is the very question of how to find out whether the analysts are in a position to produce a new mode of establishing themselves; except that this time the question is asked in such a way that it includes its own answer.

Indeed, if we remember that the law by which the sender receives from the receiver his own message in an inverted form, applies not only to the spoken word in its empty face but also to the authentic spoken word which includes in itself its answer or which proceeds from 'a transference of work', we will easily admit with Lacan that its place cannot be a crowd. In a group which meets rather precise numerical conditions, I mean which consists of four persons at least and six at the most, there is always a person who isolates himself as echo of the group, but this time, to the effect that this person assumes the function of the spoken word in so far as this spoken word finds in the listener, the answer it includes; and, contrary to the leader whose presence is obvious, the 'plus one person' isolates himself in a way which, most of the time, passes unnoticed.

There is no need to look very far for an example. Lacan's remark which we have quoted starts as follows: 'We have nevertheless suggested... In fact, it is he, himself, who made this suggestion during the previous discussion on the Saturday afternoon. However the use of 'we' is perfectly justified: because he only made it when it was, so to speak, 'in the air'. So we can say that during this very discussion, Lacan played the plus one, without anyone noticing it then. He was turning what he was saying into an act and at the very
moment that he was saying it. Lacan was indeed our man for that type of 'artifice' when Lacan says that the duty of the analysts is to pay attention to this plus one, whose presence usually passes unnoticed, he means that the cartel represents for him the fighting unit against the psychology of the group, eager for leadership.

This battle was lost; I shall mention it later. At the moment, I would to focus on two consequences drawn from what precedes: the first one is that the idea of a department of cartels whose plus ones are appointed in advance, is strictly speaking a misinterpretation, since precisely, one has to be able to spot the plus one in an act. The second one is that the idea of a cartel is the consequence, at an organizational level, of a conception of the teaching of psychoanalysis based, for the same reason as the conception of analysis itself, on the principle of the founding function of the spoken word.

Another important innovation of the Foundation Act (Acte de Fondation) is that the School is not limited to the training of analysts. This training is the task of the first section, called Pure Psychoanalysis, (Psychanalyse pure) the only one which requires a didactic qualification.

It implies that the School will not be constituted by analysts alone. That is how within the Section of Applied Psychoanalysis (Section de Psychanalyse appliquée) 'which means of therapeutic and clinical/medical', will be admitted:

medical groups composed or not of psychoanalysed subjects, as long as they are able to contribute to the psychoanalytic experience; by the criticism of his indications [the psychoanalyst's] in his results — by the testing of the categorical terms and structures I have introduced there, as supporting the straight line of Freudian experience — all this in clinical examination, in nosographic definitions, in the very position of the therapeutic projects.

Likewise, in the Section for the Census of the Freudian Field (Section de recensement du champ freudien) all those will be admitted who can contribute to the realization of its objective, which is 'to bring up to date the principles of which analytic praxis must receive its status in science'.

All this is summarized in this sentence from the Adjoining Note, regarding the Candidature to the School: 'The candidature to a school is one thing, another is the qualification of a didactic analysis.' In fact, many psychoanalytic institutes, especially in the United States, realize today the necessity for such an opening, in order to achieve what they call 'the double objective, professional and scientific, of the psychoanalytic institute'.

But, it is particularly in the domain of the didactic analysis that the Foundation Act 'holds simple habits for nought' — That is, some rules simply based on what is done and what is not done.

So, a psychoanalyst will be regarded as a didactic analyst 'for having done one or more psychoanalyses which were actually didactic'. Lacan adds: 'It is an actual habilitation, which in fact has always happened like that and which depends on nothing more than a directory ratifying facts, without even having to be exhaustive'.

I omit the procedure of selection.

The only certain principle to put down, writes Lacan, in the Adjoining Note, and especially since it has been misunderstood, is that psychoanalysis appears as didactic through the will of the subject and that he must be warned by the analyst to whom he directs his demand for a didactic analysis that the analysis will dispute this will, in proportion to the approach of the desire it conceals.

On the contrary, I find it very important to emphasize title 4 of the Adjoining Note: On didactic Psychoanalysis in the Participation of the School (De la psychanalyse didactique dans la participation à
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The School, concludes Lacan, could not withdraw from this disastrous state of things, because of the very work it is made to guarantee.

That is why it will provide the supervision suitable for each situation, by facing a reality, which the agreement of the analyst is part of.

On the contrary, an insufficient solution could motivate a breach of contract.

You may have noticed that, among all this innovative effort, Lacan constantly applies two closely interdependent principles:

1) not to deviate from the 'descriptive' rules in favour of the 'normative' rules;

2) not to give anything for a law, except what can be proven.

Those two principles are summarized in this sentence which appears in the Proposition of October 9, 1967: 'We establish only in the functioning'.

In actual fact, as Jean Clavreul reminded me, it was to solve a particular institutional problem, which cropped up during the functioning of the E.F.P.: how to deal with the question of the access to the title of 'Analyste de l'Ecole' (AE) (Analyst of the School)?, which Lacan introduced in the Proposition of October 9, 1967.35

The Proposition of October 9, 1967 is a unique work in psychoanalytic literature. Much has been written about, either the termination of analyses, didactic analysis or the psychoanalytic institution. There are even many publications which deal at the same time with the last two topics, but regard them as two independent questions: on the one hand, we have the institutions with their current structure and on the other hand, the didactic analyses which take place within the limits of those institutions; we

In other words, Jacques Lacan, not only subscribes to the practise of supervision accepted by every institute, but also by defining his reason in a proper way, he draws the necessary inferences refused by the analytic institutes.

I refer here to a question formulated at the first conference held in Strasbourg in 1969, as follows: Is the practice of the so-called psychotherapy of psychoanalytic inspiration a part of the training of the analyst or not? A question which arises because the institutes of the International Association ask their candidates to agree not to practise analysis before the Institute authorizes them. So, the aforesaid candidates, who otherwise often have therapeutic responsibilities which nobody denies, are entrenched in what they call 'psychotherapy of psychoanalytic inspiration' - as if they were not dealing with a therapy which proceeds from psychoanalytic effects. Consequently, the subject is led to fail in his function.
recall in that case the warplings to which the didactic analyses are submitted, because they are taking place within those limits; sometimes we suggest a few reforms. But, what gives the Proposition its originality is that it does not only ask the question of the end of the didactic analysis but also proclaims an institutional structure: the experience of the passe, centred around this question. It is not exaggerated to say that this question of the end of analysis as resumption of the experience of the analysand at the level of the experience of the other, must, according to the Proposition, regulate the whole activity of the institution.

In order to avoid any confusion, it is useful to recall that the termination of analysis to which I have just referred as to one of the questions often discussed in psychoanalytic literature is one thing and that the question of the aim of analysis is another thing.

By termination of analysis, we mean the conditions under which analyses really come to an end or under which we can regard an analysis as over, as well as the arrangements for this termination. It is in short a question of 'analytic technique', which is effectively found in the many text-books that we know on the topic. But no more than Freud who, on this matter, just made a few negative statements about what should be avoided, and no more than Ferenczi who, in order to express something more positive, could not do better than blame the tact of the analyst, we would not say that Lacan has written a text-book about analytic technique. If he has devoted a whole seminar to this question, it is in order to set up the basic concepts which ensure a correct work with the unconscious. It would not even be exaggerated to say that, from Lacan's point of view, to write about technique, in the meaning of a codification of rules, would only be a way to avoid the question of the psychoanalytic act by taking refuge in 'the making ('le faire').

In actual fact, the psychoanalytic technique does not exist; and the contradictions between different authors are the best proof: so and so estimates that it is better to have less frequent sessions in order to prepare for the final 'weaning'; so and so estimates on the contrary that it is better to maintain the same frequency, if not to increase it to follow very closely the depressive reactions which might appear in view of this cessation. The best advice on that matter is that of Ella Sharpe, who says that psychoanalytic technique is never learnt. The best 'technician', shall we say, is the one who remains available in the face of what he is dealing with, always the particular, without adopting any analyst's ideal and who learns something new everyday. Nobody will pretend that didactic analyses are so called because, through them, the analysand learns to carry out analyses. The fact is that during his analysis, the analysand learns to listen. There is no school for the analytic technique as there is none for eroticism. If supervised analyses are necessary, it is not because they teach the analyst how to carry out an analysis (a fairly widespread conception which only confirms the illusion that quite often, really motivates the requests for supervision), but because he learns to learn. Besides, those who had the opportunity to supervise analyses readily admit that, from what the analyst in supervision tells them, they learn more than him - so that we can say they are more 'experienced'. The 'experienced' analyst is the one, who according to a Lacanian formula 'is not without his not-science (ne-science)'.

The termination of analysis has therefore nothing to do with the question of the aim of the didactic analysis, as Ferenczi questions it and says: the end of analysis is the analysis of character beyond the pregnancy of symptoms. Freud also raises the question of the end of analysis in the improperly translated article 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'. We know his answer: the analysis moves towards a point, a rock, namely the castration complex a point where the efficiency of the efforts of Freud/analyst aim, and from where the analysis runs the risk of extending to a kind of indeterminate analysis, and for all that without crossing that point.

In the Proposition, Lacan asks the same question of the aim, except that he closely relates it – as Freud could have done but did not, probably on purpose – to the question of the psychoanalytic institution. Because the question of the didactic analysis is posed in these terms: how can the experience of this analysis create the desire to repeat it with someone else, or to take again the translation of the
unconscious at the level of the unconscious of other subjects' A question which can be asked in different ways, but the consequence is the same, regarding the psychoanalytic institution.

Psychoanalytic institutes, as we have seen were born to train analysts. Once granted that a personal experience of analysis was required for anyone intending to practise analysis, it was indeed necessary that there were didactic analysts at the start, without wondering or even having to wonder where the didactic analyst came from: in what does the analysis he undergoes for his own sake prepare him to become an analyst in his turn? This question came up after some time. If it has not been asked, despite the consequent darkness regarding the matter (the becoming of an analyst), it was of course because of the prestige attached straight away to the status of the didactic analyst.

By asking this question himself, Lacan reverses the relations: an institution is not an analytic institution because it includes among its members didactic analysts who carry out didactic analyses, but because didactic analyses are in actual fact taking place there; and it is precisely the essential task of the institution to clarify the question of the aim of these analyses.

An essential task, first because without it, we would not know where psychoanalysis stands compared with the order of science; secondly because, by realizing that the institutional structures in use were misleading the training, there was no other remedy but to replace those hierarchical structures by another one, which would allow a functioning, centred precisely around the elucidation of what is supposed to happen during a didactic analysis as a passage from the analysand to the analyst.

We admit that such a project could not fail to have some repercussions, which go as far as upsetting the meaning given to the demand for a didactic analysis. It is in this way that the required agreement not to call himself an analyst nor to practise analysis without the authorization of the institution is substituted by the principle by which 'the analyst only authorizes himself'.

It would be superfluous to dwell on the virulent criticisms and real cries of alarm which greeted this principle. Let us only say that they were based on a misunderstanding: they were summarized in this objection: 'and so, why then the institution?' as if it were a matter of a formula saying everything about the becoming of an analyst, whereas it was a matter, as I have just said, of the meaning given to the project of the one who wants to become an analyst. In other words, it is a matter of institutionalizing the autonomy into an initiative, a principle which is already for the one who takes this initiative, if he wants to take part in the common work, an appeal to have the institution, the School in that case, attest that 'the psychoanalyst (himself) brings into this initiative a sufficient guarantee of training'. To such an extent that Lacan goes as far as saying that the title of A.M.E. (Analyste Membre de l'Ecole) (Analyst Member of the School) does not have to be requested in order to be granted. And besides, we note that the granting of this title represents only for the School a testimony; the guarantee is brought by the person concerned. Let us also note that the School can give this testimony without knowing anything about the didactic analysis or 'personal' analysis from which the subject authorizes himself to practise analysis.

Does it mean that the School is not interested in the question, asked by Bernfeld, in a way to which death conferred in retrospect pathetic accents: What is the didactic analysis? Of course not. The only question is to know from whom to obtain the required explanation. From the didactic analysts? Without insisting on the actual outcome of 'the consultation of auguries', such an answer disregards the fact admitted by many expert analysts, that the value and effects of an analysis are judged only by what happens afterwards. One is therefore compelled to turn to anyone, who, judging that he has conducted or has let his didactic analysis be conducted to its end, would like to give testimony about it.

The answer to which question, are we looking for, through this testimony?

It is generally accepted that, in order to practise analysis, one must go through the experience of the didactic analysis. But this
affirmation, to which Lacan subscribes, implies that the didactic analysis includes a passage such that the one who at the start was the analysand, becomes the analyst; a passage defined by the fact that a desire appears there: the desire to retake at the level of someone else’s unconscious, the experience carried out on one’s own unconscious. It is the answer to the question; ‘What is this desire?’ that we are looking for.

Here, we could not lay enough stress on the fact that we do not expect the answer to be said; and the one who becomes an analyst is the first one to know it: since his analysis is supposed to have led him not only to come in close contact with the reality of the unconscious, but also to assume his division as a subject to the highest degree. We could not consider the desire of the analyst than otherwise, as a new formation of the unconscious; it is even the most authentic meaning of ‘the formation’ of the analyst, a meaning whose ménconnaissance has totally misled the common conceptions of the relation between psychoanalysis ‘in intention’ and psychoanalysis ‘in extension’. It remains that what cannot be said can indeed, if it exists, signify itself. This is how we can learn that the desire of such and such an analyst is, deep down, a desire to make sure that the ambiguities of an alliance imposed upon him by the constellation which presided over his birth, with any religious or social values (maternity, mother-country, love of neighbour, or even the earth), are lifted. This does not mean that any identification should be challenged, which opens the door to all treacheries; but that it should not obnubilate critical judgement.

It is obvious that to stress the desire of the analyst, implies a well defined conception of analysis or, more precisely, of those two moments when the organs of an analytic institution are bound to intervene: its beginning and its end.

Everyone says that transference is the start of analysis. However, transference, the ‘real of analysis’ which maintains in their current success or failure the societies and institutes affiliated to the I.P.A., leads to its own ménconnaissance, even its systematic negation. It is therefore transference that we must first question.

This is where the tireless criticism which Jacques Lacan has always uttered against the notion of counter-transference stands: a way, in his mind, to ask, without asking, the question of the desire of the analyst. This criticism, today more than ever, keeps its value. Because the abundant literature written on counter-transference towards the end of the 40s and all through the 50s (Paula Helman, Money-Kyrle, Marguerite Little, Lucy Tower, Greenacre etc…) has emerged, during the 60s, in the theory of Racker – who is not afraid to state, with the courage of someone who believes he is doing his honest duty, that the analyst is submitted to the same difficulties as his patrons: he is also immature, neurotic, bogged in his Oedipus, etc. As this objection does not escape him: ‘how then would he be the analyst?’, in order to give the latter a ‘raison d’être’, he looks again for differences and this time in the register of the being. But as the being could not accept any differences unless it is surreptitiously brought back to an order of perfection, the analyst becomes an adult again, helpful, passionate about truth and last but not least, a knowledgable man. A conception, needless to say, diametrically opposite to Jacques Lacan’s when he attributes the start of transference to the fiction of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge, with all that this start already implies of ‘constituent downfall’ about the position of the analyst: since the latter could not pretend ‘without being dishonest’ to be this supposed-subject-of-knowledge let us add: without blocking transference precisely.

For all after, this fiction of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge could not suit another (be it the analyst, the doctor or anyone of those characters whose function and ascendant lie, last of all, on what is called in Church vocabulary ‘the charisma of the word’) but for as much as in the other, the Other desires. Let us consider here the panic which sometimes strikes a pregnant woman in the face of the oracle in which her own mother does nothing really but signify her own desire: ‘it will be a boy’. The subject is left in this interrogation: che vuoi? If the Other deviates from the silence where the only possible answer to the question is signified: ‘let yourself be’ to act as if he knew, by being prodigal with advice, assurance, suggestions and counter-suggestions, not to speak about edifying explanations, at the same time he frustrates the subject of
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this desire which has to appear as an 'x': since the subject could not otherwise elaborate his interrogation on the question of his desire; the Other refuses him the discretion, indeed distressing (since the subject is about to be lost), but essential, however, so that his already formulated desire could be recognized there. So it is not surprising that some subjects who come to us once they have interrupted their analysis (negative transference) with an analyst too 'interventionist', put all their efforts in deceiving us and sometimes in going as far as pretending to by psychotic — 'a way to make sure that the costume (of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge) does not fit the analyst', writes Lacan. This is also why, except when the credit of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge is granted to the analyst beforehand, transference effectively starts only in the wake of an interpretation which simply restitutes to the subject what he represses in the very signifier where this repressed surfaces through his mouth, stimulating then what Lacan calls in *Acte psychanalytique* (1967-1968 seminar): the poiesis of the subject, the production by him of a new signifier.

Such is, in brief, Lacan's conception of the extent of transference. Now what of his conception of the end of analysis?

I will recall it quickly by saying that, out of the existing conceptions (those of Ferenczi, Balint, Melanie Klein, Hoffer, Strachey and many others), it is the only one which reaches the same conclusion as Freud's, with that exception, not negligible, that far from emerging as the 'rock' the analysis breaks on, the complex of castration (symbolized by — Ψ) is resolved, according to Lacan, at the very moment of its interpretation.67

An understandable difference, because Freud thought of this complex in the register of the having (l'avoir) (which is the appropriate register of the imaginary) and not in the register of the being (l'être) in so far as it is defined in the signifier, as Lacan teaches it. It is with castration as with the fiction of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge where the imaginary character is discovered only once its symbolic root as effect of the signifying relation has been spotted.

Another difference, no less important, between Freud and Lacan, in regarding the conclusion of analysis, results from the progress that the Lacanian conception represents regarding the extent of transference, as we have just seen it. According to Freud, transference comes from the need to be loved, a need the subject tries to satisfy...by loving, by becoming himself the lover — in return for which it appears that to love and to be loved is the same thing. Lacan admits all this and even develops it in many well-known formulae. It concerns the narcissistic nature of love, hence of transference love, but it does not concern its extent. Once this extent has been clarified by Lacan, we can conceive that the analysis comes to an end with 'the elimination of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge'. This elimination has absolutely nothing to do with what is commonly described as 'liquidation of transference' — an expression which has no other function, according to Lacan, but to conceal the desire of the analyst. And in actual fact, we cannot see how the end of analysis should put an end to any feeling towards the person of the analyst. Who is this person who could be grasped otherwise than through feelings, when 'to have no feeling' towards someone still expresses one of the most virulent feelings? Do we ask the analysts to depart from their 'human condition'? The end of analysis concerns the relation of the analysand not to the person of his analyst, but to analysis. It is, if I may say so, the time when the algorithm of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge, gives away his secret of also being the algorithm of what Lacan calls 'the ternary constituent of analytic function' or even of the object which blocks the gap of — Ψ: that is the object (a) of which it now appears that the analyst was only the rubbish dump. This is how the analyst is being struck, through the grace of the analysand, with an 'un-being' (dés-être), while the analysand, himself, receives from it a 'subjective destitution' already implicit in the 'first fundamental rule'.

Let us now come back to the question of the pase, in the meaning of a testimony regarding didactic analysis and of what we can learn from it.

Lacan sometimes uses such formulae as: 'What is this madness which drives someone who knows what the situation of the analyst
is like at the end of analysis, to practise analysis? In my opinion, these formulae are excessive, I mean deliberately exaggerated, probably to make one understand the situation. For after all, Lacan himself maintains that what the subject realizes during his analysis as a 'peaceful' conquest over his unconscious, if of 'an unequalled price', should be the result of this conquest be something other than the happiness undoubtedly dreamt of at the start, or should it result indeed in 'an aggravation of the natural difficulties between sexes', as Lacan said during one of the last meetings of the jury of assent (Jury d'agrément), to the astonishment of some of its members. As for me, I would not advise anyone to hold Lacan's opinion on this matter, for an immediate truth nor for something certain. I only want to say this: what has an unequalled price for the analysand, has exactly the same price for the analyst - which is understandable if it is true that the translation of one's own unconscious can always be taken up again with that of the unconscious of an other. It is therefore possible that a desire to practise analysis could arise from a didactic analysis and not, as some of Lacan's formulae suggest, despite it. For when the desire to practise analysis has appeared, the analysand is surely not without a presentiment of this identity of price.

We have seen under which condition the desire of the analyst works: on condition that it only appears as an 'x'. The question then becomes: what is the desire which drives the one that has become an analyst to act like this with his desire - a desire without which he could not realize the famous 'apathy' of the analyst, that is, to overcome other desires, as the desire to come to the point with the analysand, to throw him out of the window, for example, or to hold him in his arms?68

We shall never stress enough, along with J. Clavreul, that the didactic analysis does not have a 'first passe' which could again put the answer to this question at the disposal of the analysand, who then would only have to take it into account (why? to test its validity?) during the 'second passe' in the sense of a testimony about the first. Let us say again that the analyst could no more than anyone else articulate his desire, but what has not been articulated is no less signified. I have already given an example. Here is another one: why the desire to practise analysis could not be, deep down, in such and such an analyst, an anxiety legitimate enough to object otherwise to the truth out of hatred for the mouth which utters it.69

We see, in the light of those examples, how much interest for the structuring or the restructuring of analytic doctrine, is linked to the collecting of testimonies from the passants,69 to their accumulation and their comparison.

Let us go further. Diane Chauvelot71 showed that Freud and Ferenczi's trip to Sicily was, strictly speaking, a passe: the first one, Freud's, with a companion badly prepared for the function of passeur where he was put without knowing what was being done. She saw in that episode the indication of a 'necessity for the passe.' I will readily agree with her, if it implies the fact, which can be observed even outside of the ex-E.F.P., that some analysts do feel, at the end of their analysis, the desire 'to talk about it to someone else other than their analyst'. There is hardly any doubt that the psychoanalytic institutes which provide nothing to follow up such a desire, operate in the direction of repression, as is shown by the following fact. Some analysands go on with their analysis in an extremely 'brilliant' manner as if they were constantly going from one discovery to another, from one surprise to another; but, one sentence comes back from time to time as a leit-motiv: 'I could never talk about my analysis'. Which simply means, and it does not take long to realize it, that, despite appearances, we are dealing with analyses where repression works continually and recovers every conquest.

But can we go so far as to agree that this 'necessity for the passe' is such, that any one who finishes a didactic analysis, feels the desire to give testimony on what it was like' I would be all the more cautious of the answer, as the experience of the passe, as it took place in the E.F.P., did not keep its promises. It is to the question which crops up from this failure, as from the failure of the School as a whole, that we now have to answer.
Lacan has always paid attention to institutions. His first major known work deals precisely with that institution known from time immemorial: the family. In this piece of work, the distinction between the different registers of fatherhood (symbolic, imaginary and real) without being explicitly articulated, is however as present as could be, be it only in the distinction, explicitly introduced itself, between the normative function of the father and his natural function, or else in the criticism aimed at Bachofen’s theories on matriarchy. Again in the last pages of the Proposition, Lacan shows that the inner circle he draws ‘as a gap of psychoanalysis in intention “is tied”, according to the topology of the projective plan…to the horizon of psychoanalysis in extension.’ An horizon he designs with three points of perspective flight, ‘remarkable for each belonging to one of the registers whose collusion in heteropy constitutes our experience’. Those pages, not only testify to an extraordinary interest in sociological matters, but they are also in themselves a model of sociological study for which they give a method.

This method consists in breaking the reality represented by the I.P.A. into three dimensions, corresponding to the three registers.

In the symbolic, we have the myth of Oedipus, whose ‘ectopic’ application to an experience whose Oedipus is however the core, amounts to reducing it to the position of an ideology. An ideology which indeed contributed a great deal in the way to exempt sociology from taking sides for a century as it had to do before, on the value of the family, the existing family, the petite-bourgeoise family in civilization – ‘namely in the society conveyed by science’. Lacan’s remark is not invalidated by the fact that, in a relatively recent collective work about the family and its future, there is not a single psychoanalytic study nor even a reference to psychoanalysis. ‘Do we benefit or not, questions Lacan, from what, we cover there without knowing?’

The second ‘facticity’, that of the imaginary is obvious in the structure which the psychoanalytic societies share with the Church and the Army. The favour that the imaginary identifications receive from it, explains at the same time ‘the reason which binds psychoanalysis in extension to limit (to the imaginary identifications) its consideration, even its range.’ ‘This tendency, as we say, is responsible for the relegation to the previously defined point of horizon of what can be qualified as Oedipal in the experience.’ As for the out coming benefit, it is the same one which the subject finds in the function of the Ideal Father.73

The third ‘facticity’ is to be spotted, according to ‘the Lacanian verdict’, in what, cut off from the symbolic, surfaces in the real: the real of concentration camps, where Lacan sees the first manifestation of ‘what will go on developing as a consequence of the alteration of human groupings by science and namely of the universalization it introduces there.’

Shall we impute to Freud, Lacan questions again, to have wanted, in his introduction to the creation of the secular model of this process to ensure for his group the privilege of universal buoyancy from which the two above-named institutions benefited? It is not unthinkable.75

‘In any case, this recourse does not make it easier for the desire of the analyst to locate itself in this conjuncture’. Unless we reduce this desire to the simple desire to last or to ‘adjust’ to the test of time: ‘let us recall, Lacan goes on, that if the I.P.A. of Mitteleuropa has proved its readjustment to this test without losing one of its members among the aforesaid camps, it owed it to this feat of strength to see the occurrence, after the war, of a rush, which had its understudy candidates heading off (one hundred mediocre psychoanalysts, remember!) in whose minds the motive to take shelter against the red tide, fantasy of that time, was not absent.’

In short, Lacan knew what he was talking about when talking about psychoanalytic societies and its therefore in our interests to bring out the concepts underlying what he submits as a solution to their problems. What do we find?

We find first the declaration of a principle to which is submitted the institutional or instituting act itself a principle expressed as
follows: 'We establish ourselves in the functioning'. In actual fact, it is from the faults found in the functioning of psychoanalytic societies that, in order to counteract it, the new act, the Foundation Act, is produced.

The application of this general principle to domains which interest psychoanalytic societies, leads to the principle by which 'the analyst authorizes himself', a principle which upsets from top to bottom the meaning of the relation between the School and those of its members intending to become analysts. It is no longer a relation between candidates and didactic analysts (an ill-founded relation, since the didactic analysis and at the same time, the status of the didactic analyst are not defined yet), but a relation of testimony, which works two ways: either from the School to the analyst, the former attesting that the latter brings into his training enough guarantees, or from the analyst to the School, in case the former, of his own accord, wishes to tell the latter about what his analysis has been for him.

All this seems to be simple common sense and if a question crops up, it is rather to know why it has not been asked before. The question is really this: why were we not determined to recognize in the desire of the analyst the axis around which the analysis revolves? But, the end of any analysis is precisely to answer the question of the desire. Shall we come to the conclusion that the structure of the present societies is meant to protect right through analysts from analysis? We shall be all the less surprised since we have seen with Bernfeld which acting-out constituted the institutionalization of psychoanalysis, in Berlin in 1920. The multifarious resistances – I shall come back to them later – to Lacan's Proposition will not surprise us either.

The same conclusion is drawn from the examination of Lacan's innovations regarding the other side of the training of the analyst: the theoretical teaching.

We know the opinion he expressed on the matter in 1953: the important thing is that no predigested knowledge is taught there, that is (this metaphor has no other meaning) a teaching which gives those who receive it what they themselves know or believe to know, in other words a common knowledge. But a teaching which serves a predigested knowledge in that sense, is in perfect harmony with hierarchical structures, since 'the authority of the office' (L'autorité de l'office) that these structures put forward lies, last of all, we have seen it, on the function of the word in so far as the subject receives from the Other his own message in an inverted form and this, much as this formula applies to the word at its most worn-out level or in a word, to the empty word. In so far as the same formula applies also to the full word, the one which includes its own answer, another function appears, that of the plus one person, at which level authority practically becomes synonymous with the efficiency of the psychoanalytic act. Hence the organization of work on the basis of cartels whose members have to recognize this plus one.

Lacan's innovations, considered as a whole, were not intending to satisfy some vain curiosity, as it has been hinted, but to allow us to find if not a definition, at least a few explanations about the desire of the analyst, in the essential function which is his in any analysis. There is hardly any doubt that, if this result had been achieved, it would have allowed consideration of other institutional structures based on what we could have learnt according to the principle 'to establish ourselves in the functioning'. It would have been, if I may say so, the 'happy' case of the application of this principle. This case, alas! did not eventuate, but failure did. Why?

I shall start from this remark: if the failure of the School is the failure of the passe, it does not mean that this last failure is the cause of the first. For the passe itself took place within the limits of the functioning of the School and it would have been strange if it had not suffered from this functioning. Here is an example, if not a proof.

In a letter to the newspaper Le Monde, Lacan wonders whom, among the members of his jury of assent ( Jury d'agrément), he would have advised to take upon themselves the passe. So there had
been a mistake in their choice. We cannot be surprised when the rules of the School entrusted this choice to elections, to vox populi.

Let us go further would the recourse to another mode of choice, for example, the drawing of lots or else a direct appointment by Lacan, have prevented this failure? It is certain that if such a modification had been an infallible remedy, Lacan would have adopted it without hesitation. Although he certainly had his own reasons, which I shall examine later, the failure of the passe cannot be dissociated from the functioning of the School in general and first, we must question why the functioning failed.

There we have the opinion of Lacan himself. The last time he spoke to the members of his School and it was already at this stage of life when his appearance evoked irresistibly Rembrandt’s last self-portraits, he said this literally: ‘Group psychology, you know it, it is in Freud’. But we cannot talk about group psychology according to Freud, without talking about the function of the Leader. How did it happen that Lacan was invested with this function he otherwise hated?

Lacan appeared on the scene of psychoanalysis at a time of need and crisis. I mean that he started his functions as a didactic analyst, at a time when those intending to become analysts or at least a great number of them, could not be contented with what was said about the connection between the end of analysis and the Oedipus: that at the end of analysis one kills the father; nor about transference: Ziegarnick effect; nor about the analyst: that the important thing is not what he says or what he does, but what he is – his manna in fact. As for the theoretical notions forged by Freud, their reduction to common knowledge was such that the ‘young’ analyst, that is the one who had not yet lost the sense of questioning, felt ‘lost’, for example, in the face of an observation attesting to the devastations of the super-ego (‘heir of Oedipus complex’, it was said) in a subject who had never known his father.

The first distinctions between the different registers of fatherhood introduced by Lacan at the seminar he inaugurated at his home – 3, rue de Lille – sounded among the members of his audience, very limited at that time, as a promise which everyone grasped with all their heart and soul – even those (or perhaps should I say: especially those) who knew that it was the promise of nothing other than a proper work with the unconscious. That is how the transference with Lacan started ‘fatally’, because what I called his appearance on the scene was not a vain appearance.

But transference, as we know, carries the best and the worst; and when it is strengthened on the scale of a group, without talking of a large group, it becomes insoluble. Even a dissolution act could not do it. But let us proceed slowly.

Lacan had something to say. Not anything, but he had answers to the questions asked by those called ‘the young’. And those answers did not come out of the blue: he learnt them (he said so in America and elsewhere) from the lips of his analysands. For all that, he had, in order to find them, to ‘submit’ himself to their discourse, as he says. In a way, this ‘submission to the discourse’ was all that lacan knew; that was his strength.

The result was a message, his, which once more ‘fatally’ had to take the following shape: ‘They wrote… but as for me, I tell you’. On that account, Lacan became, whether he liked it or not, a charismatic leader. The very shape of his message proved to have some effects that the content of his discourse, of the discourse of the analyst, could not dissolve. Let us disregard what happened between the time of the beginning and the second period, which starts with ‘Je fonde’ (‘I found’). The same effects, despite the apparent enthusiasm, were still to become stronger.

Lacan has been blamed for this beginning: ‘I found, as alone as I have always been in my relation to the analytic cause...’ Did we ever wonder what would have happened if he had said: ‘I found with you, my chosen’? In a word, Lacan, analyst, had to advance constantly between Charybdis who deceives the expectation of love and Scylla who arouses what he was unable to control.
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For not only was he the founder, but also, as no one had a clear idea of what could replace the disgraced structures of the I.P.A., he had to be the legislator. Here is a position whose imaginary resonances we will appreciate, if we remember that even Roman Emperors were considered and considered themselves, as judges and jurists, whose advice could be asked, as today we ask lawyers, but not as an authority which enacts or makes up the laws. Even better: contrary to what is generally admitted, the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope was installed not to grant the Pope an absolute power, but to jugurate this power; for if the Pope is infallible, each successor is at the same time tied up by the laws issued by his predecessors. I need say no more about the imaginary place taken by Lacan in the transference of the group.

The consequences were all the more serious as Lacan was in charge of the School, from the beginning to the end. Pierre Benôt drew attention to the dangers of Lacan's double position: as a master and as a 'schoolmaster'. But the odds are that if Lacan had let someone else be in charge of the School, the result would have been the same as when Freud gave Adler the presidency of the Viennese Society: the students did not waste any time in re-establishing Freud in his position of leadership. And probably Lacan, who was very familiar with the history of psychoanalysis, knew it.

So that he only had one hope left and a very slight one: to try to modify the relation of a group to its leader. 'The one who dares undertake to establish a people, writes Rousseau, must be in a position to change, so to speak, the human nature.' Let us disregard human nature. The experience of the School, proves in any case, that group psychology does not change. At the most, we can slow down its development, by avoiding everything which can give the institution a fictitious unity, which assimilates it to what is called a 'moral person'.

It is really what Lacan could not avoid – and I wonder how we can blame him for it, unless we suppose that 'no one is supposed to ignore the future' which would be an even crazier thing to say than the dictum we know. When he was about to grant the School its institutions, what did this School mean to him? Of course, what it should have been so long as the effective experience of its functioning had not been settled, namely: an organism (the metaphor comes under the pen) meant to accomplish certain tasks and which, for that purpose, had to have several administrative organs. Here is the problem. He believed that organization = administration.

But the fact is that not only 'any administration is a domination', as Weber would say, but also should I add, precisely through what Lacan taught us, that the position of the administrators is exactly that of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge. To such an extent that, asking one day a member of the ex-School why he chose his analyst, I heard him say without the slightest hesitation: 'But because I was flabbergasted by his impudence!'. Understand: by his ability to impose on you because of the position of administrator he had been granted.

Moreover, the people in charge of different tasks had been appointed and maintained in the same position without any exchange of posts for almost twenty years by Lacan himself; general meetings practically, were merely approving the lists submitted by Lacan. But, whatever the reasons of confidence which motivated Lacan, the fact is that this mode of appointment and distribution of jobs is really characteristic of that of organizations based on charismatic authority.

Plus there is the number factor which, as we know, tends to reinforce group effects, to the extent of making them – after a certain point – practically irremediable. The School which hardly had one hundred members at the beginning, had more than six hundred at the time of its dissolution, not counting its corresponding members. An increase almost equal to that of the American psychiatric analysts, encouraged and supported by the Federal government, and who from 3,000 in 1945 reached 25,000 in 1978. Indeed, the development of the School was due to the loud echoes created by Lacan's teaching; nevertheless we cannot hold as negligible this general fact stressed by sociologists: the
loosening, today, of the identity received by the individual from his belonging to the family and the search for this identity more and more in the profession. This explains what Jean Clavreul drew attention to, during the Journées de Deauville: namely that in 1968, we hardly found in the School a non-analyst who did not become an analysand or an analyst. We wonder: where do all these people, indeed driven by a desire which trusted Lacan, but who nonetheless had to be tested, could find a sufficient number of analysts for their training? The result was that the Freudian School tended to become little by little a type of cultural movement, which some other people did not fail, since, to set up as a model. As for the association between analysts and non-analysts, which at the start met the need to take psychoanalysis out of its ‘extraterritoriality’, it became a body which was neither fish nor fowl. The same person played at the School the part of linguist, mathematician, sociologist, etc...while playing the psychoanalyst among the people of his own speciality.

The School did not become an ‘operating centre against the malaise of civilization’, but rather a place where under the apparent unity based on the devotion to the master, everyone was in fact everybody’s enemy. A formless place from where came out such and such works which we read over and over again, not without recalling the Oedipus, the denunciation of the master’s tyranny and the students’ servitude. All that without noticing that, for lack of any reference to the symbolic, such a discourse was itself included in the Oedipus, such works where, in the name of a practice, which did not change anything as if there was an analytic practice which does not rely on a theory and as if every theory did not establish a method of allowing it to consider it true or false; not to mention the publications whose ideological inspiration when displayed deceived nobody.

How could the experience of the passe not suffer from this state of things? Of course the first reason (I almost say it in the sense of the first date) of its failure is that at the time when Lacan submitted his Proposition, his students, among whom were after all the members of the jury of assent (Jury d’agrément), were far from adequately understanding what was suggested to them. Those who approved did it because they trusted Lacan. There is indeed, in the life of an institution, as in the life of an individual, an age, a limit beyond which one must be in a position to explain this trust, which otherwise runs the risk of becoming the most comfortable form of resistance. But the conditions which were arranged for the application of the experience of the passe turned out to be very impracticable, which contributed a lot to the prevention of any progress in that direction.

Firstly, the passant was supposed to be an analyst who had just finished his analysis, at a relatively recent date. But we dealt with candidates of some analysts who had been practising for several years. These candidates, which could not be rejected purely and simply, could not be of a great benefit. The Jury of assent (Jury d’agrément) came to a negative conclusion only in two cases:

a) the case where the desire to give testimony was apparently missing; the rather pragmatic reasons, of the candidature itself, only showed through;

b) the case of candidates whose testimony did not leave any doubt that those ‘seniors’ had become analysts by means of an identification to the analyst, which was sometimes well established even before the start of the analysis, which was then, a resistance right through. So that we can say that, what represents for some the culminating point of a successful analysis, is in fact, the unquestionable sign of its failure. This is at least a lesson we have learnt from the passe, even if it is a negative one.

Secondly, the passant was supposed to carry out his proceeding – this has been written by Lacan – with the agreement of his analyst. But this condition has turned out to be impracticable – and I would readily add: not always desirable. So among the candidates who applied then, some were practising analysis while their own analysis was not yet finished. Besides we know that not all analytic societies ask their students to wait until the end of their analysis in order to start practising. Some societies even require that the
analysis continues for two years after they start practising analysis. Anyhow, the examination of candidatures which came under those conditions shows - at least in my opinion - that the passage to the practice of analysis before the end of the didactic analysis is always an acting-out, where indeed a desire is signified, but a desire which refers to a given moment of the analysis, without explaining what can happen at the end of the analysis. The jury came to a positive conclusion in the case where the acting-out in question, was going in the direction of an authentic analytic work.

I shall add in conclusion that it is not exaggerated to say that almost half of the candidatures were presented by analysands or analysts who would never have thought of carrying out this procedure without the extraordinary swelling of the title A.E. (Analyste de l’Ecole, Analyst of the School) whose bearer had become the only analyst who counted, the true one, the didactic analyst, the theoretician etc. All this has not only been said and repeated again and again, but also, driven by a kind of collective frenzy. Those who said it did not hesitate to project this mirific vision on Lacan and his jury of assent (Jury d’agrément) who, in fact, were often put in an embarrassing situation by candidatures which required rather ‘a clinical listening’. In short we can count on the fingers of one hand the candidatures abiding by the conditions initially planned. But when we recall the number of observations of obsessional neuroses or hysterias needed by the analyst before he can start to understand a new observation (which the minds who like to work with nothingness cannot figure at all, like those who use any type of teaching as a weapon), we cannot see why the light should have to come out from those few testimonies.

This disproportion conveyed the disproportion which existed within the School between group effects on the one hand and what was carried on as authentic work, on the other.

Lacan certainly introduced the basic concepts on which an institution was to rely, of a new kind, even unknown before. But for the reasons I have explained, his School became an institution relying on charismatic authority and granted with a centralist administration. Such an institution has its own logic that no dissolution could stop. Max Weber showed that this logic requires that the question of succession comes up sooner or later and that its solution is found (whatever maybe the dramatic episodes which punctuate its development and the idea which each protagonist has of his role) in the ‘routinization of charisma’.

However, Lacan has left a conception of the training of the analyst, the seriousness of which will always mobilize new desires.

Learning from the lessons of this failure of the E.F.P., those driven by these desires will have no problem in finding the principles allowing that, instead of the administrative apparatus where the institution is fixed as a ‘moral person’, a support for souls in need of an identification, could be substituted, according to Claude Contes remark, a place where everyone is aware of the consequences for the institution that one’s position implies.

Translated by Claude Schneider.

Notes
2. English in the original.
3. English in the original.
4. Federn and Stekel started practising in 1903.
We can say here with Robert Bocock (Freud and Modern Society, Ed. Nelson, Great Britain, 1980, p.130) that Freud, with his group theory, complements Marx more than he opposes him.


Emphasis is mine.


As a sample, cf. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. XXXV, part II.


As Pilhes' novel points out (L'Imprévateur, Seuil), the function of those supposed subjects of knowing is far from missing from the "giant, multinational and American" companies. Cf. also, Pierre Legendre's last book, Paroles poétiques échappées du texte, Seuil, Paris.


English in the original.

in Pouvoirs, No.17, 1981.


Perspectives on the Training of Analysts in the World. This report, published by the International Journal of Psychoanalysis (1979, 1) gives the conclusions of a survey resulting from the inquiries of the I.P.A. Studies Committee about the training of analysts. Micheline Henriquez gave a very good summary of it in an article that we have already mentioned.


Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne


26. English in the original.


28. I.J.P., 43, p.227. The lists of 'qualities' required of the analyst are many. We find them among the most different authors, most of them didactic analysts.

29. English in the original.

30. English in the original.


32. English in the original.

33. English in the original.

34. English in the original.


37. English in the original.

38. 'Tu sé lo meo maestro cf. first canto in Dante's Inferno.'


41. English in the original.

42. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, No.20.


45. June 1964, after disintegration of the S.F.P. (Société française de psychanalyse)

Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts

46. Cf. The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis, The Hogarth Press, London, 1967. We will not recall here Lacan's disastrous objections to the idea of 'therapeutic alliance' and those expressed by the sociologists of the Frankfurt School against Hartman's conception of 'health'. Let us recall however, that the condemnation of the technique of Lacan's short sessions took place in 1953, when the Committee on Evaluation of Psychoanalytic Therapy of the American Psychoanalytic Association had to be dissolved after six and a half years of unsuccessful debates to find an acceptable definition of psychoanalytic therapy. Three years later, Helen Tartakoff, in her excellent review of books about psychoanalytic technique, had to admit that the word 'psychoanalysis' which appeared in the titles of those books, was loosely applied to the very different therapeutic methods, based on personal postulates, particular to each author.

In actual fact, the technique of short sessions that Lacan was led to adopt, as he mentions in his letter to Balint published in Analytica, in the face of specific forms of resistance characteristic of didactic analyses, was based on the one hand, on a refusal to define 'the force of the ego', with its capacity to support the frustration without regression (the self being a frustration in its essence) - a view largely confirmed by Wallon's observations on the envying sympathy or the sympathizing envy. On the other hand, it was based on a conception of the psychoanalytic experience as an experience of the discourse, a conception authorizing
the use of the interruption of sessions for the purpose of "punctuation". Indeed, we are dealing here with a metaphor: what will the analyst say to the analysand when asked if the interruption of the session is a full stop, a comma, an exclamation or interrogation mark, etc...? But, at least, this metaphor is better adapted to the nature of psychoanalytic experience than the military metaphors which pullulate in writings about technique. Anyway, to believe that there could be, at the level of the conduction of analysis, a technique which guarantees the practitioner against mistakes, not to mention abuse, is a lure behind which we hide for fear of facing the only serious question: that of the desire of the analyst.


49. Méconnaissance: word composed by mé (in English equivalent to the prefix dis) and connaissance (in English knowledge). There does not seem to be an accurate translation for the connotations of the word.


52. The text of this Act is published, along with a note, in the directory of the Freudian School of Paris, where the reader will also find the Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole.

53. To my knowledge, no one better than Catherine the Great has been able to explain the reasons of her authority. This passage from a letter sent, a few years after her death, to young Emperor Alexander by someone close to her, shows it: 'Nothing left a greater impression on my mind than this conversation (with Catherine): Its topic was the unlimited power with which Catherine the Great not only ruled her own empire, but also arranged matters in other countries. I spoke of my surprise in the fact of the blind obedience with which her will was carried out everywhere, in the fact of the haste and zeal that everyone showed to please her'. 'It is not easy as you think, she condescended to reply. First of all, my orders could not be carried out if they were not of that type of orders which could be carried out. You know how cautiously and warily I work to promulgate my laws. I examine the circumstances, I seek advice, I consult the enlightened part of the people and in that way, I discover which type of effects my law is likely to produce. And only when I am convinced in advance to have everyone's assent, do I give my orders and have the pleasure to observe what you call blind obedience. And that is the foundation of unlimited power. But believe me, they would not obey blindly if the orders were not adapted to the customs, to the people's opinion and if I only followed my own desires without dreaming of the consequences. Cf. Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the age of Catherine the Great, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1982, p.380. Italics from the original.
Cf. also, on the same topic, the origin of authority, Serge Moscovici's last book, L'Age des foules, Paris, Fayard, 1980, which, unfortunately I found only after I had finished writing this essay.

54. English in the original.
56. Cf. note 49.
57. Published in Silicet 2, Paris, Seuil.
60. English in the original.
61. Cf. note 49.
64. English in the original.

69. I say 'anxiety' and not 'fear'. The nature of anxiety is not that it is without object but that we don't know what this object is at the time when we feel the anxiety. Passant: Subject who takes the passe upon himself.


73. Cf. Safouan.
74. During the first E.F.P. Congress, Lacan put forward that this return does not, as in medieval times, take the shape of the neurosis of possession by the devil, but truly that of racial segregation. Those words are so truthful that today they seem prophetic.

75. All the less unthinkable, I should say, as have every reason to see in the rising of bureaucratic structures today another consequence in 'the alteration of human groupings by Science'.

76. English in the original.
77. English in the original.
78. Cf. Tony Honoré.
80. Origins of Papal Infallibility, Brill, 1972. Pierre Legendre (cf. Pouvoirs, 11) agrees: for him, the failure of the School is the failure of a centralist administration — which does not imply so much that the remedy is found in a decentralized administration.
The Presentation of Patients:
Charcot, Freud, Lacan, Today

Erik Porge*

Why, today, do we speak of the presentation of patients? Because it is one of the ways, an apt one, to speak of certain patients: the mad. However, is speaking of the presentation of patients the same as speaking of the patients? Yes, since it is speaking whilst taking into account the way in which one speaks of them, the place from which one hears them. I am not mad! cries Descartes so as to continue his Meditation, his hyperbolical doubt. Whatever interpretation one makes of that moment, this exclamation is not acceptable for us since it would be another madness to believe, not that every person is mad, but that the mad person is not a subject.

In its common psychiatric usage – since that is what it is – the presentation of patients is widely criticised, including by many

psychiatrists. This is rightly so, to the extent that the presentation of patients has a function, more or less acknowledged, of illustration. Illustration, not so much of a theory, but of signs and symptoms, of which the art would be to make a tableau and even a resemblance to a tableau, itself seen from another tableau as is evidenced by the reproduction of a tableau of Le Dominiquin (1581-1641) inserted in the notes of Charcot’s Lecons du Mardi, a tableau corresponding to the third phase of an hysterical attack in a 14 year old boy.

Such a usage of the presentation of patients is not obligatory, and one can reject a certain way of going about things – the bathwater – without having to reject the mechanism – the baby.

Moreover, this method of practising the presentation of patients is today an anachronism: since the advent of psychoanalysis the interview with the patient cannot be the same as that in the time of Charcot. For there to be any question of analysis, it is not sufficient to display understanding and tact with the patient, but one must be able to use the whole of the mechanism itself, in other words including the audience, as analytical reference points. Unfortunately, as psychoanalysis is thought to be a purely private affair, it has not been considered that the audience, provided that it is situated, could operate analytically. Any treatment of a psychotic should remind us of this however, and it is for this reason that the psychotic is a favoured interlocutor, today, of the presentation of patients.

If it is anachronistic to continue a pre-psychoanalytic style of presentation of patients, it does not mean that these presentations, in their time, did not have a value from which, precisely by taking them back to their own era we could learn something today. Thus the presentations of Charcot were not without relation to psychoanalysis, in that they had a significant effect on Freud.

Charcot had two types of presentations of patients. On Fridays, he saw the patients whom he had previously studied with great care, and about whom he had reflected at length. He strove to keep his audience up-to-date with his latest research. The presentations commenced in 1884: Freud was present. The Tuesday presentations started later. It was those of the year 1887-88 which were published from the notes of Blin, Charcot’s son, and Colin, and then translated by Freud into German. Unlike those of Fridays, the Tuesday presentations were ‘organised in such a way so as to give a picture of daily clinical practice, with all its surprises, all its complexity’. The patients were taken from all comers attending as out-patients, and were therefore unknown to Charcot, who
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the Salpêtrière, as if I had created it by my own will-power. That would be something truly marvellous if I could thus create diseases according to my whim and my fantasy. However, in truth, I am only here as the photographer; I note what I see and it is all too easy for me to show that it is not just as the Salpêtrière that these things happen. In the first place the tales of the demoniacs of the Middle Ages are full of them. Monsieur Richer, in his book, shows us that things were exactly as they are today.3

It is necessary to make a clinical tableau because the objectivity of the approach is the very same as that of the photographer.

It is in this sense that this questionable presentation style should be given back to its era where it had the historical value of legitimising hysteria of women, men and children, for scientific discourse. With his successive presentations of hysterical and neurological patients, Charcot put them on the same level in regard to medical science; and even if it was at the price of attributing to hysteria an aetiology based on the organic model, the functional lesion, he took hysteria out from that with which it was confused: simulation, imitation. He credited hysteria, its symptoms if not its words, with an originality, minus a meaning.

Following his voyage to Paris, Freud wrote:

His efforts [those of Charcot] also permitted hysteria to be taken out of the chaos of the neuroses, to differentiate it from other similar states and to give it a symptomatology which, although rather multiform, allowed law and order to reign.6

As early as his stay in Paris, Freud informed Charcot of his intention to publish a collection of his presentations, and offered himself to translate it into German. He owed this plan to, on the one hand, a close personal contact with Charcot and, on the other hand, the possibility of extending his stay in Paris beyond the
period covered by the study grant which had been allocated to him; which means that he was paid for this work.

In terms of Freud's relationship to Charcot, the presentation of patients must be taken into account. However, one thing is astonishing: Freud never gave presentations but, at no time, does he criticise this style of teaching of Charcot, even though he allowed himself to criticise him on his aetiological theories, precisely in his translations of the Lecons du mardi, in a series of notes, thus going against all conventions of translation. It seems to me that we should see in this the effect of an interpellation by Freud as a member of the audience, of the presentation, an effect not recognised by Freud, and perhaps due to the way in which the audience was interpellated by Charcot.

We know that Freud was fascinated by Charcot's person, his presence, his voice, his 'magic'". More than by his publications, he was sensitive to the 'singular charm' of Charcot's verbal teachings. For Freud, there was not only the person but also the stage, the theatre stage: Charcot was a character from a theatre stage; Freud left Charcot's home, his lessons 'with the mind saturated, like after an evening at the theatre. And elsewhere:

Charcot left a unique impression... his voice reached our ears muffled, and one could almost understand how ill-intentioned outsiders could criticise the whole class for its theatrical aspect."

Freud knew what he was talking about since, as is evidenced by his correspondence with Martha, he spent a great number of his evenings at the theatre when he was in Paris. He gives, furthermore, picturesque descriptions of these evenings, and justifies them in Martha's eyes by his desire... to learn French.

By adding notes to his translation of the Lecons du mardi, notes that openly contradict the work he was translating, Freud, in some way, stepped onto the theatre stage of the presentation, finding that Charcot was playing his role badly, in order to play it better himself. Lacan called this type of procedure an 'acting-out'."

In doing this, Freud became the partner of the hysteric on a stage. This was not without consequences for his conception of hysteria. Let us remember that Freud recognised Oedipal desires, before calling them 'complex' in 1910, by the intermediary of the gripping power (packende Macht) that the tragedy of Sophocles had on him as a spectator, and which, in the Interpretation of Dreams, he compares "to the work of a psychoanalysis.""

In a single stroke, the presentation of patients separated hysteria from simulation and made itself like a theatre stage. Today, since psychoanalysis, the hysteric has left the stage of the presentation of patients to go to that of the couch. However, the 'hysterised' stage of the presentation of patients remains, and it is the psychotics who are able to find a place there. They are able to find a place with psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis stemming from the teachings of Lacan. It is because I attended Lacan's presentations that I have tried to reflect on the conditions necessary for the presentation of patients to remain today an analytic act.

1. Since the presentation of patients generally takes place in a psychiatric hospital, the question is raised of the institutional role of the presentation of patients in the unit in which it takes place. The unit must be able to take on (in other words: to react other than with indifference, derision or a settling of scores) the modifications which the presentation could possibly incur in the patient. Thus, the choice of patient would not be made by chance, and the usefulness of the presentation for the patient should be assessed. It is only to the extent that something is expected of the presentation for the patient that the presentation can be considered.

2. The attitude that one adopts towards the audience is decisive for the presentation. I have already rejected that of Charcot. However, this is not in order to refuse to recognise that the presentation takes place on a stage. On the contrary, we should take this matter more seriously than Charcot. There is a necessary separation between the audience and those who hold the dialogue: presenter and patient. It
is like the invisible rail around the stage, which is a 'hundred thousand volt current which remains even when the actor is sitting on the knees of the spectator'. The respect for this distance is the responsibility of the presenter. Even if this barrier is broken — a rule is made to deal with exceptions — this must never take the form of a connivance, an understanding, a complicity between the presenter and the audience. If we take the distinction which Lacan established, in a seminar, between the stage and the world (the stage is the dimension of history, of the signifier; the world is where the Real exerts its pressure), we can postulate that, in their behaviour, psychotics act as if there were no stage, as if they were in the world. In this way, the presentation, by becoming a stage, can fulfill for them the function of a boundary within the delusion.

This stage is a theatre stage, not a cinema screen. The audience is present, in body, whilst the presentation takes place. The audience, by its attentive presence, ratifies the discourse at play in the presentation.

The presentation of patients remains a unique event for the patient, it is not destined to be repeated, and this uniqueness is one of the conditions for its valorisation, for its dramatization. These conditions differentiate the audience of a presentation from that which we call a crowd, which functions, as Freud said, according to the model of the Army or the Church. This audience is not a crowd in that it is also a chosen audience, of people who come regularly, who are committed to an ongoing work. They are in on psychoanalysis. Indeed, and this was the case with Lacan's presentations, the audience can share the experience of the analysis with the presenter. Finally, coming from outside the hospital, the audience creates a type of dehiscence into the inside. Thus situated, the audience is able to play an active and structuring role, even though it remains silent. It functions as a third place (which we can compare to the third person of the joke), which the subject addresses indirectly, and from where, in third position, he can contemplate an image of himself, feel the affects, hear the joke. In its role as a third place, the audience has an anti-persecutory role: it limits the omnipotence, the omniscience of the interviewer, it places itself between the dual relationship insofar as neither of the two 'partners' (the patient and the interviewer) is master of the premises.

3. It is to be understood that the presentation of patients does not relate to the re-presentation of photography, but to the act of speaking. Since, even more so than in hysteria, we would not be able to clinically locate the psychoses without taking into account the way in which we address the subject. In their own way, classical psychiatrists recognised this. Clérambault noted that we no longer knew how to question erotomaniacs:

We should not question a deluded person as we question a candidate for a diploma, for the procedure of question and answer has the effect of dictating rational answers and to give the subject the sense of which answers he should avoid... These patients should not be questioned, but manoeuvred, and, to manoeuvre them, there is only one way: to affectively move them.

Dupré, in his article on the delusion of imagination, also found that the way of questioning determines the answers:

One other cause contributes to apparently diminish the occurrence of the delusion of imagination: it is the way in which patients are ordinarily questioned by the doctor. A patient who, spontaneously, would be content to confirm that his delusion is a direct intuition of his conscience and who is not, generally, argumentative, takes, on the contrary, the appearance of an interpreter when, to answer the questions and especially the objections of his doctor, he tries to justify by facts and by reasoning his delusional system. There would perhaps be fewer interpreters and more imaginatives if the doctor asked the patient as few questions as possible and left the patient entirely free to reveal himself by his speech, the natural course of his thoughts... The same thing applies, one can say, to the delusion of interpretation as to hysteria: in certain cases, it seems due, at least to a large degree, to the collaboration between the doctor and the patient.
The case. It makes him What not in must extends Papers presentation How asked positions have extent scientific ideal, to clinical psychoanalysis since psychoanalysis act something the of the patient holds onto, which he holds onto, which he speaks. Clinical practice shows that it is not a clinical practice based on the objectification of the tableau, the syndrome, the interesting case. It is a clinical practice for which the price is –

a complete submission, even if this is an informed submission, to the subjective positions of the patient, positions which are too often forced and reduced to the dialogue of the pathological process.30

What is important in the dialogue with the patient is to put to the test that which the patient holds onto, which is also that which makes him hold on and that which is important to him.

The presentation of patients cannot take place in the same way since psychoanalysis as put forward by Lacan, in that – and here he extends what Dupré said – ‘the clinician takes charge of half of the symptom of the patient.’21

There is also some manoeuvring in the presentation of patients, but not in the sense that Clérambault intends. For Clérambault, the patient must be deceived for him to talk about his delusion. He authorises himself to deceive the patient in the non-deceptive name of the scientific ideal, to which he submitted himself, moreover, to the extent of suicide. No, if there is a manoeuvre, it is in order to stay as close as possible to the subjective positions of the patient. These positions have something in common: the subject speaks of something that spoke to him. But from where was he spoken to? Who does the subject address when he speaks of that which spoke to him? How does the presentation of patients interfere with this enunciation to the extent of having beneficial effects? The question merits being asked all the more since the presentation, such as we defend it, is an act of speech where the subject is exhorted to speak; however, this in itself has been identified by Lacan as a point of entry into psychosis:

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This is the most difficult thing that can be asked of a man – and against which in his world he does not come up against that often – that which can be called: to speak, himself, the contrary of saying yes, yes, yes, to the speech of a fellow man. It is not necessarily expressed in words. Clinical practice shows that it is precisely at that moment that, if one knows how to identify it at very different levels, the psychosis declares itself.22

Why can the presentation of patients, then, on the contrary, be particularly suited to the actualisation of psychotic subjectivity, in a way that is not overwhelming? In the first place, it seems to me, by the indirect structure of discourse that the presentation puts into place. In speaking to the presenter, the subject speaks indirectly to the audience and vice versa. Each speaks at once – I will come back to this – to an other and to the audience, a third place. This mechanism, of which the structure must be guaranteed, forms a type of loop between the structure of the subject, as Lacan enunciated it, and that which is manifested in the mental automatism.

The subjective is not on the side of he who speaks. It is something which we find in the Real...insofar as it supposes that we have, facing us, a subject capable of utilising the signifier, the game of the signifier. And capable of utilising it, not to signify something but to deceive regarding that which there is to be signified.9

If the clinician is brought to take charge of half of the symptom of the patient, it is precisely for the reason that the subject is represented by a signifier for another signifier and that ‘the subject is not spoken to. It speaks of him.’18 This is almost literally what a patient said to me, the day of a presentation: ‘The holy spirits left me this morning. Let me leave! You can interview them. They will speak to you about me. I cannot speak.’ It is to this other who is elsewhere, who speaks to the subject (écho de la pensé, commentaries on the patient’s activities and other manifestations of mental automatism), and therefore – the conclusion that the patient rightly draws – who can speak of the subject, and from where the
subject can speak? In the presentation of patients, what the subject says to the presenter is, simultaneously, heard elsewhere: an elsewhere, not who speaks to the subject or of the subject, but to whom the subject can speak indirectly. If this elsewhere is to have a calming role on the suffering of the imposition of speech, it is because this elsewhere functions as a boundary. It is not an elsewhere where, in the case of the hallucination, the Imaginary and the Symbolic are superimposed and synergised. For the clinician and for the patient, the audience represents a same listening in the name of which both speak. The audience is not a crowd which will choose, take sides for one against the other. It is only addressed indirectly: there is something of the eccentric, the partial, the not-all. There is a limitation of the Symbolic by the Imaginary: staged mirror effects on the stage by which the subject can reach the positivity of his mirror image, or experience himself as a body. There is also a limitation of the Imaginary by the Symbolic: in the suspense which the dialogue maintains in the presentation – which is prolonged – the patient may become aware of a type of answer from the Other, which, contrary to what happens in the mental automatism (anticipated écho de la pensée), does not anticipate the question. The presenter attempts to understand, attempts which he identifies as such to the patient in order to shake his certainty of the knowledge of the Other to which he is prey. Very quickly, the patient understands that he is in a position to let this audience from outside of the hospital know (faire-savoir) that which, having come from outside, brought him inside the hospital.

One day, in a hospital, I wanted to see a patient; the nurse was present in the office. The patient flatly refused to let the nurse stay during the interview, and made her leave the room. I asked him why. 'Because she is a nurse and I do not need to be nursed', he replied. The nurse did not occupy the place, for him, of an audience in third position. She was sending him back his message in a non-inverted form. The situation was persecutory: instead of receiving his message from the Other in an inverted form, he heard his message from the place of the other, Imaginary, like a reflection in the mirror: it was like giving a tit for tat answer where it is impossible to know whether the tit or the tat came first.26 The astonishing thing is that I had seen the same patient a few days previously in a presentation, in other words in front of, not one person, but 20 of them, and that after the presentation, the patient had let the audience know that he was very satisfied with 'the lecture'. What is the difference in the reaction of the same subject to two apparently similar situations due to? In one case, that of the presentation, the audience was able to play the role of the third, and not in the other. At the time of the presentation, the audience was not the same; immediately the patient inquired about the composition of the audience: it was composed of a majority of psychologists. The beneficial effect of the presentation, which the patient attested to subsequently, was attributed, by him, to having been able to speak at once (these were his words) to a doctor-psychiatrist-analyst and to psychologists. Moreover, the function of the audience was different to that of the nurse: the audience was there not to nurse him, but to listen to what he had to say, to what he had to let-know, hence the term 'lecture' with which he qualified the presentation.

From this letting-know (faire-savoir), the savoir-faire of the clinician, during the presentation, consists of being, in body, the spokes-man.


Translated by Michael Plastow.


13. Freud, S. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Ch.5, St.Ed. Vol. VI.

14. For a development of these questions, cf. Porge E. 'La présentation de malades'. Littoral, September 1985, No. 17.


17. I refer here to Freud’s distinction between Darstellung (presentation) and Vorstellung (representation).


The Consistency of the Name

María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner*

The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it.

Oscar Wilde

You never look at me from the place where I see you.

Jacques Lacan

The subject constitutes himself from the gaze of the Other.

Jacques Lacan

The no-sexual relation that psychoanalysis discovers with the asymmetry and the lack of inscription in the unconscious of the

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feminine and the masculine, is organised in neurosis as repressed, in perversion as disavowed and in psychosis as foreclosed, and is the way in which a lack is constituted in object – object that is also outlined by the arts when they identify the inaccessible with a fantasm.

In this structural lack resides the horrifying void of Medusa’s effect as the semblance proposed by all aesthetics. In this way art – as well as love – constitutes semblance of this no-sexual relation.

In the written and oral tradition of the literature called infantile this object metonymises in elves, fairies, witches, demons, wizards and nymphs. On the contrary, Saint Thomas Aquinas in his Aesthetics defines universal beauty through three qualities: totality, harmony and clarity.

The incongruous becomes evident when, losing its appearance, it shows the horror of the truth such as it has been demonstrated in the unsuccessful disavowal or in a bungled action when the Angst that was at play irrupts in the order of the nights and days of the incompleteness, the disharmony and the obscurity of that which constitutes an existence.

Lewis Carroll, constituted as passion in the literary world, master of logic, mathematics, the absurd and parody, found in the pseudonym of the Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson the metaphor of his life; profound split between being and thinking. Neither subject nor object, fantasm.

Lewis Carroll is the brilliance of the opaque Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (1832-1898), professor of mathematics for half a century at Oxford University and resident of Christ Church College, whose lectures were characteristically boring, sombre and without any trait of humour. He confirmed, in the manner of the words of Flaubert: ‘If He is to wax, then I must wane’, words attributed to St John the Baptist when announcing his fading with the advent of Christ.

The anagram of Lewis Carroll is indivisible from his writing, the invention of logical problems, syllogisms, riddles, enigmas, puzzles, acrostics, mathematical games and the photography of naked girls: ‘With children who know me well, and who regard dress as a matter of indifference, I am very glad (when mothers permit) to take them in any amount of undress which is presentable, or even in none (which is more presentable than any form of undress)...If you ever meet with any such children of Nature, I shall be glad to hear of them.’

The middle name of his creation, Alice Pleasance2 Liddell – of French origin, means what you have already guessed: pleasure. One way of operating with the malaise of Alice in Pleasure, one of the daughters of the dean of Christ Church, was by transforming her into Alice in Wonderland. The following anonymous nursery rhyme is an apt description of this transformation:

What are little girls made of?
Sugar and spice
And all things nice.
That’s what little girls are made of.

What are little boys made of?
Slugs and snails
And puppy-dog’s tails.
That’s what little boys are made of.

The weight of the indelible presence of Alice Pleasure is presentified in the lines of his writing that separate body from jouissance:1 ‘Worrity, worrity! there never was such a child!’ ‘Worrity, worrity! Can’t you leave a body alone?’4 As Lacan reminds us in Encore ‘...a body is something that is enjoyed...one’s body [is the one that] enjoys a part of the body of an Other...When one loves, it is not a matter of sex.’ Impotence of love.

We have to remember that in Victorian England, heir of the romantic forbears, the prevalent idea was that the child arrived into the world innocent and pure. Those who maintained this view were
precisely the readers of Blake, Wordsworth and Coleridge. We could summarise the Victorian moral under the perspective that both boys and girls are born pure and most especially the girl who is the result of the work of God; consequently, still close to him. From this perspective the adult, by remaining close to the child, could once again take up the contact with God which he had in the meantime lost.

Thus it is that whilst the impeccable Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson became a part of the spiritual building of Christ Church with no light of his own, Lewis Carroll illuminated with writing and genius the beginnings of nonsense literature for children. Both characters were to remain in this way separated, split – making subject of the non-sense, pun for the occasion when sense lacks.

In the writing of nonsense, the signifier Carroll is elicited from the speculation, logic and mathematics like a real elided from religion, moreover, of the religiousness always attached to sense, creating in this way the possibility of a knowledge about jouissance – at a pure loss. Could we risk saying that his writing of nonsense – or foolishness – carries, as the smile of the angel, the same enigma, the dimension of the signifier in the consistency of the pseudonym?

The pseudonym Lewis Carroll, photographic camera/eye, register of the division that goes from the body to jouissance, is the creative testimony that locked into a secret leaves for us those objects a as residues: the breast, the gaze, the voice, the faeces. The Reverend had locked himself in this way as a Duchamp avant la lettre working in silence in a hermetic world with a catechism of his own that in its repetition made semblance of fixing a limit to jouissance.

This father of the symbolic logic makes a short circuit towards science foreclosing his place as subject in the abolition of his proper name. Or hasn’t this been always the minimum demand of science before the advent of psychoanalysis? Since science is characterised by demanding an ideal of objectivity in which transmission without distortion is only possible by suppressing the subjectivity of the subject who makes science.

He arrived to the foreclosure of his name by a word game: ‘While writing verse for a short-lived monthly publication, “The Train”, in 1856, he submitted five possibilities for a pseudonym: “Dares”, an abbreviation of Daresbury, his Cheshire birthplace; two anagrams of his christian name, “Edgar Cuthwells” and “Edgar U.C. Westhill” and by a complicated process of Latinization, reversal and retranslation, from Carolus Ludovicus, “Louis Carroll” and “Lewis Carroll”. The editor, Edmund Yates, chose the latter, first used to sign the poem “Solitude” in March 1856. 

Although a pseudonym does not necessarily suggest any discreditable motive for concealing the author’s identity, we should also remember that the prefix ‘pseudo’ added to a noun or adjective forms combinations indicating close or deceptive resemblance to the thing denoted by the second element, without real identity or affinity with it. It also denotes something which does not correspond with reality, or to which no reality corresponds, as false perceptions, errors of judgement or statements.

This is obviously not the road that we have followed. Therefore, if you wish, you can have the illusion of choosing: Lewis Carroll was a pseudonym for the Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson or the Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson was a pseudonym for Lewis Carroll? ‘Although we ought to grasp him whole and entire...there is no such thing as completeness."

The Reverend Dodgson cartesianly applies the ‘I am where I do not think’, whilst Lewis Carroll carries out the ‘I think where I am not.’ The pseudonym was the place of the einziger Zug, a Verleugnung that allows in his fantasm the making of the destiny of Lewis Carroll an eternal circulation as desire. ‘There are sceptical thoughts, which seem for the moment to uproot the finest faith, which dart unbidden into the most reverent souls; there are unholy thoughts, which torture with their hateful presence, the fancy that would fain be pure."

His writings have been and continue to be a testimony to the indelible adventure of discourse, avenue of desire that as an empty semblance fixes identification. The feminine infantile gaze was to
return to Carroll his own gaze, blind to his eye, scotoma, the gaze that saw him looking. A strange case of reversed camouflage.

We know from his writings that Carroll worked very particularly the theme of inversion, reversion and the reflection in the mirror. To be seen looking at those small bodies situated between erosism and seduction. As Carroll himself said: 'It is very healthy and helpful to one's spiritual life and humbling too, to come into contact with souls so much purer and nearer to God than one feels oneself to be.' At the same time, this God he mentions is ferocious and arbitrary but not inmotivated. As we can appreciate in the following dialogue, there is always cause: 'Talking of axes', said the Duchess, 'Chop off her head... He's murdering the time' Off with his head!' In this way, Pleasure limited by the Wonderland of desire elapses in this text.

Another less well known text is that which has given an extraordinary account not of what he saw but of the blind spot of his gaze: the eye of the Other. To see and to look, making perfect the detail through the hole of the photographic camera, to be seen gazing, with a remainder, a photograph, confirmation of his memory, dating forever the gaze of Alice Pleasure that freezes him in a point of his art - there where as subject he fades.

The Reverend Dodgson - orthodox in all regards - rejected the belief in eternal punishment. Shortly before his death he offered to return the photographs in souffrance to his young models, confirming once more how the letter arrives always to its destiny. In this way death, that area between jouissance and horror, was to be condensed in a single instant - eternal capture of that which fixes a gaze, hiding in its showing that which makes semblance of love. 'Sylvie's sweet lips shaped to reply, but her voice sounded faint and very far away. The vision was fast slipping from my eager gaze: but it seemed to me, in that last bewildering moment, that not Sylvie but an angel was looking out through those trustful brown eyes, and that not Sylvie's but an angel's voice was whispering 'It is Love'.

The relationship of Dodgson with Alice Pleasure, a relationship of courtly love, reinforced as all impeded love, the illusion of the relation instead of the no-sexual relation that in its absence made it potentially existent. The photographs are a testimony of the inexhaustible Angst fixated not so much in what could be seen but precisely in what Alice Pleasure would have seen - a point in which the subject ($) as gaze only announces his fading.

The pseudonym as gaze circulated between Alice Pleasure and himself: candid trap in which Carroll fell urged by Dodgson. 'How can we know who among the puppet-players holds the true Punchinello?'

We know that the Reverend Dodgson disclaimed any tribute to Lewis Carroll saying that: 'Mr C.L. Dodgson... neither claims not acknowledges any connection with any pseudonym nor with any book not published under his name.' As the Abbé de Choisy said: 'It is sweet to deceive the eyes of the public.' As the game is clear and everything is in sight, the enigma is still greater.

To read à la lettre in an art that prides itself on being one is to have arrived without knowing where one is.

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You might think it strange that the name, being so symbolic, hole of the real, would suddenly appear consisting, which shows already the anomaly of the name since for its characteristics it should not be there where you are reading it. Therefore, either you are nor reading well or I am writing mistakenly.

What I wanted to demonstrate to you today is how the Reverend, making anagrams of his Dodgson, conjured a Lewis in order to end up with a Carroll. However, in spite of it all, a name constitutes precisely when it is made again in order to cover certain lacks.

That is why what I have written consists not so much in what the pseudonym could represent for the author but in what his work
represented for the pseudonym. The ethics in question is not: we are what we do but we do what we are. From there it is that I wanted to share with you how *Alice Pleasure through the looking glass* represents that non reflective part –- what in psychoanalysis we know as the definition of the object *a* – concerning which we are always left with the question of how it would be, what would there be, on the other side. An Other in lack, terrifying, characterised by being the instigator of a joutissance. *Alice Pleasure* (*a*), occluding that Other, fixates Carroll. He writes her but she causes him.

That Dodgson existed there is no doubt. But perhaps all we know can be reduced to the same question which we are often driven to ask an analysand who has revealed that he knows everything about us: ‘And if you know everything about me, finally, what do you know?’ In other words, that his knowing isn’t for that reason less unknown – remembering that since Freud the unconscious is, precisely, a knowledge that is not known.

We find ourselves in a similar position when having read an important work, we know ‘everything’ about its author. Yet that knowledge continues to be no less of a ‘not-all’ knowledge.

This is the way in which I have read Reverend Dodgson’s writings which no longer belong to him nor to Lewis Carroll nor even to *Alice Pleasure*, where a name no longer exists but consists – fourth knot that borrometically sustains a real, a symbolic and an imaginary with the pseudonym and the creating of a writing – *sinthome*, if you wish, with its plus which is what I call the pleasure of reading.

**Notes**

1.

2. Carroll, L.

This is an extract from a letter that Lewis Carroll addressed to the mother of one of his female models. Published by Morton Cohen in *Lewis Carroll, Photographer of Children: Four Nude Studies*, the Rosenbach Foundation, Philadelphia, and Clarkson N. Potter, Inc. Publishers, New York, 1978.

Acrostic to his child-friend Alice Pleasance Liddell:

A boat, beneath a sunny sky
Lingering onward dreamily
In an evening of July –
Children three that nestle near,
Eager eye and willing ear,
Pleased a simple tale to hear –
Long has paled that sunny sky.
Echoes fade and memories die.
Autumn frosts have slain July,
Still she haunts me, phantomwise,
Alice moving under skies
Never seen by waking eyes.
Children yet, the tale to hear,
Eager eye and willing ear,
Lovingly shall nestle near.
In a Wonderland they lie,
Dreaming as the days go by,
Dreaming as the summers die.
Ever drifting down the stream
Lingering in the golden gleam
Life, what is it but a dream?

There are several references to the gaze in the acrostic: *Eager eye and willing ear* twice repeated and *Never seen by waking eyes* as well as perhaps a reference to Calderón de la Barca in the last verse: *Life, what is it but a dream?* Furthermore, insisting with the gaze,
in yet another possibility for a pseudonym he chose the initials 'U.C.' which, homophonically, of course, are equal to You see. And there is much more, too.

3.
I prefer to leave the writing of jouissance in French and without translation because no English word aptly conveys its meaning. However, the reader should keep in mind that it corresponds to the concept that Freud alluded to, from beginning to end, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as the presence of the inmixing of sexuality and death.

From the Wasp in the Wig — the 'suppressed' episode of Through the Looking Glass which Carroll agreed to suppress following the suggestions of John Tenniel, the illustrator of the book.

4. Carroll, L.

5. Fisher, J.


For einziger Zug see Freud, S. Chapter VII, On Identification of Group Psychology, St. Ed. Vol XVIII. Translated into English as single trait.

From Pillow Problems.

8. Carroll, L.

9.
'Stand with me here and gaze. From this thrice-favoured spot, in one rapturous glance gather in, and brand for ever on the tablets of memory, the Vision of the Three T's! To your left frowns the abysmal blackness of the tenebrous Tunnel. To your right yawns the terrible Trench. While far above, away from the sordid aims of Earth and the petty criticisms of Art, soars, tetragonal and tremendous, the tintinabulatory Teachest! Scholar, the Vision is complete!' (The three T's stand for Tact, Talent and Taste.)

10. Carroll, L.

11. Carroll, L.

Alice in Wonderland.

The Story of Sylvie and Bruno.

The Secretarial Function, Element of the Freudian Method

Jean Allouch*

Madness in great ones must not go unwatched.

Shakespeare, Hamlet III, I.

The secretary is the language of his master.

Machiavelli

There are, there have been (will there be?) many other words to express what Freud laid out in such a way that the Freudian thing could gain its status. Furthermore, the 'Freudian thing' is, not the least noted, one of them. These words are not equivalent in meaning, nor do they have the same consequences. Nor are they necessarily on good...terms with each other.

Some have disappeared from usage after having had their hour of glory. Today the illustrious world can no longer lay claim to the 'Psychology of depth'. Metaphors are used or else they are found to be no longer suitable. But are all these words metaphors?

Others seem to have definitively taken root. Hence the name, *Psychoanalysis* which was not dealt a blow by Lacan, though the Freudian 'psychic reality' no longer seemed to him to be a necessary reference. But does the meaning of each of these words, that have been so unanimously accepted, abide in being as much as they seem. Is it not possible that the sense like the meaning of these terms tends to undergo the backlash (possibly indirect) of the theoretical modifications or innovations which come after their promotion. Does this 'psychic reality' have the same meaning for those who today make use of metapsychology as for those who refute it in the name of hermeneutics? What then of the PSY of 'psychoanalysis' neither of which even gives the illusion of having a meeting point any more?

Other terms still are allowed here or refuted there or simply fall out of use. This is how the concept of the 'Freudian field' stands today — an essential reference for the Lacanians, though, of little interest otherwise.

Other words feature in the foreground, then recede without ever being explicitly excluded, coming back into use again. One of these will hold our attention, namely, the word 'method'.

Let us not prematurely qualify it by calling it 'Freudian' or 'psychoanalytic'. Or rather, since we must immediately index it, if only to be able to talk about it, let us choose to call it 'Freudian' without ignoring absolutely everything that such a qualification can imply in terms of prejudices or connote in terms of legend. Nothing can be advanced by someone who could not absolutely help saying some nonsense at the start, something which is furthermore impossible to realise since a silent utterance which could appear to be a solution would not guarantee not being one itself. Let us first of all study the *discourse of the method in Freud*; this first step will then enable us to confirm that the Freudian discourse is equivalent in fact, to a discourse of the method, that it is therefore more than admissible, that it is heuristically important to distinguish and to name as such the *Discourse of the Freudian method*. In this way we will be able to situate the 'secretarial' function as an essential function of this discourse of the Freudian method.

**Discourse of the Method in Freud**

The discourse of Sigmund Freud was that of a method which he advanced. There is something here which thus formulated, deserves to be considered as an event, as a fact. Moreover, the fact would have to be given meaning precisely within the formula.

Freud presents this breakthrough precisely as being that of a new method. To describe the event thus, furthermore depends in part on pleonasm: the words 'break-through' and 'method' both referring to the route (Odos).

To be sure, this new method in the Freudian text is characterised as a 'method of interpretation', with the *Traumdeutung* being the major reference and major production. Nevertheless, Freud makes use of the term 'psychoanalytic method' at least as many times. The latter is notably defined by its opposition to other methods, lumped together by him as such: That goes from the 'anatomoclinical method' to the 'Breuer method' passing by the 'hypnotic method', the 'Bernheim method', the 'cathartic method'. Let us not go into a differential study (a glimpse of which would nevertheless prove to be very instructive) but limit ourselves to five commentaries.

1. **The Hysteric, bearer of a lesson on method**

As Freud asserts, Breuer invents psychoanalysis, accepting to treat the symptoms of Bertha Pappenheim by the means which Bertha Pappenheim suggested to him. In this very way he creates a method. Breuer chooses to question his patient starting with a 'key word' (Stichwort – perhaps it would be better to translate it by *root-word* or even stimulus word) which he refers back to her after
having received it from her via her family – the word ‘desert’ is cited.

Bertha reacts to it, telling him the ‘circle of representation’ (Vorstellungskreis) or ‘private theatre’ from which, moreover, it came – an account whose literary aspect Breuer registers straight away. In the language of Lacan, one would speak about the relation between a primary signifier, an S1, and a set of other signifiers, inasmuch as the main signifier sets them up in the same way as a sting can provoke an inflammation.

Everything rests on the establishment, for Bertha, of ‘two completely separate states of consciousness’, normal consciousness alternating with inopportune named moments of ‘absence’ since it refers to a presence which is elsewhere; at nightfall, when the state of absence prevailed, seizing the opportunity, Breuer would refer back to her this stimulus word. Having delivered her narrative, Bertha would find herself emerging from her absence, while her aphasia disappeared temporarily. Breuer soon noticed that he had to question each of her symptoms, one by one, in this way the latter faded away when he was given the account of the scene from which they originated.

Breuer accepted to put into practice with respect to Bertha Pappenheim the methodological lesson he was learning from her – a method being taken to mean that one could oppose, with regard to the apprenticeship of the reading, this ‘global method’ to some other, more spelt out method. It is clear that from that inaugural time the secretarial function was effectively put to practice by Breuer: he used to transcribe the accounts, the reference of each account to the symptom to which it corresponded, transmitted some of them to Freud but to others as well as we can see today by the report on the published case.

Wittels, in his refreshing presentation of Freud, translated into French since 1925, remains rather sceptical on the matter of this attribution by Freud to Breuer of the credit of having invented the psychoanalytic method. Wittels makes use of a metaphor to speak of his apprehension of their relation and their respective contributions in this invention:

Breuer saw the unconscious become clear just like Bruecke saw the retina. But Freud gave us the lens which enabled the images of psychoanalysis to become visible. Nevertheless, it is not so simple as one can see by the single fact that psychoanalysts do not all agree on the lens itself, its principle or its use. If, however, all is not lost, it is because the invention was that of a method, because the method takes precedence over the doctrine.

2. Method and Technique

The method is not the technique. Different techniques of referencing the lesional phenomena pertain to the anatomo-clinical method but are not exchangeable with it: Let us suppose that the magnetic resonance or any other new technique which explores the internal body ends up decaying the unknown rays, those still known as X, this retraction will in no way be considered an attack on the anatomo-clinical method.

Method and technique deserve to be distinguished precisely because historically this distinction was itself a constituent part of the modern notion of method (in Greece, the method is still thought of as an art, techne, and this identification – outside of the medical sector with Galien – will only be explained at the time of the Renaissance at the inaugural moment when the method is considered scientific).

Why is it that in spite of Freud, for whom it was not the case, we privilege the problems known as technique over method (to cite only it, the Vocabulary of psychoanalysis has no item known as ‘method’ while we do find ‘active technique’)? Having to ask that question appears all the more strange since, on one hand, the devaluing of methodological questions in matters of technique
results in making certain raised problems insoluble, and that, reciprocally, on the other hand, the distinguishing of method from technique offers the appreciable advantage of making the innovation of technique possible whilst maintaining a practice anchored in the same method. This leads us to a third commentary.

3. Method, practice and field

Lacan has certainly never claimed for himself or for those who would subscribe to his teachings the monopoly of the exercise of psychoanalysis. On the contrary, he has continuously acknowledged that where others had formed schools (be it the adaptive perspective of Ego psychology or Melanie Klein) it was well and truly about psychoanalysis – even where nothing has happened with these teachings. We find in Television perhaps the most concentrated formula of this position when he declares that:

in order to work, a practice doesn’t have to be elucidated.9

Now then it is the method which defines the practice as such. Yes, a practice ‘need not be explained for it to operate...as long as it is methodical.’ Thus in his seminars, Lacan often discussed clinical cases published by a psychoanalyst, whilst, if I am not mistaken, for over more than 40 years, there is not the least discussion, however little developed, of a case published by a psychiatrist.

4. Method and Madness

Freud, very noticeably, does not limit his use of the word method to the way he thinks a doctor must proceed. He notes and writes that defence is a method, as much as research and the gaining of satisfaction, or even wit. These indications point to the possibility of a Freudian method because there is method in madness. Shakespeare proclaimed it and Freud loved to quote it.10

Though this be madness yet there is method in’t.11

5. Paradox of the Method in Freud

These comments about Freudian method such as we can locate them in the Freudian text would enable us to overlook the fact that the problematisation of the method as such is in difficulty. A sign of that difficulty is evident in the project which inhabited Freud in 1908 – that of writing a Allaemeine Methodik der Psychoanalyse, a project which he was unable to complete, leaving us instead, some papers on technique. Why did Freud not succeed in laying down in black and white his discourse of the method by giving it his name? He did nevertheless put this method in place and there have been, and there are, those who have taken it as their own. Now then, this puts everyone of those people in that part of his text (of the knowledge which this text bears) in a certain specific difficulty, in an awkward position, which is surprising given the extent to which Freud radicalised it. Freud recommends, in fact, that we approach each new case as though it were the first, in other words, that we put aside all knowledge acquired from previously treated cases to enable this new psycho-analysis to get on its way.

Lacan reformulates this requirement in these terms:

It is also that psycho-analysis is a practice subordinated to that which is most particular in the subject, and when Freud emphasises this to the point of saying that psycho-analytic science must be called into question with the analysis of each case (see parts of The Wolf Man – the whole discussion of the case takes place on that principle), he shows the analysand the way of his formation.12

Now then, for those who put the Freudian method into practice, this methodological trait sets apart something like two different ‘furnaces’13 which can produce new statements and formulate the problems raised by the analysis in their actuality. There is Freud’s text, Freud the inventor of the method which, as the witnessing of a crucial experience and taken as a paradigm, is above all a teaching; but there is also what can be gleaned from the application (unique
in every case) of the method, which one calls analytical practice. These two furnaces do not have the same status, the production methods, the testing, and the acceptance or rejection of statements is not the same in both, the question of authority does not intervene in the same way, nor method of the constitution of knowledge in terms of sharing common ground. There is here a truly differentiating disparity. Freud wanted this differentiation — a word which meant what Lacan called cartel — a place particularly appropriate for allowing this differentiating distinction to operate.

Every practitioner of psychoanalysis is put (by Freud) in a position of having to stop short when it comes to knowing whether he welcomes what comes out of one or the other of these two furnaces as truths that are comparable or not in a way which is not only internal to each one of them but in the encountering with their respective statements. The radical Freudian principle is to maintain them apart. Freud inscribes in his method a trait, which, when applied is likely to refute the results at every moment.14 Described in this way, there is in the Freudian method a point which is quasi-suicidal.

But, out of this catastrophic point there emerges still more difficulty. A difficulty which is due to the fact that the constituent elements of the method are themselves a knowledge (savoir) or at least a savoir-faire. Put another way: some of these definitional methodological elements of the method are themselves a part of this acquired knowledge which, in other respects, the application of the method should refute. This paradox goes far and one could test here the speculation on which was based the intervention by those who became part of the school — in the Freudian field; this intervention having been revealed, after the event, to be due to one of these methodological paradoxical elements.

Let us take for example the so-called rule of free association. No one contests the fact that it is of method and not technique. How would we apply the requirement (which is also methodological) of approaching each new case as though it were the first, to our purpose? What will we consider to be a first case? Will it be the first case where a doctor stated it to his hysterical patient. Or of the first case a patient imposed it on his doctor, who had the audacity not to object to it? These two choices are not equal. It does not come to the same thing at all for the doctor (nor, for the treatment itself) to allow himself to have free association imposed on him or propose it as a rule. It is therefore not the same to take as first case of reference the case where the rule was formulated for the first time. In other words, the second, or the first in fact where the rule was indicated but not accepted by the doctor as his own responsibility.

The same thing goes for interpretation. Will we consider the Traumdeutung as providing us with tricks and stratagems for interpretation, and this, in spite of the status of the writings in that work which cannot be more particular as a lesson in method? Does this not indicate that every effective analysis can only invent its own method of interpreting dreams? To forget this other and veritable lesson can lead the practitioner to despair of not being able to interpret the dreams that come from such a case in the same way that Freud interpreted his (the patient does not associate, in spite of the psychoanalyst's insistent invitations which, moreover, end up by seriously annoying the analysand!), an endless despair when, instead of the lamentations born of the realisation of failing to meet the standard, one could invent with this analysand the processes of receiving his/her dreams just as Freud invented the grammar which allowed him to read his own. The Traumdeutung will then be a definitive help but on the express condition of daring to not make a standard of it.

In spite of these methodological problems, or rather because of them, there is reason to question: was Freud right to claim that he had created a new method? The answer is yes, but an affirmation which goes beyond even anything one could have imagined with respect to the subject. Thus we slide from a discourse of the method in Freud to a discourse of the Freudian method.
Discourse of the Freudian Method

It will be a matter of showing that this discourse of the Freudian method retracts trait by trait the itinerary along which a discourse of the method from Plato to Descartes was constituted and that in this way the discourse of the Freudian method deserves to be fully recognised as such.

1. Method and Chance

The great gesture by which Freud at once constitutes and signs the methodological character of his discourse was as it should be, a gesture of exclusion; 13 Freud (does he know it) reiterates this same exclusion which, during the Renaissance was constitutive of the emergence of an explicit discourse on and of the method. What is it a matter of excluding? Nothing less than chance.

The thing is so well known in Freud that it would be unnecessary to list the numerous citations and yet, the absolute character of this Freudian rejection of chance astonishes all the more since Freud is not, on this point, as categorical in his practice. 14 At Clark University in 1909 he will not be content to say 'that there exists nothing small, nothing arbitrary or fortuitous in psychic expressions' but he will consider it appropriate to specify a little later that it is about 'a determinism which does not tolerate any exception.' 15

This exclusion was as much a constituent part of the Freudian method as it already was of method as such. In fact the method would not have acquired its full function in philosophical discussion (that is ethical, practical and therapeutic as well) as long as we thought that the actions of the gods and of men, but also the cosmic events remain largely dependent on chance. Aristotle does not attribute exactly the same meaning to the concepts of tyché and of automaton as (does) Democritus. Chance is not any less recognised as largely determining human affairs or the mind, the cosmos or nature. The Latins will succeed in identifying their tyché with their Fortuna, a goddess who had her poets and who saw a very popular cult develop in her place. Fortune is changeable, capricious, fickle.

The Secretarial Function, Element of the Freudian Method

It is clear that when one imagines one’s life to be dependent on her the idea of managing in a methodical way makes no sense. When the chief of the armies consults the auspices in order to know how to direct his action in battle, method is not the order of the day.

WHEEL OF FORTUNE, THE RENAISSANCE ERA

In Rome itself the classic question was to know whether Rome’s success depended on fortune or virtus. 16 This discussion did not prevent Fortune from enjoying fame for a while longer, especially since Christianity managed with subtlety to use it to its own advantage by promoting the idea of what was viewed by man to be subject to chance of good or bad fortune, correspond, more exactly to a divine Providence which is perfectly ordered, though the creature is unable to figure out any of it. One would therefore have to put Providence in question in order for Fortune, under cover of which she maintains herself, to be also rejected and for room to be made for a question bearing on the direction of human action. Only then will it become evident that it is better to call on method.

Let us note, before leaving this point where we have seen how the practice of the method requires the exclusion of chance, that Lacan does not, in this point, hold the same position as Freud when Freud theorises. His position is not simply less intransigent or less radical, it does not exclude chance – this chance which has not yet been shown to exist mathematically. 17 That there might be a chance fact in such a loving encounter does not seem to Lacan to be psychoanalytically impossible. He will even go so far as to propose a formalisation to account for the fact that laws belonging to an order other than statistical can emerge from symbolic strokes plainly given over to chance. 18

What has happened in the period between Freud and Lacan for psychoanalysis to attain a different position from that of chance?
Just as we have noted in Freud some signs of difficulty in setting down his method, so we find in him a similar indication with regard to chance. So be it; in fact the classic test proposed by the psychoanalyst to the sceptic:

Give me a random figure, any figure, and I will show you, as you offer to tell me all that comes into your mind about it, that it is well and truly about the formation of your unconscious - that the so-called unconscious does indeed exist.

Wittgenstein objects to this, saying that if instead of associating a figure of his devising, we suggest that the subject associate with a figure which he is given, we will be able to demonstrate in the same way, to provide that the said figure also turns out to be a formation of his unconscious. To speak of this problem here is enough. It matters little where the figure comes from, Wittgenstein notes, if the subject is preoccupied by something, there is nothing astonishing in stating that this preoccupation manifests itself with regard to anything at all should he be allowed to free associate. Now then, not only is it not wrong, but Freud himself both welcomed and claimed such a possibility. How can this be accounted for? The different reception that Lacan reserves for chance appears here to be an indication that a solution could be formulated.

2. Method and Case

The method puts into practice a type of questioning 'by examples and comparisons'. Now then, on this point too we find Freud once more covering the road which was to end in a Cartesian discourse on method. On the status of examples and comparisons, it is Machiavelli who, with his Prince, innovates. Machiavelli, himself also a secretary, takes into consideration examples from history which occur to him, in such a way that the prince might be able to draw lessons from the past, base his present action on them, and in so doing attain virtue and the gaining of desired ends. Of Fortune, Machiavelli, clearly the founder of a new ethic, will write:

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Her natural power turns human beings upside down and her domination is never without violence, unless a superior virtue holds out against her.\(^{21}\)

MARTIN LE FRANC: THE STRIFE OF FORTUNE AND VIRTUE\(^{22}\)

On the value of the 'historic case'\(^{23}\) the resonance of Machiavelli's discourse with that of Freud, principally in his very first sketch is patent. In the same way, just as Machiavelli is putting historic cases in circulation, enter Breuer, Fliess and Freud (then soon many others, an efficient public function comes into being right from the start). The cases do not stop circulating; they are, both for Machiavelli and for Freud the locus of theoretical debates, sources of teaching. Lacan took note of this status of the case in Freud, even to the point of identifying Freud's discovery in it:

\[\ldots\text{it is the complete reconstitution of the history of the subject which is the essential, constitutive, structural element of analytical progress. I think I have demonstrated that Freud came from there, that point, that for him every time it is about the apprehension of a particular case, and this is what the price of analysis has been, of each one of his five great psychoanalyses (the three that we have already seen, elaborated, worked on together, demonstrate this to you), this is what is really essential, his progress, his discovering, the way he takes a case in its particularity.}\]

Such an ordering of the cases implies notably two things. On one hand a distancing of the known knowledge; as long as we believe we know, we have no lessons to gain from historic cases. On the other hand, and in a concomitant way, the promotion of cases likely to teach, implies the idea that they bear a hidden truth which should be deciphered. On these two points of the relation to knowledge
and to truth, the resonance between Freud and Machiavelli is still manifest here.

In the same way, Machiavelli’s gesture relegating Fortune to Virtue’s advantage seems to us to be of the same calibre as that of Freud refusing to accept that the dream is purely a chance secretion of the functioning of nervous cells, in regard to which it would be foolish to attempt to read any realisation of desire. Freud cuts short this perspective like Machiavelli breaks the chain which, with Boethius, linked together a God, Providence, Fortune and man.

The fact that in this way Freud should come to inscribe his path into a melting pot which we will have to qualify as ‘Cartesian’, permits us to glimpse his closeness to Machiavelli. The Cartesianism of Machiavelli, of one could speak retrospectively in this way is, indeed, manifest. Let us note three points.

- Like Descartes’ and moreover Freud’s method, Machiavellian method is deductive and not inductive. This, both in Machiavelli and Freud, directly results from the function granted to case histories.

- Like Descartes’ Discourse on the method, Machiavelli publishes his Prince like a lifebuoy which will enable him to re-establish himself: Philippe Desan writes that it is ‘in terms of self-analysis and therapy that one should read The Prince’. As with the Traumdeutung, the doctrinal invention remains throughout a personal matter and it is as such that it will carry forth.

- And in the same way as Descartes will, in a princely fashion, leave God in charge of eternal truths, Machiavelli will get out of the problem posed by the religious communities by means of a tremendous ‘pirouette’; the idea of a power methodically regulated, clashed rather badly with the concept that God alone directs these communities:

  Thus only these principalities are both sure and happy. But as they are governed by superior reasons which the mind cannot attain, I will leave this to be discussed; for

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being elevated and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and reckless man to discover it.

There is an essential trait here where it is understood immediately how the determination of a method recalls that of a field. Machiavelli can only implant his method by limiting his field of application:

One could not manage the State, rosary in hand.

Do these convergences astonish us? This would do so less if we took the trouble to test out the extent to which the Freudian method is analytical, in other words, is linked to the very first – Platonic – step of a methodological approach:

[...] all that can be said to exist is made of one and of multiples and contains in itself, originally associated, both limit and infinity. Since things are ordered in this way, we must therefore always ask in which set it may be, and look for a unique form in each case – it can, in effect, be found to be present there[...] There then I was saying it (was) what the gods transmitted to us as method of research, of discovery and of teaching.

3. Method and Formalisation

How is it then that the distinguished cases are not presented in the methodological discourse, as pure diversity from which no teaching could occur? In Machiavelli it is the comparison. But... ‘comparison is not reason’. And so? Certainly the notion of scientific method, born in the Renaissance, can intervene if it was only taken to be a remarkably futile lure.

The first, Pierre de La Ramée, under the name of ‘dialectic’ gave substance to this requirement of the ‘scientificity’ which Freud will not abandon. Pierre de La Ramée’s revolt against Aristotelianism anticipates Descartes’ exaggerated doubt. It is certainly a matter of refuting this scholastic perspective which, under cover of the authority of the ancient scholars gives rise to a proliferation of...
commentaries (let us leave behind this welcome lapsus calami) and from commentary to commentary to a greater thirst for more—a shortcoming from which we have not distanced ourselves in the psychoanalysis of yesterday and today. But there is more, there is a kind of passage at the end when La Ramée writes:

All that Aristotle has said is nothing but falsity. *Quacumquae ab aristotele dicta essent, commentitia esse.*

Descartes extricates himself by means of his Cogito, La Ramée less radical, by his recourse to Plato, though so far, blindfolded by Aristotle. It was then that problems were only beginning for him, becoming more specific as he aggravates his situation by adding a Protestant conversion to his Platonism thus placing himself against the Catholics, then the Aristotelians. He perished, defenestrated and decapitated, on the third day of Saint Bartholomew’s massacre.

Whilst Aristotelianism had dissolved the notion of method into a cluster of methods, each linked to an object, La Ramée by returning to Plato discovered his unique if not universal method.

(Presented here, this conflict between a plurality of methods and universal method, has not ceased to be present in the problematisation of a discourse of THE method. In a certain way, we still come across it in analytic practice where given the delimitation of the field, the method remains universal, within the boundaries of this limitation: whoever presents himself to him, the psychoanalyst has no other possible treatment but the application of his method. It is a foolish stance but at least in certain cases a heuristic foolishness.)

We are in our rights to speak of the subject of Pierre de La Ramée’s dialectic, of ‘formalisation’ because, being decidedly Platonic, he constructs it by means of successive dichotomies. Dialectic is divided into invention and judgement, judgement into statements, syllogisms and method, method into ‘natural method’ and ‘method of prudence’. A strictly methodological conclusion and into which universality can also be read.

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It is not possible to set up an art in a different way using a different path.

But La Ramée has a big surprise in store for us. Hoping to situate some of the diverse elements of his method in relation to others, he arrives, in effect, at a formula which fully deserves being named a Borromean chain. Nothing less! He describes in effect his method as

 [...] some long gold chain, such as Homer dissimulates, of which the graded links are dependent on each other, and are all linked so carefully together than nothing can be removed without breaking up the order and continuity of them all.  

This preoccupation with formalisation, this scientific horizon is a component element of the method. It is a fact that neither Freud nor Lacan have refuted this requirement. Another fact, though an unhappy one, is the rejection of this horizon which we find in the writings of certain French contemporary psychoanalysts who, having imbibed Heidegger, and wanting to be defenders of a subjectivism which can only be described as vulgar since it is defined by the anti-techno-science, do not assume that Freud is not concerned with technique but with method. It is also a certain relation to the clinic which is at stake. For formalisation, far from being antinomic to the particularity of the case, represents rather its extreme point.

Let us formulate the problem in more modern terms than those which beckon since the invention of the scientific method in the Renaissance. The relation between the cases does not depend on an expert comparison that dates back to him when it appears, that at least partially the multiplicity of cases allows itself to be ordered into a grammar that the cases are conjugated, that they therefore have elements in common, that they represent to us what Wittgenstein calls a family resemblance.

From that time on, formalisation is presented as being all the more likely to be written since the formal outlines turn out to be already
isolated in this, then in that family of cases. Conical sections have historically played this role of gathering families of cases in the framework of scientific philosophy, which regrouped just as much a multiplicity of figures (such as with the circle or the ellipse, it would suffice to transform the angle of the cutting plan from the plan of the cone to obtain one or the other) as a multiplicity of functions (the parabola, the hyperbola are inscribed on the cone). Jean-Claude Dumoncel estimates that the steps (perhaps one step too many) of such a formalisation were the ones which in the very first place in history by-passed Bergson whilst Wittgenstein, maybe in spite or because of a few schemas of his own invention, preferred in a way to stand on the threshold.

My difficulty is altogether similar to that of a man who finds a new calculus (for example differential calculus) and who looks for a symbolism. The matter of differential calculus evokes the distance between Newton and Leibniz, the latter having been acknowledged as the inventor of adequate symbolism.

Now then, up to a point, a distance of this order regulates the pathways of Freud and Lacan in relation to each other. It is not only a matter of speaking too much about this Lacan/Freud metaphor of articulation, but also of measuring the point to which it is not a simple analogy.

Freud invents a method of receiving, of treating and of investigating what was otherwise categorised as a mental illness. For him the paradigm remains the case; like Wittgenstein, he has found a new calculus though he has not put at our disposal the symbolism which corresponds to it.

The epidemic aspect of the transmission of psychoanalysis is not so much linked to the Freudian doctrine taken as a network of theses (apprehended by a large public, the tenor of this doctrine does not seem very different from that of Janet) as linked to the style of Freud, to a certain 'literary' aspect, namely, as he himself recognised it, a romantic aspect, of this accounts of the cases. Many analysts of the first generation are witness to this, for example, F. Sterba. Moreover, how could we forget, at the time of his very first intervention during the very first international congress of psychoanalysis that Freud chooses not to deliver the last stage of his doctrine but to speak...of a case. Only one. Without notes, and for eight hours! Indeed, if he wanted it to be understood that his method is the case, there was nothing better to do, a case which was neither received nor defined in any old way, but put in place as a clinical monograph that has been explored in-depth.

There is nothing contradictory in the fact that from the time of that approach to the case such as he showed it on that day, Freud led up to the setting down on paper of a few mathèmes themes (that of the Esquisse Sketch, then the onion skins of Studies on hysteria, the scheme of Chapter VII of the Traumdeutung and also that of the egg written into The Ego and the Id.) If it is true, however, that his cursed metapsychology does not provide the 'corresponding formalism' as it is noted, and not only by Lacanians, one would have to conclude that for Freud, method does not stop signifying itself in the approach of the case.

Let us conclude this point: Freud, once again, covers the ground of instituting the discourse of the method right back to Machiavelli and La Ramée, with whom he shares the unresolved characteristic of formalisation. For him, as for Machiavelli, the paradigm of the method remains with the case history. Now then, already, as with Machiavelli, this implies the delimitation of a field, that field which Lacan will qualify as Freudian. In inscribing his name in this field, Lacan will take over, beginning with Descartes, having followed the impulse provided by Freud to the discourse of the method. The subjectivisation of the method will then go hand in hand with the introduction, in the Freudian method, of a paradigm which if not mathematical is disposed to be mathematised.
Montaigne then Descartes, the ego then the subject

The scope of the case history in Freud by far exceeds its paradigmatic function (in the grammatical sense of the term\textsuperscript{41}) of the method. The Freudian approach to the case, because it goes on being maintained in the particularity of the case, because it is based on the literality of what the case presents him with, especially in terms of the symptom and in its reference to the account (what is equivalent to an interdiction focussed on the translation of the symptom, notably in ‘scientific’ terms) brings out, in actual fact, the fact that the method is a ‘subjective exercise’.\textsuperscript{42} In Freud, however, there is no theoretical account taken of this determination as such, we do not find in his work an explicit theory of the subject.

Lacan meets the pathway of Freud particularly on this literal reception of the case; he dedicates entire years of his seminar to Freud’s cases and, in 1966, he summarises this position in a formula which tells us about his journey since Clerambault’s\textsuperscript{43} teaching.

Oddly enough, but necessarily, we believe we were drawn back to Freud. For his faithfulness to the formal envelope of the symptom which is the true clinical trace which we were developing a taste for[…]

The Lacanian theory of the subject is consequent upon this faithfulness, for this reason it is a consequence of it. Lacan can here and there (therefore: not all) be said to ‘prolong’ Freud. Now then, doing this he settles the isomorphism from which we have just pieced the first traits, the one which associates the discourse of the method in Freud with the discourse of the method which, since Plato, Machiavelli and La Ramée, finds its fulfilment in Descartes via Montaigne.

The most shattering thing about this matter, for this observation is certainly capable of shattering us before it can enlighten us, is that it rests on a remarkable encounter. If we continue to follow, as we have done, the study that Philippe Desan dedicates to the Birth of

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the method, we will note that the subjectivisation of the method is produced in two times, namely, respectively Montaigne and Descartes. Now then, concerning these two names, Philippe Desan writes, this phrase which is all the more likely to make us sit up and listen, this study is in no way produced by someone who claims to be Lacanian:

This contribution of the subject in the method obviously begins with a theory of the ego, and more particularly of the construction of the ego.\textsuperscript{44}

One can see it, the two last steps of the work of a discourse of the method correspond to the first two steps of Lacan’s pathway insofar as they are connected with Freud’s pathway: theory of the ego, theory of the subject.

1. Montaigne: the ego, first moment of the subjectivisation of the method

Up to Montaigne the methodological discourse continued to be not of the subject but of universal man. Such was the ordering face of this discourse which Montaigne will refute. In fact, we find in him what we have already located in each of those who have contributed to the construction of a discourse of the method, namely, the fact that this contribution originates in a unique, personal adventure. But with Montaigne this uniqueness is inscribed into the method and becomes an element of the method. What will be known as its ego.

First of all the rebuttal. One can provide diverse formulas, the most amusing of which is perhaps this confession: However much Montaigne ‘has been worried by studying Aristotle’ makes no sense of this ‘din of so many philosophical brains.’\textsuperscript{45} His, ‘I am not a philosopher’\textsuperscript{46} when he finally resigns himself, clearly evokes the Cartesian rejection of received knowledge. There is also a decisive doubt in Montaigne, that he will not however be able to convert into a point that supports a subjective certitude and which will therefore remain indefinite. At the time of the collapse of
Aristotelianism, Montaigne takes note of 'the vain building of human science' and will cling to...himself. Now then there is a method here in that Montaigne finds this himself, in a very Lacanian way, instead of the other.

The rejection of science is also that of a truth presented as objective. The distance which separates Montaigne from Machiavelli or La Ramée is clear. The truth becomes 'personal veracity' which will only be accepted as such by the other. The art of the account becomes method, and the method discovers the language as 'the only basis of all “truth”'.

The word belongs half to he who speaks, half to who listens to it.

Thus Montaigne can read the ancient scholars, imitate them in his accounts, whilst looking for himself in them. His ego is regulated by the other, in an interaction with the other (hence his post as secretary of La Boethius). And it seems to have nothing to do with luck, that Philippe Desan, so to speak, makes use of a theory known as looking-glass self. But no, it is not Lacan's but an American psycho-sociologist's of the beginning of the century.

There is, however, an important difference between this ego such as that which Montaigne constructs methodically with reference to Boethius, to Plutarch, to Seneca, to those whom he does not bother to cite even though he makes use of their writings, making out of his own a true verbal mosaic, to those whom he simply ends up calling the other: 'as says the other...'. It is really instead, this other that Montaigne seeks himself:

This great world which some multiply like a species of a genre is the mirror with which we should look at ourselves in order to know ourselves from this correct bias.

This bias is the method. But the identification of the ego in the other, for Montaigne, does not stop not crystallising itself. Montaigne introduces the subject into the method under the form of

that ego, which has never been identified in the imaginary; the identification is certainly in the other but not to the other, (this way of flirting with the imaginary identification is coherent with the lively maintenance of doubt in Montaigne).

Lacan knew how to take note of the importance of Montaigne in what he was naming, inventing perhaps on that day a word whose destiny was 'ephemeral': 'This inaugural moment of the surge, of the sudden appearance of this term which is called the subject.' It will be, for some, as we can expect it, to immediately afterwards to arrive to Descartes:

[...] Montaigne, from a certain aspect, is really the one who focussed not on scepticism, but on a living moment, this aphasia of the subject. And it is in this that he is productive, that he is an eternal guide who remains and surpasses all that he was able to represent; a kind of moment in an historic turning point that needed to be defined, though that is not where the scepticism is.

From the perspective of this presented subjective position, inaugurated by Montaigne, the intervention by Descartes will be doubled. Descartes will be able to turn doubt into the lever of access to a subjective certainty. As a result, beyond the passage to the act of Cogito, he will no longer need to persist in refuting all universal knowledge to this knowledge as that of a subject.

2. The Cartesian sealing of the discourse of the method: Freudian resonances

Descartes gathers together into a kind of sheaf that group of traits constituting the discourse of the method. A few notations will be enough to leave to the reader the possibility of evoking their correspondences in the discourse of the Freudian method:

On the rejection of chance:
...It is so necessary to stand outside the empire of fortune [...].36

(advice to the Princess Elizabeth with regard to a comment by Machiavelli.)

On the dependence of truth with regard to the method:

We cannot do without a method in order to set about in quest of the truth of things (fourth rule).

On historicism:

In myself, or else in the big book of the world, I used the rest of my youth to travel, to see courses and armies, to frequent people of different temperaments and conditions, to gather various experiences, to test myself.

On the eminently personal character of the steps and the fact that the history of the method is a unique history:

My plan is not to teach (with regard to the Discourse) the method which everyone must follow in order to direct his reason well, but only to evaluate the way in which I have tried to conduct mine.

On constructivism and its literal character:

The method[...]is more frequently nothing more than the scrupulous observation of an order, that this order exists in the thing itself, or else it has been ingeniously introduced by thought: for instance if we want to read a writing disguised by unknown characters, we cannot see any order which can be clearly demonstrated, but we try to forge one all the same.

Let us add the mathematical paradigm to these points (it is not the method, it is the mathematic which is universal: mathesis universalis), the delimitation of a field (Lacan has studied this point for a long time, guided by the function which is attributed to so-called eternal truths), the illuminating (one says intuitive) and inductive character of the method (linked to the fact that it concerns truth and not, as in Bacon's inductive method, reality) and finally the romantic style of the works of Descartes (already taken up by Leibniz), and we will have run the full course of these parallel traits between Freud and Descartes, which makes it seem less strange that Lacan was able to conclude the matter by claiming that the subject which is fact in Freud is none other that Cogito.

Let us conclude this point: it seems confirmed from here onward that the two steps of a practice of a discourse of the method (those who are named Montaigne and Descartes) are paralleled by the two first steps of the pathway of Lacan (the theory of the ego, the theory of the subject). In this Lacan seems to have taken over from the Freudian discourse of the method.

Considerable as might be the acknowledgment of this isomorphism, we must, however, do more than simply take note of it. Indeed, this subject such as Lacan comes to define it, is not the semblance of the subject of the Cogito and therefore other; it is well and truly that of the Cogito. There is therefore not simply a parallel but a convergence, a meeting. Everything that we have just unfolded confirms this thesis by Lacan.

What does it have to say? That the Freudian discourse of the method (to be distinguished here from the discourse of Freud, since it is composed of this relay in which Lacan prolongs Freud) well and truly constitutes the discourse of the method in a very specific sense of 'constitute': he repeats it (we believe we have demonstrated it) and hence inaugurates it.

Two comments can be deduced from this state of things.

If Freud could not have traced the discourse of the method back to the encounter with Descartes, it is not, as one would think, so much due to the absence for him of a theory of the subject, but to the fact...
Thus it seems that the isomorphism that we have just unfolded as the convergence in Descartes between two parallels, Plato/Machiavelli/Ramée/Montaigne on one hand and Freud/Lacan on the other, far from leading to an absolute knowledge which would be that of the subject finally identifying with himself, merely poses (in a manner which one can anticipate as being pertinent in regard to the Freudian experience) the question of this new subject which Lacan approaches with the Borromean figure.

The Secretarial Function

Let us conclude the matter of the secretarial function as element of Freudian method. Two points of a different order deserve to be raised, one historic, the other more strictly methodological.

There is first of all a kind of intensified historical fact. With the very first steps of Freud's plan, let's say Bertha Pappenheim and a few others, but also with Lacan's inaugural thesis, let us say his encounter with Marguerite, the methodological innovation is the fact of someone who functions as a secretary. In a manner which one will have to say was classical, if one were to judge by what had already happened in terms of putting the discourse of the method in place, the method invents itself by being put into practice with regard to a case. The making known (faire savoir) of the method is also and firstly that of a case. That was already true of Machiavelli, de La Ramée as of Montaigne or Descartes. Of Anna O as of Aimee, we will only have known at first what their secretaries would have wanted us to know - 'the honest dissimulation' of the names of Bertha Pappenheim or of Marguerite Anzieu being included.

From the time of this historic making known (faire savoir) onwards, and perhaps contingent upon it, two points of view remain possible. One can declare that insofar as they are innovative these paths answered specific and not reproducible requirements including those which would be used to put the same Freudian method into practice. Such would be the status of the secretarial function, linked as it is to those first cases, but not necessarily brought into play in each one of the cases, with regard to which a certain approach that is methodologically ordered became possible. Given this very manner of contemplating things, the secretarial function could not be accepted with credit as one of the elements that specifies this method. The secretarial intervention would be interesting only to the historians of psychoanalysis.

One argument in favour of this theory would be to note that as a result Lacan has once more staked little on a case of his own experience in the same way having remained rather silent with regard to those whom he was psychoanalysing. But this argument turns on itself soon enough, silence being one of the main ways of realising a secretarial function: 'The obligation of silence which is incumbent upon you', writes one secretary to another, namely Buonacorsi to Machiavelli.

It is here to be noted how often, since the control case, when a psychoanalyst thinks he can make known to a more or less chosen public such a slice of a cure for which he has taken responsibility, this making known itself intervenes as hypothesising the result of the cure (Freud had come to recommend to the psychoanalyst only to launch into such an adventure when the analysis is completed: but how do we know it is completed since a tendency to speak of it for who ever would have taken the place of the psychoanalyst already makes the truth of this knowledge questionable?).
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If therefore it is incumbent on the psychoanalyst, to have ‘an obligation of silence’, what none of them contests, is that this obligation remains misknown in its reach as long as we refer it to a deontological code. The medical person accepts certain accommodations, in particular the communicating of cases to colleagues or students with the aim of research or teaching. However, neither this rule nor the exceptions, considered in this respect are convenient in psychoanalysis, if only because in the Freudian field there is one of these new and decisive incidents, the differentiation between colleague and patient is not clearly established, but that the said colleague can find himself as analysand, and the said patient as a psychoanalyst. Furthermore, given the most ‘incestuous’ characteristic imaginable of the links in the analytic group, moving from couch to armchair and from armchair to couch, there remains no doubt about the lack of value involved in recourse to a professional deontology to resolve the problems, which in experience arouse an obligation to silence on the part of the psychoanalyst. Furthermore, it is a sign of this inconvenience that occasionally when an analysand, in the course of his cure, has spoken ‘innocently’ of what was happening in his analysis to his familial or professional entourage or to his friends, he becomes aware of the fact that he has made a mistake and comes to acknowledge that it would have been better to submit to a certain obligation of silence. Now such an ethical problem has no place in a ruling which a deontological professional code would pretend to pose.

The obligation of silence in psychoanalysis is not the responsibility of one analyst. Not to refer it to deontology but rather to the secretarial function as an element of the Freudian method allows us not only to understand how it can return to the analysand (the secretarial function is not necessarily always held by the titular secretary) but also and especially to understand that it is only one of the particulars of a more general question, the very one which defines the secretarial function as such; thus as Mireille Blanc-Sanchez notes:

The choice of saying or not saying belongs to the secretary.

Now then, when an analysis is found to be effective, it gives way to the question such a choice might have raised and dealt with. Lacan was able at this point, to speak of an ‘ethic of the Well-spoken’ 60 without ignoring, it seems to me, the extent to which such a formula could give way to an overflow (it did not fail).

In this way, the secretarial function, defined as it is above, appears to be an essential element, constituent of the Freudian method. That it had effectively been present from the very first in Freud’s pathway was not at all accidental.

It is true that to measure the incidence of this secretarial function in analysis requires us first to understand the extent to which each effective analysis has so little to do with silence. The fantasm of the analytic consulting room as a snug place with padded doors, like a womb, protected from the so-called external world, also like a black box where the analysand could enter laden with symptoms only to come out rid of them, without allowing the ‘external’ world to intervene during that time, and without enduring any effect. This fantasm, while it can certainly offer a minimum of security,61 remains no less a fantasm. By carrying the joke to the dignity of a formation of the unconscious, Freud made a decisive breach in the one-body-psychology where one can nevertheless catch a brief glimpse of a patent fact: that to undertake an analysis is also a public affair and that, throughout, the subject in analysis has in the analysis itself to deal with a certain public, that there is no assurance at all that the psychoanalyst will be entirely able to take it upon himself to incarnate it (this public) nor that he might, a fortiori, succeed in becoming it. On the contrary to accept the secretarial function as an element of the Freudian method is the equivalent of taking note that this public’s action on the analysis,62 like that of the analysis on this or these public(s) is in an essential way what every analysis is concerned with in its completion.

There is a narrow link between this public in analysis and the secretarial function as determining the opportunity or the inopportunity of speaking. For in analysis it is not so much a question of speaking or not speaking to the psychoanalyst as a
question of bringing a certain utterance to the place of this public which is also the place where this utterance will become such. There will have been a commitment by a subject to his analysis precisely as a result of the fact that he will have taken note that his symptom was witness to the that this utterance did not come from its place. At this point, Freud invents the chief notion of defence. Now his invention of a method is a refinement of this notion. How then does he, in his method, deal with an utterance that is in abeyance (en souffrance)? Not by suggesting to the subject that he should speak at the moment when he thinks he cannot speak out, on the contrary by taking his abstention literally; by formulating the rule of free association. He discharged him, Lacan noted, of his responsibility as subject of the enunciation. The psychoanalyst takes the responsibility on himself. But not to assume it instead of the subject, a pseudo-solution in which the utterance would certainly gain nothing in the translation. Rather than take over, it would bring into play the function of the secretary who would benefit from the confusion caused by free association. This would lead to several things bring presented differently, namely the distribution of what is to be said and what has to be localised on the ‘couche’ of the secretary, of what must be the object of honest dissimulation and which will be acknowledged as being not better able to accede to the public utterance than by being localised in this way.

Here, and once in a while it does not hurt, psychoanalysis could shed light on the secretarial function, namely certain real experiences of secretaries who were rather given a rough time, or where some secretary attained sainthood. Is it not there to take note of the fact that the distribution of the utterance is not the business of communication but of jouissance? Practitioner of self-effacement, the secretary can only push his logic to its limit, put another way, he can only efface the effacement himself; if Of Honest Dissimulation, by Torquato Accetto, is to remain an essential text it is because it has not erred on the point of this logic. Now the effacement of the effacement can only include the secretary. Held to this point, the secretarial function takes a particular turn where it becomes patently clear that far from having his couch, he is called to become one.

Thus he is fated by his act, like the psychoanalyst or even like the saint to be this ‘scrap heap of jouissance’ who, realised as such, as a scrap heap, renders the utterance possible.

Yes, undoubtedly, what one cannot say one must know how to silence. In this performance, the subject becomes his own secretary and analysis finds its limitations. The subject no longer needs this ‘abject man’, this ‘freed slave hired to hear confidential matters’ as Tacitus once called the secretary.

Translated by Gina Sabto.

Notes

2. Cf. the works of Roy Schafer, in particular Language and Insight, Paris, PUF, 1986.
3. Naissance de la methode, Paris, Librairie A.-G. Nizet, 1987, p.65. The author stresses that the first conceptual usage of methodos found in Plato (this concept is non-existent in pre-Socratic writings) is explicitly linked to our approach. This work will be a substantial support to us in what follows.
4. He even entities quite clearly one of his texts ‘The psychoanalytic method of Freud’, Die freudische psychoanalytische Methode, 1st ed., 1904 in Loewenfeld, Die psychischen Zwangsscheinungen, G.W., 5, 3-10. As one would expect it, Strachey chose to translate Methode in German, which nevertheless has its English equivalent, method, into procedure in return for which, from the very first sentence we
fail to understand why the cathartic method (here Strachey translates: method) resulted in a development of a different status (here as in the title, Strachey introduces his procedure), a matter which makes no sense but which the translation gives rise to where Freud speaks more simply of two different methods. This small translation problem presents this advantage of allowing us to glimpse the antinomy between thinking of process and methodological procedure, the former (do we think of it as more "scientific") imposing itself artificially at the very point where it chases the latter away.


6. Today we can compare, term by term, the first-hand account which we have of Breuer (via Hirschmüller) to that of Freud, in particular, the one he proposes to us in the first of his five conferences at Clark University.

7. F. Wittels

Freud l'homme, la doctrine, l'école, Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1925, p.27.

8. Does a methodological equivalent of a tome like that of Edward Glover's Technique de la psychanalyse (Paris, PUF, 1959) exist? If the word 'methodological' appears in it from the second line of the introduction, it is more like a greeting before a definitive departure. Five lines later and in what follows from there on, the author speaks only of technique without realising either the slide or the gulf. The secretary's hand, however (Glover comments this function for the purpose of this study), can be discerned when on re-reading the first edition of his work, which appeared in 1938, Glover comments that domatism and rigid technique (which had been preceded by what Glover does not hesitate to call 'therapeutic slogans') are children of unacknowledged doubt.

9. J. Lacan

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12. J. Lacan

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11. Ecrits, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p.358. The paragraph on 'Variantes e la cure type' from which this quote is extracted is clearly entitled: that which the psychoanalyst must know: to ignore what he knows. Freud was not less radical. If one is in fact referred to the indicated text, one can read: 'To whoever would be able to eliminate even more radically his pre-existing convictions, more of these things would certainly be revealed.' (S. Freud, Cinqu psychanalyses, Paris, PUF, p.329.)

Word chosen here to be the one Ferenczi used to speak of transference.

It may seem that the best way to stamp the character of this duplicity is by re-covering as soon as possible the range of these two furnaces; thus we will read, with Freudian knowledge, the facts of the clinic, refuting at the same time the teaching of the method proposed by Freud even though we are risking Freudian knowledge by the very fact of the questioning. To what extent such a step is inevitable is a subject worthy of consideration.
We will remember that then are exclusions here which are constitutive of a discipline, hence modern linguistics which refutes any question of the origin of language.

That which is reported for example in the text 'Remarques sur un cas de ner'veose obsessionelle.'


Cf. Ivar Ekeland, Au hasard, Seuil, 1991. The debate focuses on the exclusion of something which, if it can be found, does not exist (Ekeland comments, that the result - 'heads' or 'tails' of tossing a coin is perfectly regulated by the way one holds it in one's hand, the gesture itself, the point of impact on the games table, the relative hardness of that surface, etc.).


Capitolo de la Fortune, v.1512 (cited by P. Desan, p.49).

Taken from P. Desan, op.cit. p.40.

The quotation marks the ambiguity: both in Freud and in Machiavelli, this term does not have exactly the same meaning, which allows the one to illuminate and enrich the other.

Les écrits techniques de Freud, Session of 13th January 1954.


Ibid., p.54. In the same way, Lacan, referring to Descartes attributing to God (if we are put it that way) the burden of eternal truths, had spoken of one of the most extraordinary duels ever fought in the history of the mind. (J. Lacan, Les fondements de la psychanalyse, Session of 3rd June 1964.)

Cited by P. Desan, op.cit., p.54.

Ibid., p.55.

Philèbe, cited by P. Desan, op.cit., p.67.

It is a case of drawing out of Aristotle or the medical domain of Galien (Molière has said all there is to say about this kind of medicine).

This sliding is crystallised from the moment one of those two 'furnaces', which were discussed above, is neglected.


Ibidem.

This analysis owes much to the recently published work of Jean-Claude Dumoncel, Le jeu de Wittgenstein, Paris, PUF, 1991.

Cited by J.-C. Dumoncel, op.cit., p.60.

Let us be specific: to the point where Lacan himself with the 'Borrowmeisation' of his ternary S.I.R., will turn to questioning its paradigmatic force (which for all that does not mean he refuted the one or the other). Freud would certainly not have found it ridiculous to be identified with Newton. Being on the same side as Wittgenstein would have doubtless seemed to him to be more strange, even though it is because of the objections that he receives to which he decides to respond in his belated work on 'Constructions in analysis'.

That treatment and investigation should go hand in hand is one of the major characteristics of the method, not only his own.
40. In the same way Lacan in his 1932 thesis: '… [w]ith the contrary it is by as complete a study as possible of the case which seemed the most significant to us, that we will be able to give our views the maximum intrinsic and persuasive scope.' (J. Lacan, *De la psychose paranoïaïque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p.151.)

41. Cf. Thomas Kuhn


43. J. Lacan


44. P. Desan


45. P. Desan


53. Has there not been and is there not still in certain students of Lacan: disciples of 'openness', sometimes to the point of preventing them from perceiving that by doing this they turn themselves into disciples of the most accepted phenomenological speech (J.-A. Miller noted it) as an attempt to reduce the ego of the *mirror stage* to an ego, in the

54. J. Lacan


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56.

57. J. Lacan


58. Torquato Aceto


61. It is not in a country so different from our own countries (i.e. democratic) where security is referred to as securitate.


64.

65. J. Lacan


66.

67. Cf. Mireille Blanc-Sanchez

'*libertas ex secretioribus minestereii*.'
Lacanian Psychoanalytic Writings

Logos • Psychoanalysis and the Institution • Ethics and the Institution • Psychoanalysis and the Psychiatric Institution • The Group as Psychic Structure and the Locus of the Symbolic • Reverencing the Letter or the Stopping of the Lacanian Movement • Being in Love and Psychoanalysis: On Reading Lacan • The Lacanian Discourse • Non Licet Omnibus Psychoanalysts Esse • Jacques Lacan and the Question of the Training of Analysts • The Presentation of Patients: Charcot, Freud, Lacan, Today • The Consistency of the Name • The Secretarial Function, Element of the Freudian Method

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