PAPERS OF
THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL OF MELBOURNE

Homage to Lacan

Australian Psychoanalytic Writings
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Papers of
The Freudian School of Melbourne

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Homage to Lacan

Editors
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The present volume of the *Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne* appears for the first time under the editorship of Felicity Bagot, Linda Clifton and David Pereira. Since the inception of the *Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne* in 1979, Oscar Zentner and Maria Inés Rotmiler de Zentner, founding Analysts of the School, assumed responsibility for the preparation and editorship of the book. The last twelve volumes stand as eloquent testament to their work. In February 1992 Oscar Zentner and Maria Inés Rotmiler de Zentner resigned from The Freudian School of Melbourne. As a significant moment in the history of The School, their letter of resignation is published here. It is also a moment for The School to acknowledge its debt to these two analysts.
Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

Notwithstanding this loss, the work of The School, psychoanalysis — sustaining a space which allows for the passage from transference to work — continues.

Felicity Bagot, Linda Clifton, David Pereira

Letter of Resignation from The Freudian School of Melbourne

Oscar Zentner
and
Maria Inés Rotmiler de Zentner

Speeches should be neither long nor short but of suitable compass

Plato

22 February 1992

To the Analysts and Members of the School,
A school of psychoanalysis can only authorise itself from the psychoanalytic discourse. The foundation of The Freudian School of Melbourne was the moment of such an authorisation.
Psychoanalysis dwells in language for the structural reason that the unconscious is born from it. Writing is the mark left behind by the act that discourse effectuates. It is for this reason that, since 1977, The Freudian School of Melbourne, school of psychoanalysis, has written psychoanalysis in Australia. Freud and Lacan indicate a direction. The initiation and transmission of the Lacanian discourse by the School gives us the ethical responsibility to further the theory and practice of psychoanalysis and to make the experience known in the traces of writing. To the present, the School has given its testimony in the field opened by Freud and recovered by Lacan, by carrying out its programme of work succinctly described in the Twelve Provisional Points of Foundation as its raison d'etre. But there is much more than that, too.

Today, we resign from the School. It is also a time when we have come to realise that taking a distance is not sufficient. This, indeed, we have tried and only succeeded to do formally. In order to complete the act we should allow for the present, as well as for our presence, to become past and for the future to become present; otherwise, at this stage our presence would be more of an impediment than a contribution, a kind of blockage, a resistance. This conclusion is intrinsic to the place we have come to occupy, a kind of real forever eluding the symbolic, an imaginary clouding of a demand that does not cease to intercept the demand of others. The resistance of the analyst is, of course, a fact.

There are no theoretical differences with analysts and members of the School at the basis of our resolution; there are, instead, theoretical reasons. There is a time to conclude: the time to conclude our membership with The Freudian School of Melbourne has arrived. It is a time when we articulate the doing without our presence for the continuation of what we regard as the most important move in our years as psychoanalysts: the creation of the School and the formation of analysts. As analysts and founders of the School, our trajectory has covered three moments: a time of transmission and formation; a time of fading; and now we pass to the time of concluding.

The analytic experience stumbles between two ailments: to seek authorisation from others and to make out of aphasia and agraphia semblance of knowledge. These symptoms, fantasms of allusion to a supposed-reachable-object-of-jouissance, produce the imaginary consistency of the diffusion of psychoanalysis. As analysts, our testimony proceeds along a different path. The analyst only authorises himself from himself. To write the vicissitudes of psychoanalysis is the after-effect that praxis brings forth in the particular, insofar as to write is to outline the real in which each one of us leaves in his transient act the indelible mark of that which does not cease not to be written. The testimony of the end of the analysis and of the pass yield its surplus: the transmission of psychoanalysis.

We have sustained an original desire in the School for fifteen years through inspiration and work: a desire born out of the certainty of the possibility of transmission. We write our resolution without nostalgia and with no regrets. The School, as the product of our psychoanalytic act, finds itself in the position to avow that the future is to take possession of the present by putting it to work. Thus we have arrived at what we aimed at: the transmission of psychoanalysis and the formation of analysts; but our task does not end here. The School, today, is knotted by and through its work. The mirror of the Other removed, the School is consolidated differently, bearing the mark of a founder but in the process of making a cut — a cut that is imperative, generative. Through this cut we emphasise, by the act, our own fading, place of the semblance of the object a.

The desire of the analyst in the place of the semblance of the object a should leave the place of the cause empty. With our resolution leaving the cause as empty, we outline the distance and the difference between the object a as an empty place and the object a as the place of the fetish.

However, there is a problem of structure that so far works as destiny, inherent both to every act of foundation and to the founder. Concerning this, the history of psychoanalysis tells of a rather
inauspicious repetitive movement. Our resolution with its outcome tries to avoid repetition with a different answer to that impasse.

Regarding the relationship between psychoanalytic institutions and founders we have received two different answers: one provided by Freud who, by remaining attached to the International Psychoanalytic Association offered himself as the guarantee of psychoanalysis; and the other provided by Lacan which resulted in the dissolution of his School, L'Ecole freudienne de Paris. In 1977 we wrote, at the close of the 12 Provisional Points for the foundation of The Freudian School of Melbourne, that we reserved the right and the moment for choosing our own path. Our resolution to resign from the School is intrinsically linked with the transmission of psychoanalysis. This nevertheless engages us and those who want to pursue the task, to further work this different answer.

The analyst always has horror of the advancement of his act, hence the possibility of counteracting it is always present. The ethics of psychoanalysis, ethics of the well-said, demands that our answer should be put to the test. Therefore we leave the School. Without its founders, the School is the cause of its own growth. It will stand for what it does with the sole guarantee of the transmission of the discourse of psychoanalysis carried out by its analysts and members.

The psychoanalytic discourse has been the reason both for the foundation of The Freudian School of Melbourne and for our exit from it. In our singularity as analysts and founding members, if we can, and if we are able to, we ought to promote the act of concluding, becoming that nothing that the analyst is when transference, being effectively re-directed, allows transmission to pass.

This is why it is not inconsequential to state, among many other things: that there is no Other of the Other, that there is no metalanguage, that the Other does not exist, that there is lack in the Other, that the sexual relation does not exist, that there is not-all, that the woman does not exist, that truth can only be half-said.

These imply that the analyst would do better to abstain both from jouissance and from believing in intrinsic ineffable goodness. In this way, not only may he then hold the chance to keep open the avenue of desire, and not of fear, as the only possibility for his act, but indeed he may advance towards the real.
Ernest Jones, in his funeral sermon on Freud's death, asks the following question: 'How can those to whom he was the centre of life go on finding sense in life?' We know only too well what became the possibilities for a psychoanalysis whose future was anticipated with such a question. Etkin notes that 'It was for that reason' — by which may be understood, the very phrasing of a question — 'that later he — Jones — centred himself upon Freud's life — and became a pilgrim of what he understood as Freudian knowledge.'

The Freudian School of Melbourne, in holding the first Homage to Freud in Australia in 1979, and in 1991, ten years after the death
of Lacan, holding a Homage to Lacan, anticipates and enacts a
different future for psychoanalysis in Australia. An enactment of
the real of the unconscious as a transference of work — a work
which situates itself in relation to the Lacanian unconscious in the
field opened by Freud. There is at play here a transference which
proposes a different question, a question to be elaborated in relation
to the significance of a Homage to Lacan within a Freudian School.

Lacan died on 9 September 1981. Why is a Homage to Lacan held
around the anniversary of a death? We situate a Homage in reference
to death for the reason that death renders pertinent the question
of whether it is possible to separate a master from a teaching or
theory. A Homage, then, fundamentally bears upon the function
of the symbolic and the efficacy of this function in psychoanalysis.
Lacan asks: 'What are these rites really, by which we fulfill our
obligation to what is called the memory of the dead — if not the
total mass intervention of the signifier, from the heights of heaven
to the depths of hell, of the entire play of the symbolic register?'
He further notes that the work of mourning is accomplished at the
level of the logos rather than group or community, although a School
of psychoanalysis is faced with the task of sustaining such a discourse
over and above that of the group.

This is to say that there is transference via work rather than via
a global association. In this way there is an effect of surplus produced
by what supplies the lack, giving rise to a social and linguistic
exchange that is a form of discourse we call writing. A Homage,
therefore, inscribes a symbolic debt to a theory in such a way as
to de-suppose a master — effecting a separation of that theory from
a master. A Homage as testament to the work that can be produced
when, as Lacan noted, his image was not there to act as a screen.
In this resides the possibility of sustaining a transference productive
of writings which advance a theory rather than revere a master. The
passage of ten years since the death of Lacan has revealed the
Freudian School of Melbourne to have produced a work which,
rather than incarnating the discourse of a deceased ancestor, invents
Lacanianism in Australia, the effects of which are more than evident
today.

Finally, how might we understand a Homage to Lacan within a
Freudian School? Psychoanalysis as it was invented by Freud
discovered the unconscious. This invention is worked by Lacan in
the breadth of a commentary on the text of Freud, in light of a
logic proper to it. A Homage to Lacan within a Freudian School
underwrites the fact that, since Lacan, the unconscious may be
situated as the product of an encounter between the Freudian
unconscious and the Lacanian real. Such an encounter resists: on
the one hand, the 'hypnotic symptom' as that towards which the
experience of the unconscious slips when it is not articulated within
the primacy of a theory; and, on the other hand, psychoanalysis
coming to occupy for itself the place of cause through the artifice
of an unified field.

There is a Homage to Lacan in attempting to articulate a formation
of analytic experience as a structure which borders on that of the
impossible to unify, against the idea that such experience is ineffable.
It is this movement of psychoanalysis away from the alibi of
ineffability that produces the obligation — in the form, if one can
one ought — to give account of the psychoanalytic experience —
the duty of both the analyst and the School.

The present volume contains works which respond to this obligation
to give account of the psychoanalytic experience. The papers by
overseas analysts: Eric Porge and Joel Dor from France, and Gustavo
Etkin, who visited and worked intensively with us, and Ivan Correa
from Brazil, are the product of an ongoing dialogue between The
Freudian School of Melbourne and analysts from other Schools.
Such dialogue situates itself precisely in that place where unity, as
the mask of that which is impossible to sustain, absents itself.

Notes
1. Etkin, G. ‘The Decentration’ *Papers of the Freudian
   School of Melbourne*, Oscar Zentner (ed.),
   The Freudian School of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1987.
Homage to Lacan
Lacan Ten Years After: Irruption or Cut?

Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin*

The passage of ten years perhaps makes possible for us a moment to conclude. The image of Lacan has not become a clear picture for us, but the screams did reach us. We read about strategies, objectives, defences and attacks. Shrewd manoeuvres and quick counter moves. Justice. The police, and in one country even a raid.

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Relationships that did not stop to not be written. The real seemed to irrupt in Lacan's discourse. Perhaps a fourth knot was missing.

Apparently it was not now a question of 'denigrating, under the pressure of resistance everything that was learned and trying to defend oneself again, as in the worst initial days' the reason why Freud concluded that 'I still had to learn that analysts could also behave exactly as the patients themselves who were undergoing analysis.'

Now, that was not it. It was simply a matter of preserving the legacy so that what happened to Freud's discourse would not be repeated. Certainty in an honest and efficient transmission via the method. Revolutionary guards of Lacan's discourse. Neither Church nor Marxism. Neither politics nor religion. Only psychoanalysis. A tolerance of the senseless aspects of its truth. Curiously — as far as I know — at no time was the Letter of Dissolution a cause for, or a subject of polemics. It would be banal, at this stage, to recall Freud's group psychology.

It is true that some of those who wanted to 'reignite the field with a spark' to quote Mao-Tse-Tung, so that they could later establish, centralise and direct it, had — as far as is known — little or no so called 'clinical experience', either as analysts or as analysands.

This perhaps was an additional element which made it possible to reach some certainty about the cause of the crisis; certainties that had a common factor; something was incomplete — a necessary cycle had not ended. What was missing was the fulfilment of a set of circumstances, a deficiency determining that a group of analysts or aspiring analysts, act like a lawless horde, foreclosing the dead father.

'Afier all, we are not in Chicago', someone recalled at one point during the epistolary war. A 'No' that as a negation, reminds us that — if the rules of the game were just slightly different then it would have been, indeed, like Chicago.

The cause for so many non-analytic acts was, then, for some the 'abdication of the demand for the Pass', its failure, which justified the dissolution of the L'École Freudienne de Paris (E.F.P.).

For others, on the contrary, the Pass, originating in the perpetuation of transferences, had nothing to do with training. Lacan had invented it in order to repeat, a transference that was not 'liquidated' by the 'tumultuous departure of Lowenstein'. Thus, the perpetuation of the transference to Lacan could also have been the cause of so many passages to the act.

Finally, in one way or another and by one path or another, something had failed.

Thus it could be concluded that in the forefront of the neo-Lacanian International Psychoanalytic Association which speaks of 'ingenieurcak'; an engineer's French, which emphasises the rectifying, directing, centralising, establishing and separating the real from the Borromean knot, are the true analysts — those who did not fail along the way, those who completed the different stages.

I don't think it is like that. Various indications over the past ten years allow us to infer that some were simply more skilful than others in reaching the same imaginary object. At least some of those who did not reach it would also have liked to own an imaginary legitimising apparatus, to centralise and branch out, while negating, obviously, being a new International Psychoanalytic Association.

However, there remains a commentary which oscillates between deception and scandal in the face of what has happened, which sometimes reappears and repeats itself in different styles and forms, referred to, connoted and denoted in writings or informal conversations, but whose common theme would be: 'But to allow all this to happen to go on and repeat itself among analysts!', analysts who, if they weren't, now are, all but submerged in different
directions in Freudian discourse, that is to say, in Lacan’s strict sense of the discourse. The suffering of beautiful souls, perhaps, but also the evidence of something else: surprise. A very special kind of surprise. The surprise of the foreseen, or more so, of the obvious.

In this case, it was foreseen and obvious that a group of ‘more or less’ analysts may function like a band — with an interior and exterior — oriented towards the golden and specular shine of investment, emblems and inheritances. If maturity stopped being a banner, and genitality a flag, if the psychoanalyst isn’t a priest and in his journey he only learns to endure his own unconscious, why be surprised by the obvious effects of this inevitable living together?

It is true that Freud says to Jones with respect to one of Jones’s paraprases: ‘A gentleman should not do these things, not even unconsciously’. That is to say that, off the couch, the unconscious isn’t an excuse.

It isn’t a matter then of being able to contemplate in an understanding way with despair and lack of style, nor to continue laughing about comic unmaskings where the quiet ‘Mon Dieu’ of the beginning culminated in ‘inaudited screams’. It would, however, be useful indeed to ask ourselves why if the obvious is foreseeable it can sometimes still surprise us.

One initial approach to the question could be to think that it is the same kind of surprise that appears on the incredulous and smiling face of that Russian peasant who discovers the Czar’s latrine in Eisenstein’s film October. The same surprise we may suppose delighted the villagers in the antechamber of the ‘Great Cover’ of the Palace of Versailles who, ‘after seeing the Queen eat her soup, would go to watch the Princes eating their stew and later ran, breathless, to watch Les Dames eating their dessert’, as the tourist guide relates.

But then, do kings and emperors eat and defecate too?

It could be that seeing an emperor defecate looks comical. This ‘comic unmasking’ of someone ‘full of dignity and authority by means of deception . . . degradation of the eminent’, which equals, says Freud, the following warning: ‘That individual, the one you admire and venerate like a demigod, is nothing but a man like you.’ To discover, suddenly, the a in the Other. The imaginary phallus is comical because, behind the large masks, the sizes are actually very small.

This implies certainly, that before, there was something of the order of transference, a knowledge and power were accorded to someone who tried to incarnate them. At any rate, in both examples there is a different detail. Whereas — as I recall — the Mujik revolutionary appears to smile, almost laugh, at seeing the evidence that the Czar defecates, the French peasants take the matter very seriously. Their ‘delight’ is that of a surprise that leaves them breathless. They are shocked, surprised, dumbfounded by contemplating the obvious: that kings eat. There is no place for laughter in their very foreseeable discovery.

It is a very curious way of being surprised, because instead of being surprised by the unexpected, one goes to a place to look for a surprise. A surprise that is both sought after and expected. It is therefore not fright. . . . that state that invades us harshly when an unexpected danger appears, for which we are not prepared; it accentuates thus, the surprise factor. It is rather a question of something like a game or a play: the awaited fort of the da and the da of the fort. Playing at being surprised.

Perhaps it is the same as Aristotle tells us in other words in the ‘Poetics’ when he refers to the condition of the Unforeseen and Marvellous in Tragedy, like the Commiseration and the Terror, that only ‘arrive in an unexpected way . . . by mutual connection (since) . . . things that happen in this way cause more wonder than if they happened naturally or casually, so that even the things that happen by chance seem more surprising the more in succession they seem to happen.’
Paradoxically then, the foreseen makes the surprise more surprising.

But, what is 'surprise'? We distinguish what is surprising from its effect, to surprise. The surprising can cause — surprisingly — pain or terror, fear or wonder. Also, why not, you can be surprisingly bored. The surprising, thus, provokes surprise: effect-affects in the I.

We saw earlier that the surprising doesn't have to be necessarily unforeseen. Not for being possible do surprises stop surprising us. Let us try to grasp then the specific and proper aspects of the surprising. Plato in *Parmenides* can help us when he defines the instantaneous as 'a moment that isn't in any time'. In effect, 'the instantaneous is a strange thing': the strange nature of the instantaneous, which appears in the interval between movement and stillness outside of all time . . . ' Afterwards Plato situates the instantaneous again in an interval between types of movement and repose, without being for that reason in the reality of being or non-being, or in that of being born or perishing. Juan Bergua, his translator in the Iberian Editions, clarifies for us that the instantaneous is 'alternating between being and not being . . . : being born and dying; it is the articulation of two states, movement and rest . . .'

Then, the interval proper to the instantaneous — the form in which surprise appears — we can also call discontinuity. And we can say that it is the effect — result — of a cut.

It is possible, however, to point out a difference with Parmenides and Plato: for psychoanalysis the One does not precede the cut. The One: One of the series — is the cut. The cut makes One and One is the cut.

Thus, the awaited surprise — as such — is the return, the going back to a surprising discontinuity in the symbolic. This is so because when the continuity of what does not stop being written the Necessary — is interrupted, an impossible appears as Possible. A possibility which retroacts on the structure of that Necessary, in the sense of allowing — upon confirming it — to anticipate the emergence of this real between the edges of the instantaneous interval, without including them. The real, as an impossibility is surmised from the symbolic. Foreseeable then, as possible, by virtue of the discontinuity in the symbolic through which the edges of the real are drawn — surprisingly — but insofar as it is repetition, implying the symbolic as a necessary condition of its possibility.

Repetition therefore is not a return to the real but to the signifier $S^1$ — of its failure to symbolise it. The real is what always returns but the same place is marked by the signifier.

Always present or 'outside of time', the real — even the possibility of naming it — follows the act which tried to designate it. That is why the real is not encountered upon repeating, but only the edges of the symbolic continuity interrupted by a cut. Edges where Freud also situated anxiety as the boundary of repetition which is not different from what Lacan alerts us to: that 'the real is that which lies always behind an Automaton'. Behind. Next to and after.

*Tuche*, the failed meeting of repetition, made possible by the Automaton. There is no Tuche without Automaton.

If 'repetition demands the new', the new is what is different. That 'pure difference', object of the desire of the analyst. The difference is, by definition, signifier. Thus it repeats itself — like the encounter between the analyst and the analysand — not to find the indifference of the real but the signifier that may mark it as a difference. The real is never found. The real, on the contrary, is a mis-encounter in the insistence of repetition. That is why you do not 'awaken' before the real but before the impossibility of cutting it with a signifier that will designate it by its effects. And, for that reason also, the real does not 'originate' the Act as saying (there is no genetic or chronological continuity between the real and the symbolic) but it is the signifier in act which — retroactively — determines the existence of the real.

From the aforementioned we can infer, in addition, that if the ethics of psychoanalysis is that of the well said, that is the saying of the
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Impossible. Therefore, to make possible the Impossible in the saying implies that there is no impossible without the saying to say it; without a letter that will make the hole with regard to which, then, indeed, the real may exist.

That possible surprise is that which places the analyst in the same position as that of the simple peasant who goes to a place to be surprised because the kings eat. This does not exclude the rest of the unforeseen phallic contingency, the moment in which what is new appears in the repetition, condemning it to failure: if the analysand can not only forget, but surprise himself 'through what is said in what is heard', then the analyst also is surprised sometimes with the effects of his act, when what is at play is the analytic act. It is not only Freud who underlines this, but also Lacan when commenting on Reik, saying that surprise is 'the sign, the illumination, the shine that, in the analyst shows that he grasps the unconscious... that which happens suddenly.' A way of defining the awaited surprise like a phallic presence, equivalent to the sudden spurts of sperm and streams of wine of the Dionysian feasts.

However, in the face of this surprise in which the analyst receives his own message in an inverted form, one can observe from the time of Lacan's death in some discourses that an irruption is dealt with as though it were a cut. That is, to take as a cut the irruption of the real into the discourse of the analysand.

Let us consult some dictionaries. The Petit Larousse tells us that 'irruption' is 'the brusque entrance, in general' and also 'the overflowing of the sea...'. From the Encyclopedia Britannica and Websters, among other entries we obtain the following definitions: 'irrupt' is 'to enter forcibly or suddenly' and 'appear without warning'. Irruption is also 'a sudden and violent invasion'. The dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy tells us that the Spanish word 'to irrupt' is 'to enter a place violently', thus an irruption can be understood as an 'invasion'. The Dictionary of Spanish Usage by Maria Moliner adds to these possibilities that of 'harsh and violent attack' and gives as an example, 'bull irrupted into the bullring'.

We may think then that the location or bullring is a place whose imaginary consistency represents the permanence of a cut; that the letter of the architect made the hole and therefore created a place, or of the workers who pierced, perforated and delineated what would later have that round consistency in which the bull irrups. This sought-after and awaited irruption of the bull is nevertheless the opposite of a cut, as far as psychoanalysis is concerned.

In this regard Websters, besides defining cut as 'an interruption' and 'stop', as far as dividing, tells us that it is a question of 'breaking the continuity, dividing or separating into two portions by removing cards from the top. To draw a card from the deck.' This division makes a card appear: the S,. The dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy says that to cut is to 'divide, separate its parts with some instrument, like a knife, scissors, sword etc.'. Maria Moliner's Dictionary of Spanish Usage says that it is 'to divide a line from another with a common point, or a surface from another with a common point.' But also, and more forceful still, it states that it is 'to amputate... to saw... to castrate... to decapitate... Thus, there is no cut in the bull's irruption but there was before in the place where he appears as expected. Of course the sudden appearance of the bull doesn't last very long: the bull, as we know, when the business is taken seriously, ends up cut down, (in contrast to the other bull, the topological one, which is the result of the cut). To say it in another way: the symbolic — as a signifier — is a cut in act, but the real — when it appears as action — does not cut, it irrups.

It is a difference that we may express in a mathematical way. Lacan also defines the Other as an empty set because it is composed of elements that are not identical to themselves, an attribute, at the same time, specific to the signifier. Nevertheless, if in Set Theory the empty set does not have any elements, for psychoanalysis that nothing — not empty of signifiers — determines effects in relation to the subject. It is not empty since its signifying elements topologically have borders that follow a trajectory in a kind of hole, the consistent effect of an act that cuts the surface of meaning.
An act, contrary to the action of irritanting, whose antecedent is the Freudian trauma, is not a cut, nor, for that matter, does it make edges along which a discourse could be knotted (although it could be — why not? that some would-be analyst, upon entering suddenly or irritanting, may begin to feel like a bull with phallic masculinity: The psychoanalyst is an incarnated misunderstanding).

From the above it can be affirmed that the irritation of the real does not cut but — on the contrary — it voids the cut: Verwertung. This is because the traumatic irritation could be thought of as an empty set, but in contrast to the Other, empty of all properties: Empty-Empty, thus we do not define it as composed of such elements as \( X \neq X \) but \( \emptyset X \) — now the empty set of \( X \).21

All of this can also be seen to operate in the Borromean knot in such a way that if the Analytic Act breaks its continuity, it is necessary to remember that that break is an effect of the cut, as much in its imaginary consistency as in the infinity of its real. An ephemeral break of its consistency which, not being an irritation but a cut, makes an instantaneous reknitting possible.22 It is a symbolic cut in the real of the symptom which makes it come into existence upon perforating it. Finally, it is symbolic in that it repeats itself insisting on the fourth knot, naming and knotting while it cuts.

Thus the Name-of-the-Father reappears as flesh-less and like a function, minimum condition for the Borromean knot to establish itself and a subject to be assumed. From Lacan's saying that 'having enunciated in writing the real in question has the value of what is generally called a trauma', some may infer that the analytic act is to irritant, traumatizing, repressing or foreclosing. Lacan immediately clarifies that he means the 'forcing of a new writing that, because of its metaphor, has a symbolic reach.'23

The theoretical and clinical consequences of the object \( a \) being at the empty centre of the Borromean knot are therefore not inferred, the object \( a \) is whatever is missing from the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. This is why non-sense is the way in which the real irritant in the meaning — always sexual — neither is it all without meaning, but it is through the object \( a \) articulated also to the subject in the fantasm, that the non-sense is the inevitable and surprising moment, necessary to the efficacy of the analytic act.

This allows us to differentiate the psychiatric act from the analytic act. The psychiatrist — a specular other of the foreclosed Name-of-the-Father — irritant the real in delirium: to silence the meaning of certainties and the metonymies that surround them will be a specular objective to the silence of the paternal function. The psychiatrist produces his Act from the standpoint of certainty in his knowledge. The certainty of nosological knowledge corresponds to the certainty of the delirious metaphor. But the imaginary correspondence of both certainties is not symmetrical: the psychiatrist knows — before hearing — what should not be taken seriously; thus, what should not be heard. The psychiatric act is, then, a way of not listening. Its objective is, as Michel Foucault says, 'to establish a system of causality on the scale of an entire biography and to dictate a verdict of corrective punishment.'24 It could be added that it is a question of a taxonomic knowledge: diagnosing to correct (or rectify) behaviour, style and discourses not adequate to consensual referents. Within this rectifying objective25 silencing what is not taken seriously.

Thus, the psychiatric act oscillates between the classifying knowledge of the Discourse of the University and the Discourse of the Master, who wants the matter to work, but silently. However, one could think that since Lacan defined the place of the analyst as a place of the semblance of the object \( a \) in the place of the agent, thus forcing him to be humble, he succeeded in avoiding, in this way, the arrogance of the deaf master. Paradoxically, for some it was not this way because the psychiatrizing of the analytic act consists, precisely, in the mis-understanding that the object \( a \) precedes the signifier which — as an agent — it causes, and therefore, is prior to \( S \), and to its Law of repetition. The place of the agent in the analytic discourse thus becomes a place of jouissance without Law, from which the analyst irrigant into the discourse of the analysand.
To go beyond the Father, which is what Lacan proposes, is to dispense with the mythical images of his diverse names in order to reduce them to one function: naming and knotting. If it is understood that going beyond him, beyond the Father, is to reach his jouissance and that to enjoy is to give precedence to the object a as cause, one forgets that at the same time, the object a is caused, both by 'the repetition of One' and by castration, a signifying operation that determines the Father as 'the real impossible'. Thus, object a as the cause of desire is also caused as 'a product of this operation.'

For this reason, although the good intentions are to occupy the place of the semblance of the object a in the discourse of the analyst, when it is carried out from the imaginary knowledge of jouissance, of what should be taken seriously and what is convenient for the analysand, the analyst in fact occupies the place of the Master, no longer as a signifier, but as the real Father of the Horde.

Because the analyst is the semblance of a from and caused by the S, that represents the analysand for the S₂: S₁ . . . . . . . S₂

Thus the knowledge of the analyst in the place of truth, is here an effect of the act that makes him an un-being in the discourse of the analysand — the discourse of free association. The analytic act then, caused by the analyst but produced by the analysand, makes a cut. It is a signifier and shows a difference. A hole in the real of the enunciation of the symptom, it makes it ex-sist as non-sense in order that a new meaning will make possible the continuity of the discourse until fragmenting the fantasm.

Notes

2. Lacan, J. in Acto e Inconsciente, Ed. Manantial, p. 15: ' . . . we do not make up a set founded in the dead father' ( . . . ) 'this gives us the possibility of acceding to certainty'. A certainty defined in the lines above, where the author affirms that 'There is only one analyst, plus another, plus another analyst; there are 'mille e tre', 'analysts.'
An 'r' is missing and that is it (to dispense with the Name-of-the-Father does not mean to not use it.)


7. Ibid. p.53.

8. Ibid. p.61.

9. Seminar XXIV, L'Insu que de l'une-bevues aile a mourre (unedited) of 19 April 1977: Awakening is the Real under it's impossible aspect.

10. Colette Soler. in Actes de l'Ecole de la Cause Freudienne, L'acte et le repetition, affirms the opposite: 'The Act is a telling that responds at this point, where the Other is missing; it thus originates in the real.' in L'Etourdit: 'Let it be said it is forgotten behind what is said in what is heard.'

11. Lacan, J. An Outline of Psychoanalysis, St. Ed., Vol. XXIII: 'Many other things occur, some of them predictable, but others which surprise us.'


13. Lacan, J. Seminar XXIII, 9 December 1975, Le Sinthome: 'This method (the triality of the Borromean knot) presents itself without hope of breaking the knot that the Symbolic constitutes with the Imaginary and the Real. This rejection is a virtue, because it is for this reason that our analytic apprehension of the knot is the negative of religion.' 13 May 1976.


15. It would be necessary to situate the moment in Lacan's teaching in which he uses the term 'rectification', as well as to seriously evaluate its reach. A term which he stops utilizing, especially as applying to the analysand.

16. El Reves del Psicoanalisis. Seminario, 20 May 1970: 'This effect of repetition is that (a)'

17. Lacan, J. 18 March 1970: 'Castration is the real operation introduced by the incidence of the significant, but it what it may, in relation to sex (...). From that it results, of course, that there is no other cause of desire than the product of this operation.'

18. Marcel Deteinne. in Falo, Brazilian Publication of the Freudian Field, Jan-June 1988, p.111: 'After a few minutes of this story in which she wanted to pass herself off as crazy, it was necessary to cut (!) the word, saying

19. Dionysos a Ciel Ouvert, Hatchette.

20. Lacan, J.


22. Lacan, J.

23. Lacan, J.

24. Lacan, J.

25. Lacan, J.

26. Lacan, J.

27. Lacan, J.

to her: You want to present yourself as crazy,' in which I punctuated, justly, the subjective position in relation to the telling, giving her the indication so that she wouldn't think that everything she said would be taken seriously. Nothing is more important in psychoanalysis than this. That is the direction of the cure: knowing what should, and what should not, be taken seriously.'


Sade with Lacan

Linda Clifton

'O thou my friend! The prosperity of Crime is like unto the lightening whose traitorous brilliancies embellish the atmosphere but for an instant, in order to hurl into death's very depths the luckless one they have dazzled.' Marquis De Sade — Preface to Justine 1791.¹

'I do not know if I am hangman or victim for I imagine the most horrible tortures and as I describe them I suffer them myself. There is nothing I could not do and everything fills me with horror.' Sade in Peter Weiss's — Marat.²

Sade with Lacan. From the criminality of Sadean desire to the 'desire borne by death' wherein Lacan situates an ethics for psychoanalysis
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— such is the passage Lacan makes in his *Kant Avec Sade*.3

Despite the scandal of a name which places Sade forever in the Other of language as signifier and for all that many would claim he is virtually unreadable, Sade is now acknowledged as a serious and important writer. To be analysts we must first become literate — Lacan was not the first to say this and Freud is a shining example. I am interested then in Sade, in the writing beyond the name.

But I approach Sade with Lacan, from the viewpoint of psychoanalysis. Lacan's reading of Sade is a complex and difficult one, juxtaposing, as he does, Sade with Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth century German philosopher.

Why does Lacan juxtapose Sade with Kant? Kant, the Professor of Philosophy, considered by some as the greatest modern philosopher. Kant, who wrote the famous treatise on ethics, *The Critique of Practical Reason* and who lived, according to Bertrand Russell, 'an exemplary and academic life'.4 Sade, a writer of works infamous, obscene and subversive, works which never found a comfortable home in either philosophy or literature. Sade the criminal, a supposed madman, a man of most 'irregular' habits.

A second question. How does a reading of a text of perversion lead Lacan to an elucidation of an ethics for psychoanalysis? These are the questions which led me into the Sadean mire.

The Sadean project was an immense one, in its volume alone. One edition of *Justine* and *Juliette* combined was more than four thousand pages. The aim of Sade's project was to create a Weltanschauung, a system, a philosophy of criminality, destruction and evil. He aimed to convert (corrupt) not only his protagonists but surely also his readers. Listen to his address to his 'Dear Readers' where he describes *The One Hundred and Twenty Days at Sodom* as,

... the most impure tale that has ever been told since our world begun ... Many of the extravagances you are about to see illustrated will doubtless displease you ... but there are amongst them a few which will warm you to the point of costing you some fuck and that reader, is all we ask of you; if we have not said everything, analysed everything, tax us not with partiality, for you cannot expect us to have guessed what suits you best.5

As you can hear, Sade's writing aims to be the object of jouissance for the reader. Sade's dictum was that to be erotic it is essential to articulate crime in language. He was not content to just arouse his reader. His aim of conversion led him to render innumerable speeches and justifications, cajoling if not 'beating' the reader into submission. In other words the Sadean project is a project of mastery. Such a project of mastery cannot be the project of the analyst either in his practice or in the transmission of psychoanalysis. And it will not be mine here.

In my own reading of Sade with Lacan I will limit myself to one important but relatively short text of Sade, *Philosophy In The Bedroom*.4 I will discuss its theme in relation to what I would call the tragic dimension of Sade's life — the dimension of crime and punishment. To trace a path through Sade's writing I will develop the idea of the paradox of freedom in his life and work, a paradox rich in implication for psychoanalysis.

Freedom, that ideal of modern man, the ideal of the Revolution in which Sade participated with its motto 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.' An ideal linked to that other ideal of happiness as in 'Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.' Freedom, an ideal that psychoanalysis puts very much into question. Lacan's reading of Sade will pursue this questioning of the allegedly exhilarating freedoms found in Sade by some.

To begin it will be important to sketch the essential details of Sade's life and to comment on the fate of his writing. Sade, a French nobleman born in 1740, brought up as a Roman Catholic, called himself a libertine, a term I will clarify later. He spent nearly one
third of his adult life in prisons or asylums. His first imprisonments were for relatively minor sexual escapades (albeit against the law). The last was for his authorship of Justine. He had the criminal distinction of being imprisoned under all the various forms of French Government through which he lived — The Monarchy, The Republic, The Consulate and The Empire. Despite being of noble birth he was a supporter of the French Revolution.

Finally, it is important to say that in his life Sade did not go past certain limits in his behaviour, limits that he certainly advocated transgressing in his writings. As he wrote to his wife in 1781 while a prisoner in the Bastille:

I am a libertine, but I am neither a criminal nor a murderer and ... I shall ... say that it might well be possible that those who condemn me as unjustly as I have been might themselves be unable to offset their infamies by good works as clearly established as those I can contrast to my errors . . . .

With respect to the fate of Sade's writing there is a word in French — enfer — which in its several meanings carries the fate of both Sade and, for a very long time, his works. Enfer means 'hell', the infernal or lower regions or figuratively torture, torment, misery. Its alternative meaning is the enf er of a library where books of 'doubtful character' are kept. This is where Guillaume Apollinaire made his researches on Sade, publishing in 1909 a selection of his work, thus bringing it 'out of hell'.

Hitherto, Sade's work had been subject to a clandestinity from which it appeared that scholars and publishers had tacitly agreed it should never emerge. During Sade's lifetime or shortly after his death most of his works were destroyed, either by accident or deliberately, not only by his enemies but by friends and family wishing to protect their reputation. Only one quarter of his creative work remains.

An extensive work of Sadean scholarship this century finally made possible the development of serious philosophic and literary criticism of Sade, particularly in France by writers such as Maurice Blanchot, Pierre Klossowski and George Bataille.

In view of the suppression of Sade's work it is interesting to note that Lacan's article Kant with Sade was apparently initially rejected by the publishers who commissioned it as a preface to Philosophy In The Bedroom. Lacan comments 'because it's dull!' that the publishers then put themselves in the position of having to recommission the work from him when the success of his Ecrits made it plausible. It seems that even with a work as manifestly subversive as Sade's it doesn't take long for a kind of 'established' critique to develop, a 'respectable' line which finds a psychoanalytic interpretation too — could we say — subversive?

Back to Sade. Apollinaire wrote that Sade was 'the freest spirit who ever lived'. Let us question this freedom. Sade was proud to call himself a libertine and he espoused a philosophy of libertinage. The word libertin had been in the French language since the fifteenth century as a translation of the Latin word libertinus — freed from slavery. By the sixteenth century it had acquired a double meaning of free thinking and profligate. Criticism of orthodox dogma was associated with indifference to morality.

With the epithet — libertine — we have then a history of ideas of freedom from shackles of all kinds, originally from slavery itself, later from religious and accompanying moral and sexual restrictions. Why then does Lacan call the sadist the 'serf of pleasure'?

Dolmance, the central protagonist in the Philosophy In The Bedroom is a libertine par excellence. He is described by his friend Le Chevalier as:

The most notorious atheist, the most immoral fellow . . . his is the most complete and thorough going corruption and he is the most evil individual . . . Sodoms delights are as dear to him in their active and passive form. For his pleasures he cares for none but men, if however he sometimes deigns to employ women
it is only upon the condition that they be obliging enough to change sex with him.\textsuperscript{11}

Dolmance gives a programme for libertinage — sodomy, sacrilegious fancies and a penchant for cruelty.

Sade did not become a writer until his middle age when he was in prison. However, the essence of the themes writ large in Philosophy In The Bedroom is contained in an account of a criminal escapade from his youth, the first to lead him to prison. Because of court records we have the details of this crime committed against a young working class woman, Jeanne Testarde, whom he had procured. This occurred in the same year as his arranged marriage to the devout and submissive Renee-Pelagie.

The young woman was locked in a room with Sade, where he questioned her about religion, asking if she believed in God, Jesus and the Virgin. When she said she did believe Sade responded with insults and blasphemies. He said that there was no God and that he had proved it. He had masturbated into a chalice. He told her about taking communion with a girl, keeping the two hosts and then putting them inside her before having intercourse, saying; ‘If you are God revenge yourself’ End of scene one.

Scene two took place in another room adorned with a collection of whips and erotic drawings juxtaposed with crucifixes and religious engravings. Sade proposed that Jeanne Testarde should beat him and that then they would reverse roles. She refused and the night proceeded with Sade attempting to coerce her to blasphemy and various other profane activities involving the religious symbols.

The next morning he let her go, naively swearing her to secrecy. Nine days later he was arrested and his life as a criminal had begun.\textsuperscript{12}

What is striking in this admittedly bald description of the night is not so much the ‘abnormality’ of the practices but the very controlled and contrived nature of the whole encounter. The roles are pre-ordained — nobleman and working class girl. The elements are juxtaposed — whip and crucifixes. The script of blasphemy is already written. There is little spontaneity or apparent freedom. While the roles can be reversed there is no true reciprocity between the parties involved. When the action flags, when the pleasure fails, bring on the whips. Such are the elements, rituals and instruments of perversion. As Lacan writes, the ideal of the inanimate object lends support ‘to a perverse desire sustained by the annihilation either of the desire of the other or of the desire of the subject.'\textsuperscript{13}

In this episode Sade required the woman to bear witness to his desecration of religious symbols and to his blasphemy. This insistence on desecration and blasphemy is like a parody of religious consecration and incantation. It has all the reiteration of a ‘creed of atheism’ — ‘I do not believe in . . .’ This insistence appears as the very invocation of the God who is denied.

In the light of this it is interesting to note that the second criminal escapade for which Sade was imprisoned was carried out five years later on Easter Day. One of Sade’s biographers writes:

‘. . . clearly Sade’s choice of day was not accidental. When the libertines in Juliette arrange a sacrilegious debauch for Easter Day, Lady Clairwille talks about the pleasure of desecrating the holiest mystery of the Christian religion on the day of the year it regards as one of its greatest festivals.'\textsuperscript{14}

One of Sade’s most cherished objectives in his writing was to prove the inexistence of God. At the same time he complained of the failed omnipotence of this ‘inexistent’ God. For Sade, God, if he exists, is useful only in a single instant, the act of creation and since then he has been ‘fixed in a contemptible stillness and inactivity’ for millions of centuries. Sade addresses provocations to an absent God.

‘If there were a God and if that God possessed power, would he allow the virtue which knows him to be sacrificed to vice . . . would
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this all powerful God allow a weak creature . . . to insult him, scoff at him . . . and offend him.13

Sade was not alone in his time in employing modes of rational argument against the existence of God. The cruelty inspired by religion in that period was a focus for attack on religion by other philosophers. But to declare or argue for an atheism is one thing. To insist on it with such vitriol and to make it an important element in one's erotic life is another.

These episodes from Sade's life show Sade as far from free, fixed in his erotic crimes by his relation to an omnipresent Other. For the perverse is no freer than anyone else in his choice of erotic objects or practices, no matter how many social or moral limits he contravenes. Desire is the desire of the Other and thus it is his structure and his history that will ordain his freedom of movement or otherwise in his erotic life. Sade gives eloquent testimony to this in a letter to his wife from prison:

'As to what concerns me, me personally, I promise you nothing. The beast is too old. Believe me: you must give up trying to educate him . . . Our habits do not depend on us but our constitution, our system . . . One cannot make virtues for oneself and one does not have the power to adopt a particular taste in these matters any more than one has the power to straighten one's spine if it is born crooked.'16

Sade's repudiation of God does not leave the place of the Other vacant for long as he immediately replaces God by the idea of Nature as the dominating force in the Universe, a force perpetually in motion. Nature, operating according to her own laws is indifferent to the very existence of man, who is just another species. At the same time, somewhat in contradiction to this, Sade sees Nature as being responsible for every impulse, inclination or sensation, whether for good or evil that man may have. Death and destruction are part of her schemes. Just as a river may flood or a volcano erupt so may a man kill another man in a moment of passion without it

transgressing Nature's laws. For what is death to Nature but a kind of transmutation of matter which is necessary for her other creations?

Nature, too, finally disappoints Sade. Almani, a Sadean protagonist expresses his disillusionment:

... since disgust with life becomes so strong that there is not a single man who would want to live again, even if such an offer were made on the day of his death. . . Yes I abhor Nature . . . because I know her well. Aware of her frightful secrets . . . I have experienced a kind of pleasure in copying her foul deeds. What a contemptible and odious being to make one see the daylight only in order to have me find pleasure in everything that does harm to my fellow man.

Should I love such a mother? No, but I will imitate her, all the while detesting her.17

Thus the Other of God is transformed into the Other of Nature — the all powerful Woman in whose name every conceivable crime of the passionate individual can be condoned. Limits are only to be put on the actions of the State not of man acting in his capacity as 'sovereign', a term used by Maurice Blanchot to denote Sadean man as alone, powerful, impervious to evil, committed only to himself and his own pleasure.18 But I propose that Sadean man is not truly 'sovereign' in the sense denoted by Blanchot. He is not alone. For the Other, whether as God or Nature, is firmly installed by Sade. The Other as the embodiment of evil, indifferent to the fate of man, but demanding obedience to its laws.

Let us explore the paradoxes of Sade's freedom from another angle. Philosophy In The Bedroom is arranged in a series of dialogues. The alternative title, Immoral Teachers, Dialogues intended for the Education of Young Ladies gives the theme of the work; the introduction and guidance of a young woman, Eugenie De Mistival, into the practices of libertinage.
The fifth dialogue, which diverts us from the action of the sexual tableaux to a political commentary is the famous 'Yet Another Effort Frenchmen, If You Would Be Republicans'. In this dialogue Sade the libertine becomes Sade the legislator.

On the basis of the Rights of Man Sade proposes his extraordinary 'right of sexual enjoyment', which Lacan will call a 'right to jouissance'. This law states that while no man has right of possession over another as in slavery or in marriage he has a right of enjoyment over all others. This enjoyment is to have no limit and it refers particularly to the rights of men, being the stronger sex over women. 'we have the right to decree laws that compel women to yield to the flames of him who would have her, violence itself being one of that right's effects, we can employ it lawfully ... All men therefore have a right over all women.

Sade goes further in his ordering of lust within the republic by proposing:

... to establish all the security necessary so that, when need sends the citizen near the objects of lust, he can give himself over to doing with them all that his passions demand, without ever being hampered by anything. Various stations cheerful, sanitary, spacious ... and safe, will be erected in divers points in the city; in them all sexes, all ages, all creatures, will be offered to the caprices of the libertines ... and the most absolute subordination will be the rule. ... the slightest refusal will be instantly and arbitrarily punished.

Thus obviously freedom for some becomes slavery for others. But beyond this — and perhaps one can afford a little levity here — doesn't one suspect that once such a 'right of jouissance' were legislated no self-respecting libertine would be found in such a 'safe', 'sanitary', socially sanctioned environment? Is it not transgression that is central to the joy of the libertine who revels in the very criminal nature of his act? There, beyond the pleasure principle is his jouissance, in the very risk he runs of punishment and death which his criminal acts may involve. The libertine Borghese says in Juliette, 'If only my transgressions can lead me like the last of creatures to the fate to which their wild abandon conducts them. The gallows itself would be for me a voluptuous theme, and there would I face death by relishing the pleasure of expiring a victim of my crimes.'

Again, Sade says, 'What animates us is not the object of libertinage but rather the idea of evil.'

Thus we would predict that the legislation of desire will cause desire to disappear for, as Lacan writes, 'When the law is truly there, desire doesn't hold, but that's because the law and repressed desire are one and the same thing.'

Sade as libertine rejects the law. As legislator he puts himself in the place of the law. Ultimately, Lacan will show that despite Sade's transgression of both divine and moral law he is finally subjected to the very law he rails against. This is the Law which for psychoanalysis is the primordial Law prohibiting incest. How does Lacan show this?

He evokes the disturbing scene which is the culmination of Philosophy In The Bedroom. This scene portrays the punishment of the heroine's mother, a punishment on account of the strict and religious upbringing of her daughter, the now thoroughly corrupt Eugenie. It involves many outrages and cruelties but the finale of the scene is the literal sewing up of the mother's genitalia with a 'large needle' and 'red waxed thread'. Lacan argues that this strange 'sewing up' of a mother, thus rendering her inviolable, can be seen as Sade's subjection to the Law, the Law prohibiting incest, the Law he elsewhere incessantly repudiates.

For psychoanalysis, when the Law holds, castration will mark the subject. Roland Barthes argues that this sewing of a woman is a kind of secondary castration imposed in the absence of the penis. He calls it 'The most spiteful of castrations indeed, since it makes the body retrogress into the limbo of the sexless. To sew ... is to
return the divinely cut up body — whose cut up state is the source of all Sadean pleasure — to the abjection of the smooth body, the total body.25

What starts at the beginning of Philosophy In The Bedroom with a mood of anticipation and even exhilaration moves inexorably to become the discourse of the master as desire becomes jaded. Again one must resort to the whips — what will not come spontaneously the sadist must coerce. Finally, the only crime is that of acknowledging a limit, of refusing to invent ever more ingenioussly criminal acts. For this failure a libertine will kill another libertine. As Lacan notes, Sade’s fantasy is that ‘nature, woman that she is, will magically always yield to us more. It would be a mistake’ he says, ‘to trust this typical dream of potency.’26

For Sade, the crime must be eternal. He never rests from his project. Addressing himself to the other as reader Sade will continue when the reader stops exhausted. Beyond the reader he addresses the Other, placing himself as object, cause of desire for this Other, an Other who will apparently never be appeased. What this Other demands is suffering, a suffering even beyond death. Lacan writes:

... however bizarre the fantasy of perverse desire may appear to you never forget that the subject is always in some way present and involved in that fantasy... the subject always stands in some relationship to the pathos of existence — to the suffering of existing itself or that of existing as a term in a sexual configuration. For a sadistic fantasy to endure, the subject’s interest in the person who suffers humiliation must obviously be due to the possibility of the subject being submitted to the same humiliation himself.27

This demand for suffering and punishment, experienced as emanating from an Other, in Sade’s philosophic work can be seen to be that with which we are familiar in psychoanalysis, the demand of the superego. Now at last we can address the question posed earlier about the apparently strange juxtaposition of Kant with Sade.

In making this pairing Lacan presents an argument that Sade’s writing, like Kant’s, is based on an attempt to use reason to erect a moral system and that it portrays, even in the ‘unreasonable’ excesses which it produces, the perverse truth of the Kantian Critique. A truth I am sure which would be unrecognisable to Kant but which shows the fundamental role of the superego in systems of morality, even in, or perhaps especially in, those that would appear to contain the embodiment of evil.

This is the superego that, as Freud points out, is never satisfied with a single renunciation but which always demands more. It is the superego which for Lacan is that ‘obscene’ and ‘ferocious figure’.

Sade’s own prolonged deprivation of liberty and his resulting very great suffering were linked to his development as a writer. Sade himself commented ironically that the government could have spared itself the trouble he caused by his writing if they allowed him to be free with access to a harem. Many have commented on Sade’s own role in bringing about his own punishment. Some — like Jean Paulhan — have solved the question to their own satisfaction by proposing that the ‘other side’ of sadism is masochism and that Sade’s masochism was responsible for this degree of alleged self-punishment.

I would prefer to take something else Paulhan says about Sade’s years of undoubted ill treatment, humiliation and anguish. He says that Sade, in a very real sense, paid.28 But paid for what? I propose that he paid, not for the rather seedy little crimes of his youth nor even for the obscenity and cruelty in his writing but for a jouissance of the writing itself. Sade said that there was no better way to amplify one desires than to put limits on them. Desire cannot be articulated, but within the limits of the four walls of his prison Sade produced a writing, surely an excessive writing, a writing of excess, a writing that went beyond every imaginable limit, a writing which became the very reason for his existence.

After six and a half years at Vincennes, Sade had nothing he valued more than what was going on in his mind, which he painstakingly
wrote down:

My way of thinking is the fruit of my reflections, it is a part of my existence my constitution . . . my only comfort; it alleviates all my sufferings in prison, provides all my pleasures . . . and I value it more highly than life.

Sade continues in this letter to his wife:

If then, as you tell me they are willing to restore my liberty if I am willing to pay for it by the sacrifice of my principles or my tastes we may bid one another an eternal adieu, for rather than part with these I would sacrifice a thousand lives and a thousand liberties if I had them...10

It is to the Sade who wrote this that I will pay my respects because Sade knew well the price he had to pay through bitter experience. Isn't his defiance here an expression of the maxim quoted by Lacan; 'And lose not for the sake of life, the cause of living.'

Lacan writes, 'Desire . . . suffices to make life have no sense in playing the coward'.11 This desire, which may not be for 'the good', this desire which may lead even to destruction, is the desire proposed by Lacan as the basis for his formulation of an ethics of psychoanalysis, an ethics unrelated to the formulation of a Kant or a Sade in their moral or 'immoral' philosophies, based on the assumption of the existence of universal laws of morality, where issues of freedom and happiness are pursued. One is not free in one's desire, nor will a psychoanalysis guarantee happiness. The ethical question that will be posed in an analysis will rather be; 'Have you lived a life in accordance with your desire?'

Notes


5. de Sade, Marquis The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom, Arena, 1989, p. 253-54.
12. This account is derived from Ronald Hayman's biography of Sade — De Sade, A Critical Biography, Constable, Great Britain, 1978, p. 48.
15. de Sade, Marquis in Klossowski, P., 'Nature as Destructive Principle', published as a preface to The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom, Arena, 1989, p. 66.
17. de Sade, Marquis. The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom, Arena, 1989, p. 72-3.
21. Ibid. p. 316.

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**The Lacanian Thing or Psychoanalysis since Lacan**

María Inés Rotmiler de Zentner

But there is a remainder risen at the moment in which the limit that founds the subject is constituted: that is what I call the object 'a', and it is there that jouissance, which escapes the pleasure principle, takes refuge. There is already a presentiment of this in Plato's Philebus, where Socrates speaks of an anaesthetic part in the relation between soul and body. Here is precisely where jouissance dwells, in that outside-of-the-body, where the *Dasein*, not only of the pervers but of all subject, should be situated.

Jacques Lacan
The Logic of the Fantasm
There is little doubt that the unconscious not only speaks but also that it speaks so well as to think what it speaks. Not only does it speak well when it speaks; it speaks even better when, by failing through its blunders, it succeeds in presentifying the misunderstanding on which the whole idea of communication is based. In this regard, the fantasm shows, more than anything else, why the particularity of the unconscious implies that it has to be taken as being structured like a language.

The equilibrium and permanence of the fundamental fantasm are due to the fact that it is a highly condensed structure of metaphorical value which seems — contrary to what we have learned from the metonymy of desire — to stop all displacement on the object. Strange as it may seem, the fantasm is a metaphor of desire. So even though the fantasm is directed by desire, its structure per se renders desire fixed as metaphoric and not metonymic.

The grammatical construction in which the fantasm is expressed possesses, seemingly, few of the characteristics of the primary process. Although the organisation of the fantasm belongs to the secondary process, its structure is unconscious. These mixed formations were typified as compromise solutions, like dreams or symptoms. What is certain is the grammatical substratum which allows the interpretation to be something other than an interminable guessing game.

There is, therefore, in the interpretation as much as in the scansion of sessions, nothing arbitrary. Consequently, it is quite clear that we arrive in this way at an over-determined grammatical unconscious. In order to counterbalance the semblance of the effects of an unconscious so full of grammar we should recall that the complete formula of the fantasm is \( S \circ a \): in which we read divided subject, \( S \), on one side and object \( a \), irreducible to any other object, on the other. The \( S \) corresponds to the order of the signifier and grammar, while the object \( a \) corresponds to the order of the real and to what is neither signifier nor grammatical.

The formula of the fantasm permits us to clarify, beyond doubt, that the only desire that the subject brings to the analysis under the guise of wanting to know, is a desire to understand. This desire to understand comes to the fore with the sole aim of maintaining a status quo whereby something is altered in order that nothing changes. In analysis, neurosis is certainly organised around this desire to understand, a desire that theory has wrongly called intellectualisation. This fallacy has the value of a regressive obscurantism in psychoanalytic thinking and demands as a consequence that the analyst suppresses rationality from the psychoanalytic cure. The desire to understand is not intellectualisation — as if one could do without intellect! — it is its repression as it is proper to the fantasm of neurosis. Or haven’t we yet learned that the neurotic is the only one who brings that desire to us? The psychotic, instead, is always brought to analysis by those who notice in the dullness of his life an eternal and failed attempt at rigour.

For the perverse, on the other hand, the fantasm is not directed by the desire to know, but directed by the sexual act: repetitive act which is only finite through exhaustion. The only act that the perverse avoids is suicide; an act of perfection that cannot, evidently, be repeated. And the whole fantasm of the perverse is to make of the act an incessant repetition. This is why suicide can either be neurotic or psychotic — but never perverse. The perverse is structurally determined to produce an act endorsed by disavowal and, therefore, characterised by being something other than what it is.

The fact that the drive in perversion is not repressed but disavowed, explains why he (the perverse) cannot but be foreign from his own unconscious — something in which he is no exception. In other words, his drives are far from being self-evident, both for himself and the others. Although the perverse seldom demands an analysis, when he does so, it becomes clear that what he wants is the modification of the circumstances which prevent him the continuation of the repetitive act ad infinitum.
Intrinsic to the perverse is the way he presents himself to the other, with the credentials that he has the knowledge and the object that the other desires, thus becoming an expert in avoiding the anxiety produced by the lack in the Other, S(Â).

The fantasm of the perverse brings out a division that does not belong so much to the signifier as it does to the object â€œa; to the experience of the body in bits and pieces. The perverse is interested no doubt in a division of another kind: one that can be recreated between body and jouissance. Jouissance imposes its limits to the pleasure principle by going beyond and surpassing it. These clinical differentiations have made us notice that what is at play in perversion is the object â€œa and not the subject as expressed in the neurotic by his own division. In the neurotic fantasm, the divided subject is caused by the object â€œa as cause of his desire (â€œS â€œa). In the perverse fantasm, â€œa â€œS, things take a different path. The perverse identifies himself as object â€œa, as cause, producing the division in the other while keeping the Other uncastrated.

The non-coincidence between desire and jouissance is therefore explained here, where both the neurotic and the perverse are unable to give an account of what is the object of desire. However, the perverse, by disavowing and displacing his own division on the other, introduces an extra variable regarding knowledge. He masters knowledge by the complete paradox of knowing without repression. This knowledge is produced through disavowal: an extra knowledge beyond the possibilities of the neurotic, knowledge of the object of his jouissance. In other words, it is not desire that is at play with the perverse, but jouissance, jouissance of a torn-apart body converted into meat.

The neurotic, as Freud maintained it, carries out the possibility of the sexual act through a fantasm of repression where the lack in the Other, S(Â), is shrouded under the guise of a gift of love. In this way the neurotic is closer to the truth of his anxiety while repressing it. He even goes so far as to keep a strict separation between the signifier male and female in the model offered by society through the 'toilet division': 'ladies' and 'gentlemen'.

The subversion of psychoanalysis consists, indeed, in posing the question of desire as the cause of what has always been called human passions, desire that the English language denotes so well in the fact that 'to want' is 'to lack'. But it is this structural lack that conventional knowledge holds as a proof of madness whenever the subject, in absence of empirical objects, cannot restrain himself from desiring precisely what is lacking. We know what phenomenological psychiatry has produced so far in this regard by reinforcing conventions to the point of stating that a perception without object is an hallucination. These defenders of the reality principle also state that desire is normal only by having an empirical object, while psychoanalysis remarks that desire is born out of lack. Two thousand years ago, this conception, a kind of religious belief in empirical reality, was discredited by Plato who urged these realistic people, so fond of reality, to go on to embrace trees and the likes of nature.

It is at the very root of this mis-conceptualisation that desire itself, contrary to what the clinical experience teaches us, is considered to be perverse. This misleading belief has resulted in the obscuring of the very important difference that psychoanalysis clarified to us from the beginning: that neurotic desire is based on repression and perversion is based on disavowal. Furthermore, desire is not to be confused with jouissance. The object â€œa is not the signifier and, what is more, to be clear on this is to permit the formulation of a differential diagnosis as the prerequisite for the direction of the psychoanalytic cure. To rest upon a principle of reality which is no other than conventional empirical reality is to regress from psychoanalytic discovery. We should not look further in order to understand the relapse of psychoanalytic practice into the practice of counselling, for what other course is left for the analyst, if he is directed by reality, than to adjust the analysis precisely to that convention in which neither he nor the analyst are to discover anything other than what they already know?

Psychoanalysis, instead, remarked that it is from the absence, from the lack, from what Freud discovered very early on as the object originally lost, as what is not, as being the particularity of this
of life? This is why both the moralist and the believer are, beyond doubt, dangerous people when they exert their will and effort to divert the subject's subjectivity from desires which are considered to be abnormal because they do not conform the norm, which is their own. The fact is that those who approved of this direction disregard what they are passively witnessing. The confusion of the aims of analysis with sophisticated after-repression only unleashes the same thing that takes everyone's good conscience by surprise, when they ask in disbelief how can such degree of destruction appear? To which we, in turn, wonder, what else did they expect?

The superego, of course, is one of the most neglected of the names-of-the-father. For the above reason, the differences between desire and jouissance are fundamental in order to know what one is doing and unleashing when analysing.

Connected with these clarifications, there is another relevant difference to address, emphasised both by Freud and Lacan. The unconscious is what thinks the subject and the It is what ex-ists the subject. To say it in another way: the unconscious is structured like a language and the It is the result of the perforation of the body by the drives. The formula of the fantasm, \( \mathcal{S} \circ \mathcal{A} \), condenses fairly well the unconscious and the It. It means, on the side of the divided subject, that he is more (>) or less (<) than the object but never equal to it; and, on the side of the object \( a \), reunion (\( \wedge \)) or intersection (\( \lor \)). The losange in this formula condenses the structure of the unconscious and the It: regarding the unconscious because language will always be more or less but never equal to this metonymic object of desire, and regarding the It, because the object \( a \) is reunion or intersection of the drives, metonymy of the symbolic and of the imaginary facade. Insofar as the object \( a \) as real is concerned, it is a successful and permanent metaphor.

The real, which proper writing presents as unspeakable, presents itself in the Freudian metaphor of the It, while the symbolic finds its place in the unconscious, grammarian par excellence. This grammarian is also the place of the equivocal, the nonsensical and
all nuances of which the formations of the unconscious are a good example. Furthermore, we could say that the interpretation finds its place here while the scansion finds its place in the former.

The imaginary, the homologous, is the place of sense; that of which the logo-homo makes a daily duty. The real, neither symbolic nor imaginary, therefore comes, by force, as a true discovery that breaks the homologous. Movement or discovery in analysis takes place only when a limit is arrived at: to write it bluntly, when there is a successful metaphor, since there is no metaphor of the successful metaphor. This may somehow explain why there is emphasis on the real. To accentuate the real, however, is not equivalent to arriving at a true discovery. Regarding the equivocal, though it is correct to think that the prestige of the symbolic is due to the apparent infinite combinations that it provides, the fact remains that the unconscious is open to only one leap from the interpretation — as the prey is only one leap away from the predator. The rest is pure miss.

Sense, proper to the imaginary, is that around which there is agreement and understanding: whence, as I have explained already, normality is an effect of sense as much as meaning is effect of nonsense. It is for this reason that Lacan always insisted in his teachings in the non-hope of hope. Life is, after all, the hole of the real that the logo-homo tries, through the imaginary as well as the symbolic, to fill. Death, instead, is hole of the symbolic and this is why it is also submitted to the equivocal; but sense, contrary to some fashions, should not be dismissed since it dwells at the intersection of the imaginary and the real.

Furthermore, when sense lacks in the logo-homo, except when producing science or psychoanalytic knowledge, we shouldn't fail to see the onset of a psychosis. Death, which in psychoanalysis is nonsensical in itself, has the single value of representing castration; but the other way around, its reverse, does not hold. This, of course, does not clarify at all what death is, and it is the reason for Freud's statement that the unconscious can't represent a negative concept — the un of the unconscious. Once more, our daily clinical practice is of help here. Who, if not the obsessional, gives his sensical (that is, within the imaginary and the symbolic) testimony of death through the care taken, all the time, in order to avoid it or keep it at bay? For the obsessional, death comes as a mistake and this is why he doesn't usually commit suicide other than by a true mistake.

The fact that the unconscious does not know anything about contradiction is no excuse for the analyst not to know that there are contradictions, and the question is, what does he do with this? To remain stony-faced is surely not sufficient. Since the subject is prey to language, language does not depend on him; but discourse, conversely, does depend on the subject. Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that, for both analysand and analyst, there isn't something that always escapes from their discourse. Scansion and interpretation are present there as a proof that the expression 'discourse of the subject' cannot be equated with 'unconscious of the subject'.

The Lacanian Thing or Psychoanalysis since Lacan in this writing of psychoanalysis is that from the moment in which there is logo-homo there is subject of the unconscious, S, and not unconscious of the subject. The ego to which so many hold tightly as the last resort of rationality in this apparent chaos, is limited by Freud following Groddeck's remark, by the It, not belonging to us but rather as something which lives in us despite ourselves; .. we are 'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable forces. Furthermore, it is in this that the It remains in incessant intercourse, as a result of the drives, between the body and the object.

Notes
phantasies and the prevalence of its grammatical form.

3. Freud, S.
   Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895)
   St.Ed., Vol. I.

4. Zentner, M.I.R. de
   A Pseudonym: the Itinerary for a Perversion, in Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne, On Perversion
   Oscar Zentner (ed.), The Freudian School of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1980.

5. Lacan, J.
   Seminar XXII, R.S.I. 1974-9175:
   Unpublished seminar.

6. Speaking-being is referred to in this paper as logo-homo.

7. Strachey remarks in a footnote to Freud's The Ego and the Id (1923) that Groddeck himself no doubt followed the example of Nietzsche, who habitually used this grammatical term - das Es - for whatever in our nature is personal and, so to speak, subject to natural law. Groddeck took the term from Ernst Schweninger but it goes back to Nietzsche.

8. Freud, S.
   The Ego and the Id (1923), St. Ed., Vol. XIX.

Of Psychoanalysis –
What is Transmitted is not Taught

Oscar Zentner

For some... and others
Jacques Lacan

Genuine poetry can communicate before being understood
T. S. Eliot

There is no fear of plagiarism;
he cannot have said all;
he cannot have said what I want to say
George Moore

The principal matter of discussion presented in this work is closely related to my previous work On Psychoanalytic Transmission; it is both a continuation and an expansion.
The effects produced and even promoted by an analyst are often referred to but the bibliography on the subject rarely, if ever, touches upon what he transmits despite himself. From the dawn of psychoanalysis, transmission and teaching have revolved around an unresolved disjunction: what is transmitted is not taught.

With this title, therefore, I am marking the distance between teaching and transmission that has always existed in the field of psychoanalysis. In fact, we know that the coincidence of both has pendulated between inexistence and impossibility. For these are some of the reasons for the difficulty in establishing, beyond shallow theories, the scope of what psychoanalysis is. The trend that insists that the problem resides only in the fact that psychoanalysis is not a science is not, as I will try to clarify here, the principle obstacle. The obstacle, as I will explain, dwells elsewhere.

The concept of the unconscious being, as it is, indivisible from the concept of the subject-supposed-to-know, is a field dominated by the transference. This is the situation in which the work of analysis, bearing the trade-mark of *made-in-transference-neurosis*, unfolds. The analytic act at the end of the analysis—from this perspective means the re-direction of transference, the traversing of the fantasm, the fall of the subject-supposed-to-know, to know what-to-do with the symptom (*savoir-faire*), the destitution of ego-certainties and, therefore, accession to the conditions for the possibility of being in the position of the semblance of the object *a*.

However, so far the fate of psychoanalysis has testified to another destiny. The transmission of psychoanalysis has given more than sufficient proof to demonstrate that the hurdle to the re-direction of transference has been identification and fixation with the ideal. Indeed, this is the very nature of the transference neurosis to which the neurotic himself remains attached. Consequently, unable to reduce the subject-supposed-to-know to the fall, he cannot re-direct his transference. This obstacle of the analysis is not less deadly for being known. Furthermore, if there is any possibility of furthering psychoanalysis we have to make use of logic to work the impasses presented and to bring them to the fore. This is our *Homage to Lacan*.

A new conceptualisation of psychoanalysis could not have occurred without first reaching the limitations of previous concepts. The praxis of Lacan, which took its meaning here, led him to unite transference, love, and the unconscious on the one hand, and the analyst and the unconscious on the other. This is the way we understand his conceptualisation of the Freudian unconscious in terms of that *failure which knows of the blunder is love flying towards death*, making of the *sinthome* the transformation that this failure allows. For this reason, although the field remains Freud's, the unconscious is no longer Freudian.

Thus we come to that which psychoanalysis teaches: that transference, identification and love, without being the same, are not separable. That this be taught, is different from the transmission of psychoanalysis. However, there are some; yet not others who, by inverting Lacan's aphorism (knowledge can be taught, but what is transmitted is the formula) into the opposite, have strived for the formula to be taught and for the knowledge to be transmitted. From the formalisation of a supposed psychoanalytic knowledge, they hope to obtain a *matheme* which will transmit itself through teaching without distortion.

This implicit disavowal of the transference in the psychoanalytic discourse gives the *illusion of the future* and the annihilation of the difference between knowledge and the work that results in *to-know-what-to-do* (*savoir-faire*). Therefore, the discourse of the university comes to replace the *to-know-what-to-do* (*savoir-y-jaire*) of psychoanalytic discourse with *know-how* (*savoir faire*), following the American way of psychoanalysis. The matheme was thought to be the way to resolve the problem of transference which, like the dream of a science, needs to foreclose the subject. Although transference and identification are the inevitable guests of stone in the transmission of psychoanalysis, each time that there has been creation, it has been the result of a dis-identification with the ideal.

Let us remember the perplexity provoked by Lacan's answer to his own question: 'With what does one identify at the end of the analysis?'—neither with his mature genital analyst nor with his
unconscious, but with his symptom. To what end? To-know-what-to-do, to proceed with it beyond the fixity of the fantasm. In other words, to work, no longer to persist, solely, in Freud’s lieben und arbeiten, for this is to love and to work within the limits of the father to protect him; in a Lacanian analysis, instead, the analysand has to sublimate the love of the père-version by working with the symptom beyond the limits of the father.

Freud, for whom the protection of the father was the noli me tangere of his discovery, showed in this way what remained in him as non-analisable. To be sure, not his dreams, lapsus linguæ or bungled actions, but one symptom, on which the whole edifice of the I. P. A. was built: namely Freud’s desire to protect the father. From it derive the impasses of the Freudian analysis. The confusion between the end of analysis and the liquidation of transference is, therefore, unavoidable and results, among other things, in the identification of the end of the analysis with the end of the Oedipus complex. Lacan, by deciphering the problem of the desire of the analyst, took his analyses beyond the limits of the Freudian analyses and realised his return to, in his long debate with, Freud.

Since Lacan’s death, we have taken cognizance of the theoretical production and symptoms that his teaching and physical disappearance have provoked and still provoke. It has also become clear that it was not necessary to have been his analysand or student in order to have suffered an identification with him. This mimetic identification, an operation contrary to Lacan’s proposition, blurred the reasons for the ending of the analysis in the traversing of the fantasm and watered down the effects of the pass of the analysand to the position of analyst as the function of the semblance of the object a. Hence a new procedure, such as the pass formulated to give account of the singular of an analysis, due to the pressure of the group to make sense, became a by-pass: a ritual.

However subversive Lacan’s conceptualisation of the end of the analysis was, what was neglected was to have questioned the axiom of the supposition of the analyst’s analysis as being necessary. Henceforth, his ambiguity gives place to the following: either the analyst authorises himself in the analysis, or the analyst does not authorise himself except from himself. Considering the first possibility, there are analysts who authorised themselves without analysis (and certainly not the worst, Abraham in order not to mention the first one). Regarding the second possibility, there were analysts able to authorise themselves in spite of their analyses (and these, the majority, were not the worst, in order not to mention the most eminent of them). Therefore, the only way of being in the place of the semblance of the object a that is, to have conducted analysis – is the result of a retroactive function (après-coup), only to be verified by the fact that there was someone who testified to having had an analysis with that analyst. This inherent unsatisfactory insufficiency is the mark of what psychoanalysis demands from us in discourse, beyond the pressure of the psychoanalytic group.

It would then be necessary to take the risk and put the experience to the test without any guarantee that it would not be false. Our psychoanalytic impasses, our failures, our mistakes and, if there are any, our successes, have no other guarantee than ourselves, if it is valid that the analyst does not authorise himself except from himself, which is completely different from believing that it is he who self-authorises himself as an analyst. The latter mere self-ritualisation is based upon the same principle as that of being authorised by others; it is its symmetrical complement. This is why from this perspective the question of who is an analyst, or what it is to be an analyst, usually receives an insufficient, if not an arbitrary, answer.

The analyst of the I.P.A. was able, by means of guilt, to justify his authorisation within the limits of a theory which for presupposing the father as an effect of the revenge of the sons permitted the origin of the mythical One (\( \exists x \Psi x \)), through this totem. It is, indeed, this One, that produces the All, (\( \forall x \Psi x \)), as a necessary axiom. This is, certainly, an important reason for the success with which the guilt was instrumental in the perpetuation of the father. Once this is demonstrated, the analyst has no other course of action than to avow that, intrinsic both to the father and to the authorisation by the institution, there is père-version, a version
towards his nullifying jouissance, that which in good tongue, the maternal one of each one, brings about what each one should have known, that the analyst is an outcast without needing to be Lacan, Freud or One.

When Lacan said, 'I found alone as I have always been in regard to the psychoanalytic cause . . .', he was not mistaken. There, angst is the outcome and angst is that which does not lie. Guilt and so-called reparation, instead, are at the foundations of leader function and corporative illusion. The analyst may be able to be with others and the meeting of analysts may prove this, but of the new social link of the analytic discourse to which Lacan aspired, of that – until a new order – we still know little.

A psychoanalysis transmits and what it transmits is a savoir-faire of the order, without doubt, of fiction. This corresponds to a discourse in which the analyst continuously displaces truth with knowledge, S, if it is correct to maintain that of knowledge, there is metonymy, and of the subject, only metaphor.11

Lacan suggested that knowledge (savoir) can be taught, but that what is transmitted is the formula. This is simple. What is not simple is its consequence.12 Psychoanalysis is the transmission of a lack, S((jQuery:inline-block) A), a lack which is lacking from communication. But transmission without communication is one of the functions that psychoanalysis ascribes to the father under the concept of castration ( (A X Y X )).13 The problem of how to go beyond this father has to be addressed in order to resolve this knot. This is why we said before that, according to our thesis, the function that the matheme came to occupy in psychoanalytic theory was linked to an attempt to resolve the problem of transference and identification. But since the question limps, perhaps it is not a bad idea to remember Freud’s dictum: 'If we cannot advance flying, it is not a sin to advance limping'. If there are dupes who can be in love with their own unconscious, then a writing may become a transmission. That was the case with Freud and with Lacan. Each was a case of augury echo. The praxis introduced by Lacan consisted in demonstrating

the possibility of the transference to the letter, thus elevating, a posteriori a writing to the level of a transmission. This alone, but no more, was the sum of the relationship between Freud and Lacan.13

If we agree that each analysis is singular,16 then it is also feasible to arrive at a writing that gives account of the limits of the Universal, a writing that distinguishes whether the analysis of the analyst is: Possible, Necessary, Impossible or Contingent. I will try to clarify these limits with the formulae of modal logic17 used by Lacan to explain the impasses of sexuality.18

The history of psychoanalysis is well known but, in itself, it neither demonstrates nor explains. There was the One analyst: Freud - who always gave us the impression of inexhaustibility with his work. Was it not even here that hermeneutics believed to have found the reason to come back to the text to reverence it? That is to say, to not read it?

There was the One. But, had he been read, would not the status of the Other in his inexistence, as real, S(), have been found?

Propositions

First Proposition: The Impossible gives place to the Necessary which (for being the exception) is limit and guarantee to the Universal as only being Possible. Instead, the non-Universal of the Contingent writes the Impossible which (for being the non-exception) is the limit. This can also be read as follows: the Impossible, which does not cease not to be written (the real Other inexistent, S(), and without law) causes the Necessary, which does not cease to be written (the symbolic Other as the mythical origin of the Law) which is the limit to the Possible, which ceases to be written (imaginary Other). While the Necessary gives its law to the Possible, the Impossible gives its not-law to the Contingent which ceases to not be written:
Second Proposition: The Impossible, there was not at least One for whom there was no analysis, $S(x)$, is based upon the non-exception that gives place to the Necessary. The Necessary, in its turn, for being the exception of the at least One for whom there was no analysis, becomes the limit and permits the writing of for All there was analysis as Possible. The Impossible produces the writing of the for not All there was analysis as Contingent.

Third Proposition: To show what cannot be demonstrated. The Impossible of a non-analyst for whom there was no analysis (Flies) who caused the at least one analyst as Necessary (Freud) for whom there was no analysis. Another more subversive situation was put forward by Lacan himself, in recognising that the person who led him to analysis was Aimée, his psychotic patient. This third proposition could have been addressed also by showing how Flies, the Aimée of Freud, was the cause of Freud's search. To wit, Freud's theory of paranoia was conceived in terms of a defence against homosexuality, therefore his '... triumph where the paranoic fails'\(^9\) meant not the disavowal of homosexuality but its re-introduction through the bisexuality of the hysteric, as well as the re-direction of his own transference. Marguerite Anzieu, the Aimée of Lacan, who led him to psychoanalysis\(^9\) and his analysis with Lowenstein, also permitted Lacan's recovering and re-situation of psychoses within the field of psychoanalysis. In the seminar of 6 January 1972, he explained the reason for his farewell to psychiatry: '... the psychiatrist is defined by his relation with the asylum - as the lay effort to exclude psychoses from everyday life - point in which the analyst and the psychiatrist are different. ... the analyst is led to the object a by his analysand. ... while the psychiatrist is someone who is confined to the walls of the asylum where there are people who are dangerous to themselves and to others, according to the law of 30 June-1938'. In this way a clear cut distinction between the discourse of the psychoanalyst (to be led by the analysand) and of the psychiatrist (to lead the patient) is drawn.

Consequence: Just as, up to recently, it was considered that analysis could have been defined by a universal standard so, too, the analysis of the analyst was the universal and necessary condition to be an analyst. To this axiom was added always the prestige of stating that such a condition was necessary but not sufficient. Today, only very few would dare to sustain with seriousness that this universal standard would be the guarantee of the analysis. But, until now, as far as I know, in what concerns the analysis of the analyst, everything is based upon an axiom which is not interrogated.

Hence: There is a conceptualisation of the analysis which has pretended to replace the Possible by the Necessary. This is psychoanalysis as it is conceived by the International which, for having foreclosed the psychoanalytic discourse on the question, has received in a pseudo-hallucinatory way its own message from the real, the Impossible, remaining for this reason ignorant of its consequence. Furthermore, when they believe to deduce from the Universal the Necessary of the analysis, they actually arrive at the Necessary of the exception. From this situation derive all the obsessional rituals which indicate only that the problem lies elsewhere. This is sufficient reason to explain why this analyst is authorised by others. For lacking a theory to formulate the explanation of these imps, the I. P. A. has finished by confusing the other with the Other. Post-Lacanism instead, as a result of disavowal, neglects the psychoanalytic discourse while reinforcing the homogeneity of the psychoanalytic group under the ferule of an embodied ideal. In this way they also arrive at the same result. They, while profiting from the confusion of the other with the Other, for not being duped, err.\(^{21}\)
Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

**All (I.P.A.)**

Contingent

\[ \exists x \psi x \]

(That there is at least one analyst who has not had an analysis)

Necessary

\[ \forall x \psi x \]

(For all analysts to have had an analysis)

Possible

\[ \exists x \psi x \]

(That at least one analyst has had an analysis)

Impossible

\[ \forall x \psi x \]

(That not-all analysts have had an analysis)

Therefore:

Necessary

\[ \forall x \psi x \leftrightarrow \exists x \psi x \]

Possible

\[ \exists x \psi x \leftrightarrow \square x \psi x \]

Contingent

\[ \exists x \psi x \leftrightarrow \square x \psi x \]

The Necessary gives origin to the Possible or the All originates the at least One.

The Impossible gives origin to the Contingent or the Not-All originates the at least One.

**Not-All (Our Position)**

Necessary

\[ \exists x \neg \psi x \]

(That at least one analyst has not had an analysis)

Possible

\[ \forall x \neg \psi x \]

(For all analysts to have had an analysis)

Impossible

\[ \exists x \neg \psi x \]

(That there is at least one analyst who has not had an analysis)

Contingent

\[ \forall x \neg \psi x \]

(That not-all analysts have had an analysis)

Therefore:

Necessary

\[ \forall x \neg \psi x \leftrightarrow \exists x \neg \psi x \]

Possible

\[ \exists x \neg \psi x \leftrightarrow \square x \neg \psi x \]

Contingent

\[ \exists x \neg \psi x \leftrightarrow \square x \neg \psi x \]

The Necessary gives origin to the Contingent or the Not-All originates the at least One.

The Impossible gives origin to the Necessary or there was not at least one analyst who has not had an analysis but does not guarantee the Not-All.

In this way, what is Contingent, Necessary, Possible and Impossible for the I.P.A., is Necessary, Possible, Impossible and Contingent for us.

**Conclusion:** That the analyst does not authorise himself except from himself signifies first that the analysis of the analyst is Possible when it is not Contingent. For, for it to be Necessary is mutually exclusive with the analysis of the analyst. Since Necessary is only the exception, one would have to be a mythical symbolic Other (if the place of the law coincides with the exception of the at least One) or a perverse.22

It would be from the Contingent (the not-All) that the Impossible is written. For if God is not dead and is real, as Parmenides taught us in the fragment three of his poem, '... for it is the same thing that can be thought of and can be...', and all that is real is rational and all that is rational is real, then it is not superfluous to say that it is from the Contingency of the not-All that God,23 real and impossible, exists.

It is stated that the analysis is Impossible. But this is the contrary to what has been written on the subject, where the Impossible was confused with impotence. The Impossible means that the foundations of psychoanalysis are given by the structure of the
discourse with which we attempt to produce an interrogation that would reach the limits of a real, that is to say, an Impossible.  

The writing that I propose is the parapraxis of a meeting with the real, to write what cannot be demonstrated. This is why for me, the clinical praxis is the outlining of the real, in act, Impossible to bear.  

Fear not, take only into consideration the testimonies of the so-called training analysis. These are examples of paramount importance since they show what happens when someone undergoes analysis to become an analyst and not from the sufferings produced by his fantasms or symptoms. We want to make clear, moreover, that we are not suggesting that the analyst should not have an analysis. We are, instead, proving that the axiomatic obligation as a rule has, so far, not only prejudiced but ideologised all psychoanalytic inquiry on the subject.  

The analysis of the analyst then, Possible, but not Necessary, indicates what should have been known always: that the prescription of an analysis is at the root of the proscription of psychoanalysis. 'To navigate is necessary, to live is not', Freud dixit. The formation of analysts from the contingency of the not All has yet to be invented, to be written, it is not only singular, it is real.  

Notes  
1. Lacan, J. L'insu que sait de l'une-bêvue s'aille a mourir. Seminar XXIV, 1976/77. Of the multiple possibilities for rendering it in French, my translation is: The failure which knows of the blunder is love flying towards death.  
2. Lacan, J. Encore. Seminar XX, 1972/73, Editions du Seuil, p.108: 'Mathematical formulation is our aim... because only this is a matheme... that is to say transmissible in its totality... it is a writing which only subsists if I employed the language that I used... I speak with my body and without knowing it. Therefore, I always say more than what I know,' The Illusion of a Future was the name of a book by Pastor Pfister. See the answer given by Freud in The Future of an Illusion, St. Ed., Vol. XXI. The knowledge of the analyst is in the antipodes of the university knowledge.  
3. Lacan, J.  
4.  
5. Tirso de Molina  
7. Lacan, J.  
8. Lacan, J.  

Of Psychoanalysis - What is Transmitted is not Taught
himself there is only the analyst. For my thesis, which inaugurated the break with the practice whereby the so-called Societies make of analysis an aggregation (competitive examinations conducted by the State for admission to posts on the teaching staff of Lycées and Universities), nevertheless does not imply that just anyone may be an analyst.'

While for Aristotle it is from the Universal that the Particular can be derived/written, in our proposition it is from the exception of a singular that a Universal can be derived/written. Therefore our logic is not Aristotelian. I will dare say that it is psychoanalytical logic, in the same way in which psychoanalysis uses linguistics. The unconscious is not to be confused with logic; logic is the ink with which to write it.


11. Lacan, J. Note to the Italian Group, 1973: 'I have already said: this is the condition of which - wherever his fortunes may lead him - the analyst must bear the mark. It is up to his fellows to know how to find it. It is striking that this supposes a different knowledge from the one previously elaborated . . . This is that same responsibility of having transmitted - to the only outcasts from the learned ignorance - a hitherto unknown desire . . . to make an analyst. Whatever science may owe to the hysterical structure, Freud's fiction is his infatuation with truth. That is the model whose fall the analyst, if there is one, represents: the casting out I have said; but not just any one.'

12. Lacan, J. Ou pire (Le savoir du psychanalyste). Seminar XIX, 4 May 1972: 'We needed to wait until the end of the last century to recognise that the function of the One would appear as the empty set. That is that the function of the One is the One in lack. Better still, when the function of the One emerges there is One that lacks.' The formula of the function of the father is found in Encore, Seminar XX, 1972/73, Editions du Seuil, p.73.

13. Lacan, J. Les non-dupes-errant. Seminar XXI, 13 November 1973. ' . . . Wouldn't this be a way of allowing for a different ethic to appear? An ethic founded in the negative to not be not duped. That is, in the fashion of becoming more and more strongly duped of that knowledge, of that unconscious which at the end is our only possession of knowledge?' It is true that this title, Les non-dupes-errant sounds like Les noms du père (The Names of the Father). The Names of the Father was the seminar interrupted by Lacan when he lost his affiliation with the I.P.A. As we know, the seminar was replaced with The Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis. The effect that he produced in the I.P.A. by depriving them of knowing what these Names were, can be found in the text of my thesis. As you will see, the effects were far from being negligible. In fact, they explain very well why the I.P.A. couldn't but remain stuck to the caducity of a theory of analysis.
15. Freud's comment and answer to Lacan's remittance of his thesis on *Paranoia and its Relation to Personality* (1932), does not amount to more than thanks, and this without entering into an analysis of Freud's slip of the pen with the address in the envelope.


17. Lacan, J. *Ou pire (Le savoir du psychanalyste)*. Seminar XIX, 4 November 1971: 'The Catholic Church affirms that there is sexual relation (to procreate). It is an affirmation only sustainable by religious discourse, which characterises itself by not separating Truth from Knowledge. In psychoanalysis we separate both. Knowledge is of the order of *Jouissance*. The question of the knowledge of the analyst is to know to which degree science tends to the real.' Lacan subverted classic modal logic to give account of the impasses of *sexuation*. I have subverted the application *effectuated* by Lacan to render account of another real: the impasses of the formation of analysts.

18. Lacan, J. *Ou pire (Le savoir du psychanalyste)*. Seminar XIX, 2 March 1972: 'Tiresias, who was a woman for a while, was there to demonstrate to Oedipus his disgrace for having been born, since his partner (Yocasta) by lying to him offered herself to him, instead of asking him to reject her offer.' This is a way of producing the relationship between the real and the symbolic through the metaphor of incest. Would incest then be a place that for being prohibited encourages the permanence of a fantasm of the existence of sexual relation? From where one of the aims of the analysis is, certainly, to cure the mental prejudice of supposing the existence of the sexual relation.


20. Lacan, J. *Ou pire (Le savoir du psychanalyste)*. Seminar XIX, 6 January 1972: 'To say everything and to pay Homage to something alien to her ... everyone knows that due to this patient which I named Aimee - name which of course was not hers - I was directed towards psychoanalysis'. See also Elizabeth Roudinesco's *Jacques Lacan, La bataille de cent ans* and Jean Allouch's *Marguerite ou L'Aimée de Lacan. Télévision*. Editions du Seuil: '...Furthermore - and I am sorry to refer to some ill-bred you's - I think the analytic discourse should be withheld from the rabble: surely that is what was behind Freud's so-called criterion of culture ... (psychoanalysis) renders them dumb ...' In effect, in psychoanalysis not to be duped, is the way to err. This was a polite way for Lacan to point out those whom, for being scoundrels, psychoanalytic praxis singled out as non-analysable. See footnote 13.


23. Lacan, J. *Ou pire (Le savoir du psychanalyste)*.
Seminar XIX, 1 June 1972:

'Psychoanalysis is situated by the discourse of the analyst. What I am trying in this Seminar is also to give you the history of knowledge in relation to truth:

\[
\begin{align*}
(Semblance) S & \rightarrow S \ (Jouissance) \\
(Truth) \overline{S} & \rightarrow \overline{S} \ (Plus \ of \ jouissance)
\end{align*}
\]

In psychoanalysis there is horror of what is known. The analyst has a complex relation with what he knows. He repudiates it, he represses it, even sometimes he doesn't want to know anything about it.'

'As a sample this first hand dialogue:

Someone asked me:

'What do you do?'

'I am an analyst. And you?'

'I am a therapist. But, as from next week, I will be a psychoanalyst.'

I thought afterwards, in the truth of Lacan's words, that it would be cruel to ask a person bent by the weight of his suitcase what he carries, if indeed he carries bricks.

Once the prohibition to question the problem of the formation of analysts is lifted, we are able to exact beyond prejudices, the consequences of the formula, the analyst does not authorise himself except from himself. For this formula points out that the analyst could be neither a psychotic nor a perverse. The negation implicit in the formula (...) does not (...\! marks sufficiently clear that authorisation is originated in repression and not in disavowal or foreclosure. 'In order to be duped, one has to adjust oneself to the structure', says Lacan. And we know that structure in psychoanalysis refers to neurosis, perversion and psychosis; and furthermore, the structure is that which even analysis cannot alter.
Psychoanalysis, if understood as the attempted science of the unconscious, presents us with an immediate paradox: if the unconscious is what we do not want or cannot know about ourselves, and if there is only one passion — for not knowing — then how can any apperception of truth pertaining to this unconscious be sustained?

In other words: how will resistance operate on the psychoanalyst, on the psychoanalytic group, even on psychoanalytic theory?

Ever since 1923, when Freud's cancer was diagnosed, the elite of the young, originally maverick movement had been waiting for the
master's death; the period between his imagined and his real death saw the emergence of a process of progressive institutionalisation, a stifling of that early spirit of invention, which in the analytic setting found and continues to find its most overt expression in the rigid adherence to ritualised technical rules, some of which were based on Freud's personal preference for regularity, in other words, his personal style.

Another aspect of these developments was an over-enthusiastic regulation of the selection of candidates, their training and accreditation to a point where one wonders whether the founder of the movement himself would have had any chance of satisfying the criteria had he been put to the test. Interestingly, theoretical development within the movement started to change from approximately the same time onwards: a shift occurred away from the subversive conception of the unconscious which rendered the social appearance a pretence and the ego or personality a mirage to ever increasing emphasis on that very ego, on the person, as that which can be trusted, that which needs supporting. In a sense, psychoanalysis became psychosynthesis, a process that bore considerable similarity to earlier developments that had led to the breakaway of disciples of Freud such as A. Adler and C. G. Jung with their respective movements.

With the introduction of such 'ego strengthening synthesis' (for we can no longer call it psychoanalysis), an element of moralising was — by logical necessity — introduced into the process: for to suggest privileged solutions for personality development involves a moral judgement of what constitutes 'good' and what 'bad' outcomes. The introduction of the so-called training analysis, in contrast to the personal analysis, ultimately aims at achieving 'purity of soul' and is supposed to free the future analyst from irritating conflicts and countertransference problems. An analysis, the outcome of which, to be sure, will determine the granting of a degree, of 'professional recognition': conditions which in the most general sense are well known to encourage pretence and dishonesty. The focus is on the 'person' of the analyst, his/her well adjusted genitality, his/her heterosexual lifestyle, moderation and wisdom.

If adaptation is demanded of the analysts of the International Psychoanalytic Association, then adaptation will become the goal of 'analysis' (then no longer Freudian analysis). No longer psychoanalysis in a theoretical sense because the central tenet of psychoanalytic practice, the suspension of knowledge or certitude, has been compromised beyond recognition or repair.

So in the place of psychoanalysis as an essentially subversive cultural force, a radical critique of culture, the International Psychoanalytic Association puts adaptation as ultimate goal, placing itself and its practitioners at odds with the Freudian experience and that which Lacan was able to recover of it.

Psychoanalysis affirms and produces the division of the subject as a cut. The cutting edge of psychoanalysis was (and continues to be) blunted by the attempt to put psychoanalysis in the service of adaptation, of morality, of purity of soul, of healing (by goodness and love).

Lacan put that cutting edge back into psychoanalysis, thus (re)introducing the subject, which he recognised as a desiring subject, divided between knowledge and truth by the function of speech.

The influence of Lacan's teaching among the young intelligencia and the lack of respect he demonstrated for sacred rules such as the 50-minute session led eventually to what he himself referred to as his excommunication, his exclusion from the International Psychoanalytic Association, whose training analyst he had been for many years.

Lacan went on to found a school of psychoanalysis, The Freudian School of Paris. Ironically, but not surprisingly, Lacan was not exactly immune from being admired, idealised and therefore imitated. The freedom of his technical innovations threatened, in the hands of some, to become a new if more surreal ritual. Another development was that of a dogmatisation of his complex, highly abstract theory, which in Roudinesco's assessment could be seen
to have assumed an analogous function to the ritualisation of technique that had taken place in the post-Freudian movement.

In 1980, in order not to repeat the mistake S. Freud had made, he decided to dissolve his school, which led to the development of a host of schools and groups in its wake.

During the same year, (Lacan was suffering from cancer and knew that he had not much longer to live), he attended a congress of Lacanian analysts in Caracas in South America. In his address to Caracas he stated that he had come to Latin America to see what happened when he wasn’t there acting as a screen to his own teaching.

Melbourne

There had been an Institute of Psychoanalysis in Melbourne since 1940 which had, however, remained a branch of the British Psychoanalytical Society until 1967 when an Australian Study Group was established. It became a full, independent component Society of the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1973.

The International in Australia never produced its own publication, and its members have published little. Where they did, they wrote on psychotherapy rather than psychoanalysis. At a conference in Lorne, Victoria, in 1982, a Lacanian analyst of the Freudian School of Melbourne asked a speaker from the International why, in more than forty years, the local members of the International had produced virtually nothing in this country. To which the reply: ‘The best analysts often write very little!’. When the Lacanian asked where that left S. Freud, who had written twenty three volumes (not counting the copious materials still unpublished), he was met with embarrassed silence.

Until 1986 annual symposia organised by the Freudian School of Melbourne were attended by some, not too many, members of the International. An exchange seemed possible. These attendances stopped suddenly and simultaneously and since the first Australian Psychoanalytic Congress (organised by the Freudian School of Melbourne in 1987) none have been sighted at scientific meetings organised by the School. The local society, ‘under evaluation’ by the International Psychoanalytic Association, hence anxiously looking towards the ‘parents’, had reportedly received instructions to stop all contact with the Freudian School of Melbourne.

On the occasion of the second Australian Psychoanalytic Congress, the director of the Freudian School of Melbourne sent a letter to the president of the Australian Psychoanalytic Society:

... This Homage to Freud should allow those who recognise and claim their work as Freudian, a facilitation of interchange between different currents of existing thought... The Freudian School of Melbourne doesn't claim to hold the psychoanalytic truth, and it is from this position that we would feel honoured if your association accepted this official invitation to join us in this important event in which only one truth should prevail: scientific truth... if we work together respecting our different views, this anniversary of Freud's death can be an example of how stagnation only grows where interchange is curtailed. 1

The official response arrived three months later. Salient sections read as follows:

We certainly endorse your view that interchange in different currents of thought is fruitful and that scientific truth is larger than any individual or organisation. Beyond this, as a component society of the International Psychoanalytic Association we have particular responsibilities. A major concern in this respect relates to the training of practitioners in the field of analysis. We are concerned that in the wider community the fact that the Australian Psychoanalytic Society is the only Australian body that has been accredited by the International Psychoanalytic Association may easily be overlooked. We feel that...
official participation in your congress... would help to promote misperceptions... accreditation of the society and its training scheme has been gained only after detailed discussions with, and appraisals by, international site committees (of International Psychoanalytic Association); this has involved scrutiny by overseas analysts of a variety of theoretical emphases. In view of the above considerable possibility of misperception we must, with regret, decline your invitation to participate officially. As you no doubt realise, the attendance of individual members of the Australian Psychoanalytical Society is entirely a matter for them."

What these two letters represent from a psychoanalytic point of view could be stated as follows: An avowal of difference, hence a chance for symbolisation, versus a relying on an authorisation from above, a hiding behind what we could call an Other of approval, where difference is looked for at an imaginary level.

What were the reasons for the cultural isolation psychoanalysis experienced between 1940 and 1977 in Australia?5

In 1940, with the opening of the Institute in Melbourne, Clara Geroe, a Hungarian child psychoanalyst close to Anna Freud, arrived in Melbourne as the first — and for a long time only — training analyst. Consequently, many of the analysts at the Melbourne Institute were trained, analysed, supervised by and studied with her. A transference of awe, love (and the rest) appears to have been preserved for this lively and enthusiastic woman who died in 1980. However, judging by the result, this transference was not transferred into work which, in psychoanalysis, is always a work of writing. A transference that remained, nostalgically, related to the person thus failing to find its expression in theoretical production.

Lacan's reception in Australia

In 1980 an article by Dr John Dingle who was — together with Oscar Zentner, Maria Inés Rotmiler de Zentner and Gayle Paul — a foundation member of the School, was published in the Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne; the title: 'The Entrance of Psychoanalysis into Australia'.6 The topic: the history of psychoanalysis in Australia.

Two years later, in 1982, a (then) associate member of the Psychoanalytic Society published a similar document, concerned with the history of psychoanalysis in Australia, in Meanjin.7

The first word in the text of that article is... 'Lacan'.8

The name appears strangely in isolation. The reason given for introducing it is to refer to Lacan's register of the symbolic which, it is stated, allows for authentic meaning to enter through 'gaps'.

The gaps heralded do not fail to occur. What is missing is any reference to the very similar article that had gone before; what is missing is a reference to the first Australian psychoanalytic publication, the Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne, in which it had appeared; what is missing is the first Homage to Freud; what is missing is the foundation of a Lacanian School of Psychoanalysis, the Freudian School of Melbourne, five years earlier, in 1977; and last not least what is missing is Lacan's text itself: for the bibliography of that article tells us that it wasn't Lacan the author had referred to but a secondary text referring to '... faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion'.9

This little example may well exemplify the reception Lacan10 has received at the hands of the pre-established psychoanalytic community in Melbourne: an attempt at a suppression which proved to become repression of a message that was unpalatable, hence the return of that repressed.

After the foundation of the Freudian School of Melbourne in 1977,
a comfortable arrangement between psychotherapists and psychoanalysts of the International was threatened. A quasi feudal arrangement of admiration and respect paid by the psychotherapists, which, in a strange way, appeared to mirror the submissiveness demonstrated by members of the local Society towards better places in particular London.

This analytical cringe perpetuated itself down the line to end up with the patients, who were (and in many cases still are) expected and encouraged to regress in order to relate as children would to parents, good children if they didn’t ask too many questions.

A demand for masochism in the analysand, in order to preserve the analyst in the position of a master, finds its theoretical and clinical conclusion in the question of the end (and the ‘desirable’ outcome) of the analysis. The demand for the ultimate submission, the identification with the ‘mature Ego of the analyst’, implies a knowing, a refusal to fade in the analyst, which lies at the very heart of the paralysis, that inability to produce, which has been so much a hallmark of post-Freudian analysing in this town.

Instead of an avowal of desire, a prescription of desirability.

After Lacan

Let us change from here to another scene. In January 1991 the premier colloque interassociatif was held in Paris, reported by a newspaper article entitled ‘Les fils de Lacan sont ré-unis!’ Approximately 3000 participants, belonging to a large number of associations, attended. Eighty per cent of psychoanalysts following Lacan’s teaching worldwide belong to independent Lacanian Schools and groups. The colloque interassociatif represented an attempt to create a forum for these administratively diverse but theoretically and ethically similarly oriented schools. An analyst of the Freudian School of Melbourne presented a paper at the colloque.11

The remaining twenty per cent of Lacanians have been more tightly organised. Lacan’s son-in-law, Jacques Alain Miller, holds copyrights to the majority of Lacan’s works, most of them still unpublished and only available in pirate copies. The parallels to the ‘family business Anna Freud & Co.,’ deplored by Lacan, are ominous!12

Under the leadership of the son-in-law, a policy of ‘networking’ with a goal of global extension of the champ Freudien appears to be rivalling the organisational network of the International Psychoanalytic Association. One suspects a certain colonialist attitude and wonders whether Australia will prove receptive to it.

Since the mid-eighties, Millerians have formed a centre, more recently a school, and have started their own occasional publication. They do present their work publicly, allowing for an examination of their practice and theoretical stance.

Psychoanalysis and psychiatry

Let us turn to the reception of the work of Lacan, himself a psychiatrist by training originally, by ‘psychiatry’ in Australia.

Individual psychiatrists have partaken in the activities of the School as members and students since its foundation. Psychiatry as a whole, in particular institutional psychiatry, has, until recently, remained untouched and unaffected by a Lacanian contribution to the clinic of the psychoses.

In 1989 a decision was made by the Freudian School of Melbourne to make its weekly seminar, which had commenced in 1977, open to the public. This seminar which, in its new form, came to bear the title ‘The Foundations of Psychoanalysis’, has been held at Mont Park Psychiatric Hospital since 1989. In September 1989 the Clinical Section of the Seminar, ‘The Presentation of Patients’, commenced. There, a suitable patient was, after a very brief introduction, seen by an analyst of the School in front of a silent audience, with a clinical and theoretical discussion taking place after the patient had left.13
Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

The 'Presentation of Patients' represents, among other things, an encounter between two related, but nevertheless different disciplines: institutional psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

In the field of psychosis, psychoanalysis, being different from psychiatry, attempts only to open a space in which a listening can be produced. Hence it was of great importance to the Freudian School of Melbourne to differentiate between the psychiatric diagnostic or therapeutic interview and psychoanalytic listening. We suggested that, if this was clear, an interdisciplinary process of exchange may become possible. An obliteration of this difference, which essentially would amount to an obliteration of the difference between two discourses, each with its own justification, would by necessity lead to the opposite result whereby the richness of the process would be lost. The ethics of psychoanalysis imply a listening different to that of psychiatry. In contrast to the ideal of holistic completeness, founded in knowledge, which guides the psychiatrist, psychoanalysis can only occur when knowledge is suspended.

Why psychoanalysis?

Psychoanalysis is a discourse which allows for a radical critique of culture and of knowledge which constitutes it. This occurs by reintroducing the subject, as subject of the unconscious and of language (language being the precondition of the unconscious), into the scientific discourse.

Freud, in discovering and formalising psychoanalysis, produced a critique of the knowledge of his day. Lacan returned to this point and demonstrated the unique position of psychoanalysis: where other discourses proceed from the unknown to the creation of a knowledge, analysis proceeds from what is known to what is impossible to be known - that which Lacan termed the real. So from the luck which may lead one to rediscover Freud's lost object he points out that there is only lack, a lack constituted by the fact that we are speaking beings.

Where does this leave the clinical practice of psychoanalysis? Lacan states in Television (where he talked on French national television on crucial issues for psychoanalysis) that, in order for a practice to work, it does not need to be elucidated14. Here we address ourselves to the difference between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Psychotherapy borrows from psychoanalysis, but what it borrows is a knowledge which it does not suspend but which, to the contrary, it applies. As any discourse, it does produce effects, but the effects are attempted to be accounted for, if at all, by recourse to other systems of knowledge.

Psychoanalysis, historically as well as clinically, represents a move from suggestion to transference — in Lacan's registers from the imaginary to the symbolic. For psychotherapy, the opposite can be said: it knows something about transference, but by assuming the role of a master as 'the one who knows best' (in a somewhat perverse swap for the place of the sujet supposé de savoir) the resulting movement is actually from transference to suggestion.

In all this, what is the place for the Freudian School of Melbourne? The importance of the School lies in the fact that it has insisted that a possibility of a transmission of psychoanalysis only exists if the transference is to a teaching, not to a master. In a Homage to Freud or to Lacan, a tribute to a text is being paid, a text that created a new discourse. This is to be separated from idealisation, which always is to an (idealised) image. Idealisation can thus not escape imaginary rivalry as an outcome. The difference between a homage and idealisation is akin to the difference between 'letting the father die', thus allowing for the entry of a symbolic function, and the 'killing of the father', which belongs to the imaginary and which will either produce an hysterical struggle with the father or an obsessional awaiting for the father's death. Writing is the function that allows for an insertion of the transference in an act of creation, hence a going beyond the father.

The School does not believe the group or the institution to be an instrument of transmission of psychoanalysis. Transmission occurs in a redirection of the transference into the work of writing: the
furthering of psychoanalytic theory and praxis. It is the insistence of the School that its field is psychoanalysis, more precisely, and in order to avoid confusion, the field demarcated by the unconscious: no more, no less.

The scandal which the Freudian School of Melbourne has caused lies in the fact that it addressed the issue of the transmission of psychoanalysis, without assuming a priori that this could not happen outside the bureaucratic, obsessional rules of a society which, in fifty years, has produced so little that what they actually do remains a mystery to most. In contrast to this, the School has subjected itself to the scrutiny of an annual open scientific meeting and also presents its work in its annual publication. An attempt is therefore made at a scientific transmission in contrast to religious diffusion which relates to the ineffable.

Lacan teaches that in psychoanalysis, ethics relates to not giving up on one's desire.

The group or the institution will never render any assistance in the realisation of the moment for conclusion, which is here understood, following Lacan, as that logical instance where all action or previous production become ethical.

To act ethically means to maintain the possibility of a future. This is not the same as living in hope.

Notes

1. A regularity which the founder was able and willing to neglect when circumstances demanded: he was well known for analysing during walks, in restaurants, etc. - a fact overlooked or explained away by his 'heirs'.


3. 4.

5. 6. Ibid.

7. Gold, S.

8. 9. 10.

11. Zentner, O.


Letter dated 3 March 1989, signed by the president of the Australian Psychoanalytical Society.

The interested reader is referred to Dr Dingle's article: Dingle, J., 'The Entrance of Psychoanalysis into Australia,' *Papers of the Freudian School of Melbourne,* Oscar Zentner (ed.), The Freudian School of Melbourne, 1979, p.23-38.


Lacan thereby becomes, in adherence to the Freudian principle of retro-activity (Nachträglichkeit), the starting point of psychoanalysis in this country and does so from the pen of a member of the International...

Emphasis is mine.

Earlier, Peto, a Hungarian analyst practising in Sydney, had referred to Lacan's early concept of the mirror phase, which he took up in a simplistic way. All reference to the doctrinal master ceased after the latter left the Paris Society in 1953, making him politically undesirable and reference to him something that would have required a modicum of courage.

'De la psychanalyse - Ce qui se transmet ne s'enseigne pas' in *l'analyse et l'analyste,* premier colloque interassociatif de psychanalyse, SOLIN, Paris, 1991.
An important consequence for the local intellectual scene of the fact that the copyright of Lacan's works is so tightly and jealously guarded by the 'second generation family business' is that important translations of Lacan's texts by the Freudian School of Melbourne, such as *The Object Relation*, *The Formations of the Unconscious* and others cannot be made available to the interested public but need to remain restricted to members of the Freudian School of Melbourne and students at its seminars.

The Presentation of Patients is currently being held at Larundel Psychiatric Hospital. The seminar has remained at Mont Park Psychiatric Hospital.

Among the Twelve Points of the Schools Proposition (1977), a document produced to authorise the foundation of the School, it is stated that 'the School constitutes a scientific group which applies the psychoanalytic method to itself.' The School therefore 'recognises the dangers to psychoanalysis from the imaginary processes of identification and idealisation' which are particularly prominent within groups. These are closely related to power and (idealised, or fetishised) knowledge.
After Lacan, who proposes a relation between the self-authorisation of the analyst and the analytic act, we may inquire as to both the status of this action of which Ferenczi is not wholly capable, and Freud's differentiation between the end and the completion of the analysis.

Ferenczi is unable to complete his analysis with Freud. We see him stuck in a position of writing letters to, and clearly for, his analyst — keeping alive the 'continuous thought of the presence of the analyst'. Ferenczi was unable to effect what we will come to speak of as a transference to the letter.

I do not intend to undertake a criticism of Ferenczi, who is able to reveal to us a knowledge in failure, allowing us the possibility of advancing. The question at play here, between Ferenczi and Freud, and still for us today, concerns the vicissitudes of a residual transference. This is a question which Lacan rendered relevant in proposing, not a resolution but a re-direction, as the fate of the transference at the end of the analysis.

It is this question, as it pertains to the formation of the analyst, which I will address in order to elaborate something of how the analysis and the transference articulated therein, is relevant to the formation and self-authorisation of the analyst.

To write it in a condensed way: the transference, as it operates during the analysis, posits a supposed-subject-of-knowledge; the re-direction of the residual transference involves a de-supposition.

What does this mean? Supposition and de-supposition may be articulated in reference to what Lacan refers to as moments of alienation and separation respectively.

In the moment of supposition, the being of the subject is established as alienated in the field of the Other as guarantee of the oneness or unity of meaning. This supposition, and hence alienation, is maintained insofar as the analyst as object of the transference occupies the place of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge. This is illustrated by the position of the ‘continuous thought of the presence of the analyst’ to which Ferenczi refers. The analyst remains firmly in the place of an object which supposes the existence of the Other and the jouissance of the Other which is prohibited to the subject.

There is even a fascination with this enjoyment of the Other in the face of which the subject remains transfixed, proclaiming his own insufficiency in order to guarantee the surplus in the Other. Despite Freud's, 'I prefer to keep in the background so as not to disturb you in your productivity. In this way I hope to render harmless my continued presence in old age', Ferenczi is unable to move beyond the need for the 'continuous thought of the presence of the analyst'. He writes that 'for me personally, it is scarcely imaginable not to be able to discuss everything of importance with you — in the future as in the past — or to think that all psychoanalytic work — but especially my own — is no longer under your guidance'. Further, Ferenczi remains stuck in his anticipation of Freud's pleasure or displeasure with his production — an anticipation which hampers the possibility of his act.

An object is kept in place and an enjoyment of the Other is supposed in order to mask an empty space — a hole in the sense of the Other. In this supposition the subject is articulated in relation to the chain of signifiers which emanate from and find their signifieds — their sense — in the field of the Other. After Lacan, we can refer to this entire category of signifiers as $S$. A category of signifiers of pure supposition — the field of well worn and familiar signifiers which subordinate the subject and chain him.

The being of the subject is pledged to this field of $S$. Desire finds refuge in the fantasim — a particular relation of subject to an object — in such a way as to preserve the sense and jouissance of the Other.

In the act of separation there is a de-supposition whose corollary is the fall of this object. Thus, if the transference is maintained by a supposition which situates the Other as the site of the unity or oneness of meaning, as existent, then de-supposition produces an
encounter with a lack in the Other. This is to say, an encounter with the inexistence of the Other as guarantee of the unity of meaning.

In the separation and the fall of the object there is a disarticulation of the terms of the fantasm — the subject and the object which anchors the subject in the field of the Other — such that the subject has no possibility of articulation in relation to the field of signifiers belonging to the Other, the field of $S_1$, the field where everything of the signifier which can be articulated comes to be signified.

Opposed to the being of the subject in the field of $S_1$ as signifier of pure supposition, in the moment of separation there is an unbeing of the subject, unable to articulate itself in relation to the field of meaning guaranteed by the Other. Here we come across the initial murmuring of *Wo es war soll Ich werden*. Where it — the Other as the One of meaning was — comes to be the One of the signifier, what after Lacan we can write as $S_1$ — signifier of that very lack in the Other as the One of meaning. $S_1$, then, as veritable signifier of desire.

The subject, in being separated from the field of $S_1$ can only articulate itself in relation to $S_1$, as that signifier which is the first operation of the subject’s effective inscription. A signifier for which there is no signified, but only a representation of the subject’s effectiveness.

In the movement from $S_1$ to $S_1$, the analyst sustains the place of semblance of object a insofar as it is an object which falls; a fall which reveals a seeming which created a corresponding seeming or image of the subject at the level of $S_1$. The analyst, therefore, sustains the place of object a as the place of a fall — an emptying or discompleteness of the field of $S_1$ as the field of the Other as author of meaning.

This is a moment which is always more or less traumatic. Without recourse to the object tying him to the field of $S_1$, the subject is cut adrift, leaving only the trace of a trajectory. The most frequent recourse during the course of the analysis is a de-supposition. This is to say, a movement back from $S_1$ to $S_1$ — the repetition of this movement constituting the very insistence of the object — a bringing forward of the storehouse of imaginary objects and familiar signifiers. The end of the analysis distinguishes itself as a de-supposition which retains the possibility of sustaining itself — calling for a re-direction of the residual transference.

This movement from $S_1$ to $S_1$, then, is a de-supposition, making $S_1$ the signifier of pure de-supposition — a signifier which makes lack function. $S_1$, as the signifier of the effectiveness of the subject, insofar as it sustains an emptying or discompleteness of the field of the Other, arrests a certain repetition in which the being of the subject remains subjected to the endless chains of signifiers in this field. In the de-supposition, Lacan, in the *Proposition of ’67*, noted that the "unessential of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge is unveiled." It is from this position that we may propose that the unbeing of the analyst is pledged to the essence of desire.

In contributing to the ruin of this field of the Other as site of the unity of meaning, the subject ceases to support himself on previous epics — the well worn and much traversed field of $S_1$ and supports himself on his own epic — the yield of his encounter with castration as lack in the Other. A lack which he puts into play as pure desire through a signifier without signified in the Other. With this comes the possibility of re-thinking and re-inventing the entirety of a discovery in light of one’s own experience of it — the possibility of the de-institutional formation of the analyst.

The encounter with castration as lack in the Other, and the subject’s recourse to articulation through $S_1$, is a moment of self-authorisation. Self-authorisation insofar as the Other of authorisation, the Other as author of meaning, does not exist. I will propose then that self-authorisation is not merely saying that one is an analyst but, rather, the particularity of castration for the analyst. It is only insofar as this structure is supported that there is an analyst. Self-authorisation is therefore inherent to the very function of the analyst — not a singular assertion which remains...
Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

established. Self-authorisation attests to sustaining and supporting a lack and making it function.

It is towards a clarification of this functioning that I will now turn — if only to establish the relevance of a title concocted some months ago now. In this also, we may see the way in which a title functions as an Other which needs to be discompleted and re-invented in order to produce a writing.

The recourse to S₁ further articulates itself in relation to a movement from the jouissance of the Other which masks the lack in the Other, to the jouissance of language as discompletion. This is to say, to the possibility of a meeting of jouissance and logos, a meeting which opens a face of language to the real, supporting a real of the transference as a jouissance of language. The hole in the jouissance of the Other henceforth carries the mark of a primary signifier — S₁.

It is here that we may locate the possibility of a transference to the letter which draws the hole of the real and functions as littoral — frontier — between the symbolic and the real. In the movement from S₀ to S₁, as Lacan notes 'by an underpinning of the signifiers which the unconscious consists of, each One of the unconscious is capable of being written down by a letter'.⁹ We see then that the letter situates itself as that point of articulation between the real and the primary signifier — S₁.

Now, for Lacan, the unconscious itself is an effect of discourse, called writing, which is articulated by a chain of meaning from which it is nevertheless distinct. The Lacanian unconscious, then, as that point of fertile interaction between the symbolic of the Freudian unconscious, and the Lacanian real. Thus, if the analyst himself forms part of the conception of the unconscious, then his formation and function articulate themselves in relation to such a writing.

We might propose then, that this function of emptying or discompletion in relation to the field of the Other has a point of articulation with writing as a function of the letter. The letter thus establishes itself as different to the object — supported by the 'continuous thought of the presence of the analyst' — and the signifying chain as alienated in the field of the Other. To speak of a transference to the letter, then, is to speak of the writing function of the analyst — a de-supposition which carries itself as a decisive act whose signification trails after it. In this fertile period of trailing one may locate the urgency of writings which maintain the efficacy of such a trailing, producing a knowledge which is able to sustain its own discompletion — a Lacanian echo of the Freudian suspended knowledge and attention — the place from where the analyst listens.

In the moment of separation, or de-supposition, there occurs a 'cut in the signifying chain which verifies the structure of the subject as discontinuity in the real... making holes in the meaning of the determinants of its discourse.'¹⁰ This function of discompletion, or emptying of the sense of the Other, refers to a writing function which is well articulated in Lacan's interpretation of the Freudian Wo es war soll Ich werden. 'There where it was just now, there where it was for a while, between an extinction that is still glowing and a birth that is retarded, 'I' can come into being and disappear from what I say'.⁹

Lacan further notes that what remains here is the trace of what must be in order to fall from being — the place of that fall being what the analyst sustains in incarnating it, sustaining the emptiness of cause as real. We may propose then that the real is at play in the formation of the analyst via the letter which, with a Moebian twist, knots the desire of the analyst to the real — a desire which sustains that frontier between the symbolic and the real from where is derived the analyst's act.

While the field of S₁ pertains to chains of signifiers which maintain a perpetual sliding belonging to the law of discourse, the letter pertains to the knotting of the desire of the analyst to the real, supporting a real of the transference which allows a lack to function — as writing.
The perpetual sliding of S2 keeps Ferenczi demanding more analysis — being not wholly capable of action. Transference to the letter knots the indefinite sliding to produce a tendency to the act — self-authorisation — that passage from analysand on the one hand to analyst on the other, in which the very division of the subject is articulated in producing a writing; a writing whereby what remains is the emptiness of a cause as residual impetus.

In this way, writing carries within itself a process of discompletion which all the while marks the remains of the discompletion — Woz es war soll Ich werden. Where it was, I will come into being in order to fall from being, by writing.

Notes
1. Ferenczi, S.


2. Ferenczi, S.

Letter to Freud, 17 October 1916, Ibid.

3. Freud, S.

Letter to Ferenczi, 24 October 1916, Ibid.

4. Freud, S.

Letter to Ferenczi, 22 January 1924, Ibid.

5. Ferenczi, S.

Letter to Freud, 30 January 1924, Ibid.


7. Lacan, J.


8. Lacan, J.


9. Ibid.

Seminars

The following four seminars were given by Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin, Analyst and Founder of Vel Grupo Freudiano da Bahia, Brazil, and guest of The Freudian School of Melbourne on the occasion of the Homage to Lacan in September 1991. Gustavo Etkin has published extensively in the field of psychoanalysis, many of his works appearing in the Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne. This particular series of seminars constitute a significant contribution to a critical examination of the development of Lacanian theory and practice.
'The text of Freud is structured like a Borromean Knot', Lacan tells us in his seminar *Le sinthome*. It is structured like a Borromean Knot because the symbolic of the unconscious and the id, the imaginary of the I and narcissism, and the real, beyond the pleasure principle in the traumatic energy that the representation tries to bind in the failed repetition, are mutually implicated. The fact that the real, the symbolic and the imaginary are synthesised in a symptom is expressed in the clinical manifestation of a theory that attempts to *formalise its knotting*.
To do without any of these dimensions is not to be in the field of psychoanalysis because, as with the Borromean Knot, if one of the rings is cut — any one of them — the other two become un-knotted.

Nevertheless, although there is no order of chronological precedence nor of axiological importance, we can affirm that there is an order of logical precedence: the memory trace, the representation and the word determine the composition of the images and the investment of the objects.

The unary trait of primary repression is the condition of possibility of secondary repression — that with which the I collaborates. Similarly, the id, constituted out of primary repression, precedes the differentiated functions of I and consciousness.

For Freud, likewise, the images of the dream of an Artemidorus of Daldis1 are not important to the deciphering of the dream. What matters, instead, are the words with which those images are told: images and words that, in turn, interweave around a real of which nothing will ever be known — the navel of the dream.

We can also apply Lacan’s statement to his own discourse: a discourse that is knotted in such a way that to do without the imaginary, the symbolic, or the real is not only to destroy its essence but to evaluate it outside the field of psychoanalysis. It is not, however, only that doing without the imaginary, the symbolic or the real is to destroy its essence and to evaluate it outside the field of psychoanalysis, it could also be to reformulate the order of logical precedence.

For, chronologically, there isn’t first the imaginary, then the symbolic and then the real. There is no evolution from the imaginary to the real passing through the symbolic. Moreover, from the fact that in the last years Lacan would have emphasised the real as the impossible of his own symptom, we should not infer that the symbolic and the imaginary, each in its own way, no longer knot themselves — in the saying — with the real.

The fact remains that if Lacan repeats himself in insisting on capturing the real — an insistence that he knows is condemned to failure — he can’t but insist from the symbolic. To return to the same place — one of the ways to define the real — is to do it through the vehicle of the signifier, by definition, incomplete.

The signifier, single instrument that determines the possibility of repetition, of return, with its trademark of failure, defective, is the only one with which that return can be made.

An imaginary, in turn, as the surface of narcissism and the I, as love, hate and angst, as the enunciated of the possibility of knowing the disputed object of paranoia as a form of socialisation, is only possible through the articulation of the image — as phallus — in the desire of the Other, $S(A) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$. This matheme is a way of transmitting that moment of ‘jubilant recognition of one’s own image’ accompanied by a gaze, outside the mirror, addressed to an Other that tells him: ‘You are that, for me.’ This only becomes possible because that is lacking in the Other, a lack that can only be symbolised because there is a Name-of-the-Father capable of naming it. This is what Lacan called the paternal metaphor, instead of the Oedipus complex.

In other words, that if there is no Other with regards to whom the specular image can be articulated, there is no image — I — recognised as one’s own.

And the Other, that which in turn has no Other, is symbolic. A fact and an effect of signifier, because ‘there is no Other of the Other’ means that there is no beyond the symbolic, the imaginary nor the real. On the contrary, it is precisely because there is Other that — in a certain way, — afterwards, there can be an imaginary to look at and a real to write.

We say ‘in a certain way’ because the Other has no imaginary consistency as permanency in being — rather, it is ephemerally constituted by the act of saying. The Other is constituted while being:
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Although truth can only be half-said, a half-said, nevertheless, must be said: or, half-saying it in another way, a meaning is indispensable to nominate its non-sense. Thus the non-sense, by shortening the circuit of the sense, makes possible the emergence of meaning — S₁ — unary trait as the product of the analytic act. Likewise, the object a emerged from Lacan's discourse as Aphrodite, from the foam of the signifier and its meaning.²

The singular letter of the dissolution of L'Ecole freudienne de Paris, perhaps written by Lacan, is a letter in which he upholds the non-sense of the mathemes of psychoanalysis as opposed to the sense offered by Marxism and religion. Here, too, the Borromean Knot is the only way of situating the meaning of the non-sense to which that letter refers.

For psychoanalysis, sense — reinforced and named by the fourth knot — is, in the last resort, always sexual. The fourth knot knots the other three, even rendering unnecessary their previous knotting.
Meaning without signified or signified without meaning as pure reference to an object that, in the case of psychoanalysis, is a negative object, absent, without image or signifier: object $a$, an object situated in the de-centred centre of the Borromean Knot.

Notes
1. Freud, S.

2. Lacan, J.


*From Rome 53 to Rome 67: Psychoanalysis. Reason for a failure*, in Silicet, 1968. ‘...Aphrodite of this foam, from there has emerged of late the difference with an $a$. This allows for some hope for what Freud consigns as the relief of catechism. Nevertheless, not all has been lost in the sewerage. Neither the object $a$ nor the Other with capital letter quite swim there yet.’ What Lacan wanted: that the object $a$ swim there - with and from the Other - in the place of Aphrodite.

3. Lacan, J.

*Le sinthome* Seminar 9 December 1975.

This approach, with Althusserian resonances of the scientific Marx, epistemologically differentiated from the young humanist Marx, forces us to remember that although for Husserl there is no difference between the signifying naming of an object and the sense — which is a reason for which the mathematical expressions are without sense, Frege differentiates between meaning that can be without a referent object, and signified, whose object in a logical proposition is its value of truth.
The Unconscious in Freud and Lacan
Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin

We could say that for Freud the establishment of the unconscious as a formal category was the construction of a cause. The cause of symptoms, complaints, repetitions, destinies. The cause of neurosis, psychosis, perversion. The cause, then, of a sexuality qualitatively different from that of the animals and not determined by any hormone.

The cause, in its turn caused by narratives — stories, words, the Oedipus myth, the discourse of which will be the effects of those causes.

To achieve this, Freud will first have to cut with the medical
conception of the origin and place of the psyche, a cut which we will find in three places in Freud's writings:

1. The 1889 prologue and notes to Bernheim's book *Suggestion and its Therapeutic Applications*. There, at odds with Bernheim and Charcot, he affirms that hysteria is neither caused by suggestion (by virtue of which it is elevated to the status of illness in agreement with Charcot) nor by a slight and brief cortical lesion of a functional nature as in the case of a vascular constriction. For Freud it was not caused by suggestion (Bernheim) nor by transitory somatic alterations (Charcot) but, rather, by motives of an historic nature, in being the effect of a psychic trauma.

2. The 1893 *Comparative Study of Organic and Hystérical Motor Paralysis* where he affirms that a paralysis whose etiology is hysterical does not affect the body as it is known in medicine. It is not the neurone which is sick but rather the psychical representation of the body. In this he agrees with Janet in saying that hysteria attacks the organs of the body as it is known in a vulgar or popular way. We could add: in the way in which one speaks of the body. That is to say that, unlike Charcot, he considers that it is possible to have a functional alteration without the existence of a corresponding organic disorder.

3. The abandonment of Breuer's conception of catharsis: it is no longer a matter of a detained affect due to an organically conditioned oneiric-crepuscular state impeding its immediate discharge. Hysteria is not an effect of a hypnotic state but rather a neurosis of defence resulting from a psychic conflict.

Later, that place outside the body, that other scene, the Freudian model of the unconscious, underwent various modifications and maintained certain constants.

In the case of the modifications, let us remember the first schema for the psychic apparatus, that described in letter 52 of 6 December 1896, which is also to be found in the first book of the Freudian School of Melbourne:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pc association simultaneity</th>
<th>verbal images</th>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
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<td>Pc</td>
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Later, somewhat modified, that which appears in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the schema for the psychic apparatus which incorporates a direction.

The excitation enters the system at P tracing a trajectory through diverse forms of fixation caused by the permanent disturbances of the systems, disturbances that are constituted as such in mnemonic impressions.

To my mind however, the two schemas which are drawn above are antecedent by another model which is described only in *The Psychotherapy of Hysteria* of 1895, the last of the *Studies on Hysteria*. In this work Freud refers to the manner in which the pathogenic psychic material is ordered by an intelligence 'equivalent to the normal ego'. This material, made up of memories, is organised into three different orders:

1. That which is chronologically linear, which determines memories which emerge in chronological order, as if products of an archival search.
2. Those which are found to be concentrically stratified around the pathogenic nucleus, and which make up layers of increasing resistance as one advances towards the traumatic nucleus which they envelop.

3. Those which form a logical chain, a system of converging lines, with foci which would bring together 'two or more threads ... various independent threads flow into the nucleus'.

The possibility of drawing a schema — a figure — is implicit, given that Freud tells us that in such a case, the linear and concentric orders 'would have to be represented by straight or curved lines, while on the other hand the representation of the logical chain would form a broken zig-zag line', analogous to certain moves in chess.

It is worth noting that for Freud at this time, pathogenic material stratified in this manner, is infiltrated in the ego, which, in its turn, has interior and exterior layers.

Later, as you also know, we come to the second topology, that which, in Caracas, Lacan called that most absurd idea of Freud's: a bag of drives that, like marbles, enter and exit.

The different Freudian conceptions of the psychic apparatus have two characteristics in common:

1. Interior and exterior;

2. The implication of the pre-existence of the unconscious in relation to the possibility of its manifestations.

It is precisely with this in mind that Freud differentiates between the technique of suggestion in hypnotic therapy, and the analytic clinic. One is reminded here of the way in which Leonardo da Vinci is said to have differentiated between the techniques of painting and sculpture. Whilst in painting one is concerned with adding, accumulating and depositing, in sculpture - like psychoanalysis, according to Freud - subtracts, takes away, removes, uncovers in order to externalize that which — before — was hidden underneath. Inside, one can add.

That bag which, according to Lacan, contains the Freudian unconscious can also be called a sphere. The sphere of Empedocles, that of Parmenides and Plato. Empedocles, that pre-Socratic who Freud tells us he reads just before writing *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* in 1937, in whose works he finds — there since before Christ — his eros and death under the name of amity and discord, union and separation. Perhaps, he says, a kind of hidden amnesia. In any case, the confirmation two thousand years earlier of the second theory of the drives.

Nevertheless, there we find that both destructive discord and amity, separating and uniting fire, water, earth and ether 'walk inside of that which is in the sphere', 'the well polished sphere of circular solitude in joy given that:

Nothing lacks in the world in any part nothing is left over in any part as of all parts it was born the same;
what was born was this infinite sphere well rounded and polished.
Its joy is of a circular solitude whilst amity is dominant;
such solitude that not even ideas can reach to distinguish between the sun and its fast arrows.

That is to say that Freud finds in Empedocles an eros which fights against death in order to achieve its spherical perfection. Hence, the triumph of eros in this case is to reach/achieve the glory of the sphere. On the other hand, this does not imply that for Freud either this triumph was seen as possible, or that the two drives were seen to be symmetrical and balanced. Both are seen to be conservative and regressive, but one of them, eros — harmonious and brilliant — is detained in the process of synthesis, its objective. Meanwhile the other, death — mute and dark — goes right past, continuing
on until the last analysis, total disintegration. That is to say, they are not in harmony, nor do they form a sphere.

Notwithstanding, this inadequate spherical model appears as early as 1920 in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in Freud's proposal of a basic drive to 're-establish a previous state of things' — in this case an inorganic state, paradoxically exemplified by what is seen as a regression towards death in love — Aristophanes in the Platonic *Symposium* offers the myth of androgyne as proof of the existence of that completed, and for this reason ugly, sphere which Zeus was driven to divide in two. The original division which would then be seen as the cause of love — an impulse towards the re-union of the two separate parts. It is in this context, as you will remember, that Freud quotes Prof. H. Gompez who speaks of the *Upanishads* where Atman (him-self or ego) feeling himself to be alone and for that reason lacking joy, divides himself in two. From whence were born man and wife.

As we can see then, basing the return to the inorganic on the death drive — passing through the destruction of the synthesis implied by eros — paradoxically leads Freud to exemplify this return to a previous state of things with eros — as the tendency towards the re-establishment of a mythic spherical totality once divided (and whose inevitable failure will be the determining basis for repetition).

This is perhaps the reason why in the *Ego and the Id*, as well as clarifying that 'life itself is a compromise between these two aspirations' he sets aside the question about the origins of life which, he says, continues to be of a 'cosmological' (and we could say mythical) nature 'in that this question because of its finality and reason would elicit a dualist response'.

A difficulty experienced by Freud, an impasse in the model, which perhaps explains why even if Lacan says that the discourse of Freud is made like a Borromean knot, he nonetheless criticizes the spherical conception of the model. Even if the real, symbolic and imaginary give consistency to the bag — that is to say, the sphere — they are not written as knots. That is because, while the Freudian sphere presupposes a tri-dimensional space, the writing of the knot implies time. A time captured in a synchrony in which the diachrony of the signifying chain is cut out. In this way, a subject will be an effect of the unconscious in the place of the Other, that is to say the effect of what a signifier; $S_1$ represents for another signifier: $S_2$

$$S_1 \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots S_2$$

Between the two, undetermined, in fading, the subject of a fleshless knowledge which does not know itself knowing.

Thus that which makes this unconscious possible will not be a phylogenetic myth which is passed on, as in Freud, and which will form the bottom of the bag, that is, the interior part of the sphere (primary repression as a consequence of parricide), but rather a signifier situated in the position of first in relation to the one which follows. That is why Lacan alerts us to the fact that his One is not that which refers to totality (that would be to revert to the sphere), but rather the One of the series.

However, this One, will only be first from the point of view afforded by the second: $S_2$, which will by its presence constitute — Nachtraglich — that other signifier as the first:

$$S_1,\ldots\ldots S_2$$

Here we find another way of formalising the paradoxical nature of Freudian causality, that of the complementary series, in which the effect is anterior to the cause and hence its constitution.

This in its turn implies a linearity, that of the signifying chain, which delineates a trajectory: that of the repetition of demand around desire and that of desire around demand. To desire the demand, to demand the desire, taking the topological form of the two inter-linked toruses, the toruses of the imaginary and the symbolic, sustained by the consistency of the supposed cord of the real.
Hence, for Lacan, the place of the unconscious, rather than being inside a sphere, will be the effect of the Borromean knotting of the symbolic and the imaginary, sustained or held in place by the impossibility of knowing which is the real.

From here it can be inferred that the Other, there where the unconscious has its place, is possible because the symbolic, the imaginary and the real are inter-linked in the Borromean knot.

We may also ask ourselves, from an Aristotelian perspective, about its material cause, that is to say, about what makes up this knot.

Now, if the real is a cord, the symbolic and the imaginary — the toruses which they form — are made of the saying. The saying of demand and the desire which that demand — its only vehicle — never catches up with, never manages to say.

A saying which is a signifier, that is, which represents the subject.

A signifier which because it is not — by definition — identical to itself, is difference.

A difference, then, which implies a discontinuity with respect to a continuity.

A discontinuity which we can also call a cut.

It is the signifying act — symbolic — of the saying, then, that will make — originate — both the subject and the unconscious which determines it.

From all of the above, we may infer that Lacan’s unconscious is in act. An effect of the mother tongue — made possible by her — and appearing, being, between the cuts of the signifying chain. It is not anterior to the act of saying. On the contrary, it is the saying — as signifier — which makes it possible. Hence, it was not in an interior out of which it was uncovered.

This is the reason why Lacan, in introducing his topology, refers to the a-sphere. The symbolic castration of the sphere which makes of it an imperfect figure, without either interior or consequently exterior, and hence unable to be turned or manipulated in space. A figure with only one side: the Moebius strip. Cut and constituted in the Cross-Cap, the Klein bottle, the torus. But a Moebius strip of an ephemeral consistency — as ephemeral as the Other — constituted by the trajectory of a cut which, at the same time, restores to it its other side. This being the way in which the unconscious appears as it disappears.

A signifying cut — eminently symbolic — which makes the unconscious because it also makes the Borromean knot, in this way giving a consistency to the imaginary and an existence to the real.
Sexuality and Logic
Gustavo Ezequiel Etkin

It was in a popular, rather sensationalist magazine that I once read a comment which was reported to have been made by one of the first astronauts to have discovered the blue of the earth from the moon: 'Heaven is the atmosphere', he said, more or less. This trained astronaut did not of course even suspect the revolutionary effects of his phrase, nor the end of the period in history which it announced — the end of Heaven, the beginning of space.

The end of Heaven — as well as having religious implications — also puts an finish to the above/below difference which pertains to the Logos and perfection. Below, let us remember, was where the Greeks
situated Hades — the place of the death — just as it was there that Aristotle, for example, situated the animal pleasures of the body.

Whilst up there in the heights was the place of the Logos, the immortality of Olympus made possible through the intelligence which brings the philosopher closer to the gods by contemplating them, hence achieving the only true happiness. It is in this way also that Athena, Goddess of Wisdom, emerges from the head of Zeus, because there in the head resides reason, soul and immortality. Below, in the body, in descending order, irrationality, corrupt flesh, death.

An axiomatic model of being which distributes its value according to a reassuring geography in which the *Logos* — reason and word — always ends up winning from above or at least managing to control the irrationality of the senses — above all, that of animal desire — and, through religion, also winning over death, a 'happily ending' ontology in which sooner or later, in one way or another, good always triumphs.

The definitive phrase of our surprised astronaut has an antecedent in Freud — who in his second topology, though it continues to situate the unconscious and the Id below and the Ego and consciousness above, tells us, as we saw in the last seminar, that the unconscious is organised according to a certain order and logic. Moreover — to the scandal of reason — that thought is unconscious. In the primary process, though the laws of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, proper to formal logic, do not apply, and though negation does not exist in the unconscious, certain laws of condensation and displacement do apply there. This is an unconscious in which sex is not irrational animal desire, arbitrary passions and unforeseens but rather, regularity, order, repetition, determinism. And a place where, as you will remember, Freud says that there is no masculine/feminine. There is not the unconscious of the man and the woman. True sexual difference — that which does not depend on socially acquired secondary characteristics nor on biologically determined primary characteristics, — the sexuality of desire, of jouissance and identifications, the sexuality which is cause and consequence of the Oedipus complex and the paternal metaphor, that sexuality is the relationship between the phallus and castration.

A phallus which has ceased to be the penis in order to become a supposition, a universal premise captured by logic and not a secondary defence as Jones misunderstood it from a biological perspective in which the vagina was for him, from the start, the feminine organ. This is because Freudian bisexuality was qualitatively different from that of Fliess. While for the latter it was a question of a complementarity, biologically inscribed in periods of 23 days for men and 28 for women (a menstruation which is hence also masculine), a complementarity equivalent to a bilaterality (the right hand side of the body corresponding with the left), in the end a Western perspective belonging to the end of the twentieth century which names the Yin and the Yang as the present and positive feminine which is complemented by the masculine to form a unity, a synthesis made flesh in every human being. For Freud, on the contrary, both sexes 'repudiate femininity', that is, the lack of the phallus. The way in which this repudiation is organised in the unconscious — the logic of that negation — will determine the sexual position of each and every speaking being.

Following this line of thought, Lacan will go on to define the phallus as a signifier with a function. We may add, with the function of designating its own lack. A mask at that moment when it ceases to be that, the affirmation of a presence which represents its own absence, a flash in the mirror, an allusion in discourse, that which is beyond the object; it is that which demand cannot name.

The slippery object of desire, it is the principle which lends an order — always sexual in nature — to discourse. It is also that which supplies — in the word, like a plug of sense — the space, the hole, the real abyss of non-sense of the lack of sexual relation. In this way, speaking beings will be called men and women according to how each one of them unconsciously relates to the phallus: to have it or to be it, to have lost it, to be able to lose it, to desire it, never to reach it.
Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

Even though Freud speaks about the Logos of the unconscious as of a hidden reason for an apparent non-reason, as we have seen, he nonetheless continues to situate the unconscious along with the Id, below, while conscience (Super Ego) and the Ego emerge above, as the visible part of the iceberg.

In this respect, Lacan takes a further step in the formulation of his graph of desire — representing the way in which desire, the object and identification are structured in the unconscious — by situating above, contrary to Freud, desire and the relationship between the subject and the phallus.

In this way, it is from the matheme (S(A)) with which the articulation of the subject in the face of the desire of the Other is formalised as the response to his demand (S o D) that Lacan derives the logical alternatives of sexualisation. The bar which renders the Other inexistent — the writing of desire into which he disappears — as he makes clear in Le sinthome, is not that which separates signifier from signified, but rather the bar of logical negation: \( \exists x. \Phi x \). The significance of this being that there needs be at least one who will say 'No' to the phallic function. A saying 'No' which is the symbolic castration, and which is then equivalent to a logical negation. I here emphasise the basic and indispensable nature of the signifying act of the saying in the constitution of the formulae of sexualisation. Hence also implying that if the phallus is the signifier of castration, it is so in being logically posterior to it.

What I am proposing then is that the phallus is to castration as the implication is to logic: that which says that the consequence (protasis) is true if the antecedent (apodosis) is also true. In our

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Sexuality and Logic

In the case there is a phallic signifier as a consequence if its antecedent was symbolic castration. To put it another way, the phallus — as signifier of idlangue (mother tongue) — is the result or effect of a necessity (of an axiomatic or mythical nature according to one's particular sensibility) which applies to a law in the act of being said, precisely as the logical negation of the phallus, in order that — afterwards — the phallus may become possible as sexual sense.

Hence it can be seen that the phallus is there in each of the four alternatives, but functioning in a different way in each of them: on the right hand side — the side of woman — above, the real: \( \exists x. \Phi x \), because it is impossible that castration not exist in a speaking being. On the left hand side — the side of man — that saying of a speaking being which does not stop writing itself as Necessary in order that — afterwards — it will be possible for a man to speak an act as sexual, in order that there be sexual difference and in order that it may be Possible that castration stop writing itself as Necessary.

On the right hand side, below, the Contingency of a Woman as different, and hence 'not all' with respect to the phallic function. That is to say that the reason for her lack is not symbolic castration as Necessary for the circulation of the phallus between two bodies to become possible, but rather the Impossible of not being castrated.

With respect to the way in which the side of man and the side of woman relate to one another: \( \forall x. \Phi x \bar{\forall} x. \Phi x \) Lacan proposes that they be considered as logical opposites — not contradictory — that is to say that the intersection of the two may be true. In
this way, the Possible may intersect with the Contingent by way of a common element: the phallus.

\[ \forall x \phi_x \neq \exists x \]

She, who lacks the phallus because she never had it, comes into sexual relation with him who, in order to have a phallus, had first to have lost it. In this way the phallus, both for the side of man and of woman, is the place where they meet with the equivalent of the lack, though each arrives at it by a different route. But I would like to point something out with respect to the relationship between the Universal-Particular in the formulae of Sexuation. One can see in these formulae, the inversion as it were of the so-called Traditional Square of Opposition which formalises the relationships between the Aristotelian Universals and Particulars, given that for Aristotle the Particular is derived from and is a consequence of the Universal.

The Formulae of Sexuation on the contrary, the Universals \(- \forall x \phi_x\) and \(- \exists x\)- are the consequence of the Particulars. Particulars which in turn are excluded from the Universals, an exclusion which is the condition for the possibility of their existence. From this perspective one might, in my opinion, wrongly infer that the Part should come before the Whole from which it is excluded, an inference which leads to granting an ontological status to the Part which allows it being and substance outside discourse. How, for example, can one even pronounce the word Part without implying the existence of a Whole? I don't think that we can find consolation in answering that the Whole in question is the real, in this case, a logical Impossible. I think rather, that the way to approach this question is by focussing on the signifying act of saying castration as a said writing of the negation of phallic jouissance.

That act, as well as constituting as Necessary the S, of a Particular already in existence \((\exists x)\) constitutes, synchronically, the possibility of the phallic Universal as excluded from it \((\forall x.\phi_x)\), and also the Contingency of that Universal being incomplete or Not-All \((\forall x.\lnot \phi_x)\), and also that there be a place — Impossible — where there is not any castrated speaking being \((\exists x.\lnot \phi_x)\), that is, where castration does not cease to not write itself.

With respect to this, I think that one may consider the Necessary of \((\exists x.\lnot \phi_x)\) as equivalent to Lacan's fourth knot which after the 1974-75 Seminar, R. S. L., he proposes as a necessary condition for the knotting of the Borromean knot. A fourth knot which is the Name of the Father as the paternal function of Naming. Symbolic re-enforcement, then, which situates on the side of the Saying — in this case Naming — the Impossible as prohibited. A signifying act in which the real is marked with the letter of a logical negation. From which we may be led to think that if, as Lacan says, Logic is the science of the real, in also being only symbolic, Logic constitutes or makes the real in the very act of its writing.

And the act of listening also, from this perspective, may be seen as another of the ways in which Lacan insists on the symbolic, as I have tried to emphasise in different ways.
One could object to the title of this seminar from two perspectives, in my opinion, firstly because not even I would have the audacity to speak of the clinic of Lacan without having myself been either analysed by him or supervised by him. I only saw him and heard him speak in Caracas. I have not had what followers of a new 'wholistic' Yankee-Brazilian psychology call a 'feeling for Lacan'. For over twenty years I have known Lacan only through his writing and through the effects of that writing in my practice and in that of analyst friends and colleagues.

I cannot give a testimony, then, of his practice. But can one speak of the theory of Lacan without speaking of his clinical practice?
And also, can one speak of his clinic as anything other than his theory in act?

An impasse, undoubtedly, from which I try to exit by differentiating clinic from practice. For, if the clinic is the theory in act, the manner in which it is enacted implicates the subject that enunciates the act — 'act' here referring to the interventions of the analyst in the cuts of the discourse of the analysand and what it entails of failure, of repetition, of incompleteness, of signifier.

In this way, the clinic among Freudian analysts can be structurally the same, in the same manner as the truth of a logical proposition is pure enunciated, doing without the enunciation. But the practice is different for each analyst since, as different from logic, it includes the enunciation — that is to say, the indeterminate subject that incarnates it. In our case, the supposed-subject-of-knowledge.

The analyst, when offering himself in the transference as the semblance of the object $a$, also does so, obviously with his real, his symbolic and his imaginary, since the object $a$ is in the de-centred centre of the Borromean Knot. This is another way of saying that each analyst, as subject support of the supposed-subject-of-knowing, has a consistency that can also be called style.

And if we take into account that according to Michael Rifaterre, stylistics, that is the outlining of style, is the study of 'the linguistic elements used to impose the way of thinking of the sender onto the receiver' — that is to say, 'the act of communication... as marked by the personality of the speaker', one of the effects of the fall of the supposed-subject-of-knowledge, his dis-incarnation at the end of an analysis, is equivalent not to an identification with the style of the analyst but to his loss. That is, to mourn the impossibility of this imitation.

Because if 'style is man', it is this being of man that must fall at the end of the analysis as the object $a$ of the fantas$\text{im}^2$m but now without semblance nor likeness, only as pieces — particles alluded to in some sentence.

This is a negative that contrasts with the attempted imitation on the part of some of the style of Lacan: such as those who may not yet have arrived that smoking twisted cigars or giving a blue tint to their white hair (though they are likely to do so if baldness does not prevent it) and who slap their patients in the face as, sometimes, Lacan did, according to written testimony. A personal style — with all the imaginary reflection that the word 'persona' connotes — whose imitation, in addition to being comic, is rather unavoidable for some for whom his image functioned as a screen when the weight of his name proved — in spite of him, perhaps — those effects of church or army that Freud dealt with in *Mass Psychology*.

From this perspective we could then say that the ethics of psychoanalytic practice are the ethics of an impossible clinical practice without style. And from this we infer that while the clinic formalises the psychoanalytic act as the specific way of offering the cuts, the style may sometimes irrupt with its real.

I think that in the above I have answered my first objection.

The second objection could be formulated as follows: why Lacanian clinic and not Freudian clinic? Or, did Lacan not call himself Freudian?

It is already a commonplace to say that, for Freud, the cure consisted in completing the remembering, in filling lacunae. But it is also convenient to remember that, for him, this did not imply either synthesis or unification. As he says in 1918: 'The psychosynthesis is carried out, then, in the patient in an automatic and inevitable way without need of our intervention. With the decomposition of the symptoms and the suppression of the resistances we have created the conditions for that synthesis.' It was the time when he wrote to Oskar Pfister on 9 October 1918: 'In science one has to analyse first and synthesise after... in analytic technique a special work of synthesis is not needed; the individual occupies himself with that far better than we.'
Nevertheless, concerning his practice, we have the impression that Freud speaks too much. He gives far too many explanations endeavouring to convince his patients, as well as his contemporaries, of, above all, the existence of the unconscious: a convincing that, indeed, did not have to be the work of suggestion but the effect of a demonstration founded in the discourse of the analysand himself.

Such as, for example, when he tells Dora that: ‘...from her behaviour towards the children (of Herr K.) one could extract the same conclusion as from her silent approval of her father’s treatment of Mrs K.’ Freud later adds that: ‘...later on, when the abundance of the emerging material made it difficult to ignore it, she conceded that she could have been in love with Herr K...’ I think that this is what Lacan refers to in The Direction of the Cure with the not very happy expression of ‘subjective rectification’ — that is to say, ‘to introduce the patient to a first location of his position in the real.’ A real that here seems to deal truly with reality since, as he says further on, it is ‘the relations of the I with the world’ of which Dora complained and that ‘they would not have continued had she not been complacent about them’ (although, if it were the real, it would be simply to assume the symptom as self-complaint in pursuit of a knowledge).

Nevertheless, concerning the so-called ‘rectification of the relation of the subject with the real’ which is part of the cure and proceeds in an orderly manner until transference and interpretation, Lacan, further on in the same text, clarifies that: ‘...this subjective rectification of Freud’s is dialectical and departs from the sayings of the subject in order to return to them.’

Afterwards, he insists again: ‘To take sides as far as the objective is concerned, is an abuse.’

Perhaps this is the reason for not using again the expression ‘subjective rectification’ that he had used in his 1958 discourse — only two years after declaring himself a psychiatrist in the seminar The Psychoses. ‘Rectification’ is perhaps a remainder of his previous psychiatric formation which, as a not expelled object $a$, fixed itself to his discourse, in a way equivalent to Freud’s biological models and examples which, we could say, were the residue of his past as a physician and neurologist.

Be it as it may, Lacan no longer needs to speak of ‘subjective rectification’ in 1972 in Létourdit. Now it is a question of referring to one of the three puns — together with the logical and the homophonical — that, inscribing themselves in the enunciation, make possible analytic interpretation. It is the grammatical pun equivalent to ‘I do not make you say it... a minimal interpretative intervention’, a punctuation that refers the said word to the desire of the one who has pronounced it. This is what Freud did concerning Dora: show her that she complained of the effects of her desire, without any need to now name it fourteen years later, with the psychiatric term ‘subjective rectification’.

Could we then say that between Freud and Lacan there are only differences of style in regard to their practices, but that the clinic is the same?

In certain aspects it is the same — particularly when what is at play are those signifying puns that Lacan formalised in Létourdit. But when what is at stake is to go beyond the bedrock of castration, the ‘repaudiation of femininity’ for both sexes, a place where for Freud the analysis finishes and a beyond that Lacan pursues, then that also affects the clinic, making it different, in this point, to Freud’s. Because in that aspect — without excluding the possibilities of encouraging the pun in the signifier — it is the ease, also, of a saying, saying in a certain manner, the object of the fantasm; that is to say, the $a$ in relation to the subject.

That is why it is fundamental to remember that the object $a$ — although not a signifier — is in discourse, both in what it says and in what it does not say: a not-said, then, that in the clinic is only possible to locate through the said. A half-said, therefore, that will designate it by some object that will simulate it, that will feign it, thus implicating it in an approximate manner. Half-said of a truth
that is built in a phrase where the subject, in the infinitive or in the third person but always impersonal, is, or makes possible, something almost unsayable, because it causes shame or because there are no words to say it.

This is all another way of referring myself to Lacan in his 1975 seminar, *R. S. I.* , when he says that: ‘... the Other functions as a grid. The *a* constitutes one of the entries and the other... *is* the One of the signifier’. And he later alerts us: ‘... the imaginary and the real are here mixed with the One of the signifier (since) the One of the signifier acts also upon one and the other side (because) we would be mistaken in believing that it is the imaginary that is mortal and that it is the real which is living’. Hence, he concludes: ‘Where does the arbitrary (of the use of the signifier) come from if not from a structured discourse?’

This means that although the entry of the Other may be by way of the object *a* — negative, lost, fallen, absent object, and fundamentally not a signifier — even so, there is no other possibility than to situate it in relation to the subject, in the fantasm, through a half said of the signifier.

I shall try to illustrate this with an example of an analysand of mine who finished his analysis and whose case I presented in 1982 at the ‘Second Reunion of the Freudian Field’ in Paris where I went, like so many others, convoked by Lacan in Caracas before the theoretical and clinical differences that divide those who continue his teaching clearly manifested themselves.

The title of my paper — *Pica* (one of the ways in which the penis is designated in Brazil) — was also a key signifier in the complaint and the history of this analysand. He did not come to analysis to stop being a homosexual but in order to sometimes be active himself. He also wanted to do it. Besides, his most frequent complaint was that he lacked torque — that is drive, initiative, will — to do things. At different times I played with the pun pique/pica which made it possible for him to speak of the disavowal of the phallic value of his penis. Both his mother and his father, in different ways, pretended he did not have it. But there was, as well, another complaint: he felt himself a thing, like someone from outer space, when he was being looked at in the streets by women, a gaze that he also admitted to searching for with his own, because it was like ‘the gaze of a thousand mothers.’

I do not wish now to elaborate any further on this case that I have already presented but I want, instead, to comment on what was his fantasm and how saying it has determined the disappearance of his complaint and the moment of his cure, since the gaze of the Other — cause of his desire as object *a* — constituted him as a ‘shapeless ball of shreds.’ In this way, at times, in his discourse there appeared the possibility of constructing ‘being looked at like a shapeless ball of shreds’, with different variations according to the preceding text, a construction of the order of the quotation — that is to say, proposed from the signifiers of the analysand’s own discourse.

As can be observed, this wasn’t the case of any play of the pun with the signifier — which would be of the order of the de-construction — rather, on the contrary, it was a construction that did not favour the pun and therefore the metonymic sliding or the metaphoric substitution but, instead, the repeated fixation of an object, in this case ‘a ball of shreds’. This was the way in which the gaze of the Other did not see him as carrier of the phallus, although he searched for the phallus unsuccessfully in the repetition, in that gaze of the Other which was ‘the gaze of a thousand mothers.’

In this way, after my having mentioned several times the ‘shreds’ that listened to him, or stared at him, or the ‘shreds’ that were there in different ways, a final formal declaration of the end of the analysis was not necessary. There came a day, after nine years, when he stood up from the couch, sat opposite me, looked at me and, as if he were conversing with just anyone, he told me, calmly and sadly, that in his new job he was looked at as if he were one more, one among others, and that perhaps he would return to analyse himself when he would be in a position to pay my full fees (I had charged him a symbolic fee that also made him wish he had what he could not give me).
Almost one year later he phoned to tell me that he was enjoying his work. I asked him then about ‘the gaze of the thousand mothers’, those that in the street made him feel so strange. He replied that he was already able to walk in the street without caring about the looks, although occasionally he had a relapse because, as he said laughing, ‘nothing is perfect’, and the only thing he could now do was to bear it and live with it.

As can be seen, he tried to name. Although it is important to clarify that it was not a matter of naming the object of the demand from a knowledge of the analyst but to name the details, the parts, the little fragments of the object-gaze — signifying details of the analysand’s own discourse.

In order to conclude, we can then emphasise that, yes, there is a Lacanian clinic that, as such, cannot but be Freudian.

Notes
Lacan's seminar did not steadily develop for twenty seven years without a great deal of discussion, without agitation, indeed without a few lawsuits. Such a remark may seem trivial, but we sometimes neglect to consider its real importance. This importance is firstly due to the impudent consistency of Lacan's work in the history of the psychoanalytical movement, as much by its volume as by its demands of internal logic. It is also due to its immediate continuity with Freud's work of whom Lacan is one of the greatest successors.

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Twenty seven years of teaching represent not less than several thousand written pages of work and reflection. It would of course be indigent to limit the density of this work to a simple arithmetical quantification of the subjects which are developed. But it would be even more indigent to fail to recognise the achievement of this thinking, the richness and acuteness of which has had no equal up to now, except the work of Freud itself.

Putting Freud's work into perspective with that of Lacan's, one must carefully distinguish the originality proper to the Lacanian transmission. As an example, let us take note of the inaugural rupture that Lacan's teaching introduced in relation to the development of Freudian thinking. Whereas Freud employed the best part of his talent in constructing his work mainly by using the written word, Lacan applied himself to the same task but expressed the main points through speech. One may suppose that this difference is unessential in regard to transmission. That is not the case. This difference is, on the contrary, one of Lacan's most fundamental contributions to psychoanalysis.

No one more than Lacan emphasised the principle originality of speech in regard to writing. Take, for example, the case with which Freud drafted, in the style of a conference, a series of interventions only meant to be read. Freud himself underscored this singularity in connection with these New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: 'These lectures have never been given ... Therefore, if I resituate myself in the lectures which are to follow, in the middle of an audience, it is simply through my imagination.' Whereas Freud does not seem to place great importance on the difference between speech and writing, Lacan, on the other hand, introduces a radical separation. It is precisely because the articulation and scansion of speech are not to be found in writing, that Lacan purposely called all written statements by the term 'poubellations.' With this neologism, Lacan especially wanted to remind us that the subject of writing is nothing more than a puppet working for the imaginary poses of the ego. That is why he considered auspicious that an authentic psychoanalytical publication should avoid this subjective abuse and take the initiative to expose its thinking in the quasi-absolute dimension of anonymity. This was, for example, the case for seven issues of Scilicet where each written article was simply introduced by a title — the name of the author does not appear at all. Yet, if the principle of anonymity was only quasi-absolute, it did bear one exception. Such an exception did confirm the rule but, nevertheless, only Jacques Lacan persisted in claiming paternity for his writings by affixing his name.

Such an innovation for anonymity could only induce an imaginary overbid into the bubbling pot which was the L'Ecole freudienne de Paris in the late 1960s. It was more important to know who had the privilege of publishing an anonymous text than to spend time reading and studying the texts themselves. If only some readers were reassured as to the identity of this anonymous club it was very easy, once their curiosity was satisfied, to turn it into a secret conspiracy. Each initiate in turn could thus reveal the secret to an unknowing and astounded proselyte who was then able to repeat this occult procedure himself for another catechumen. The variants of this hermetic transmission did not come about by chance. They proved, afterwards, what Lacan must have sensed at the origin of this idea of anonymous poubellation. With this secret potentiality of speech likely to reveal the anonymity of writing, it correctly proved the effects of the subversion of speech in regard to writing. Lacan probably never doubted such effects and the whole development of his Seminar has constantly recalled this precedence of speech.

But not just any type of speech can be the object of teaching in the psychoanalytical field. Lacan's conception of his Seminar was appropriate to the idea of teaching only under certain conditions. The main one was to never forget the unmasterable dimension of the inter-subjective relation engendered by the spoken word. Lacan was always vigilant regarding the reciprocal incidence of the effects of the spoken word which come about when a subject addresses another subject: his entire Seminar is placed under that sign. Is it by chance that in the introduction of the first seminar, on 18 November 1953, certain proposals are the echo of the last sentence of the final seminar given by Lacan in August 1980? At the beginning of this opening seminar which had for its theme Les écrits techniques
de Freud, Lacan introduced his own discourse in the following terms:

The master interrupts the silence any way he wants, a sarcastic remark, a kick.

It is in this way that a Buddhist master proceeds in the search for meaning according to the Zen technique. The pupils themselves must look for the answers to their questions. The master does not teach a ready-made science *ex cathedra*, he gives the answer when the pupils are on the point of discovering it.

This type of teaching is a refusal of all systems. It reveals a thought in movement — nevertheless able to enter into a system for it necessarily shows a dogmatic side. Freud's thinking is the most continuously open to revision. It would be an error to reduce it to worn out words. Each notion has its own life. This is precisely what is called dialectic.\textsuperscript{4}

A few moments later, Lacan went on: 'Let us now consider the notion of subject. When it is introduced, you introduce yourself. The man who is addressing you is a man like everyone else ... One-self is therefore implicated'.\textsuperscript{4} In August 1980, in Caracas, Venezuela, Lacan, exhausted by illness, distilled the last words of his Seminar. During a public address as brief as it was final, he left his audience with this final message: 'It is you, by your presence, which enables me to have taught something'.\textsuperscript{4} Did Lacan's teaching find its true measure only in regard to the audience to which it was addressed? To support without reserve this idea would give credit to the charismatic dimension that some have willingly attributed to this teaching. In these conditions, it is easy to understand why the question comes back to the listener who is deaf to the dialectic which regulates the inter-subjective relation. In fact, if the listener refuses to recognise that 'the man who is speaking is a man just like anyone else', for this reason: 'he, himself is therefore implicated'. An imaginary step is then rapidly taken. It is a subjective gliding which consists in detaching oneself from the speech of the speaker to then find oneself blissfully confronted by it. There is thus produced an imaginary trick by which the listener, remaining deaf to his own unconscious processes, gives free rein to the best products of his *phantasmatisation* and wonderment.

Charisma thus operates in the best theological tradition — that of a supposed gift given by divine grace. The speaker's remarks are quickly raised to the dignified level of prophecy whereas, in reality, they are only speech 'on the subjectivity of the subject, in his desires, his relation to his environment, to others, to life itself'. (Lacan) This phantasmatic propensity, while depending on the blindness of unconscious effects always at work in the inter-subjective relation, is at the origin of all the commentaries which liberally developed concerning the charismatic myth of Lacan's teaching. One thing is that a fraction of the audience could have indulged itself in the illusion of this charismatic fascination. Another thing is that Lacan, during his Seminar, consistently flatters the jubilation of such deaf unrepentants. This charismatic misunderstanding has had, as we know, its certain hour of glory in the ancient tradition. The *Socratic maieutic* did not seem to develop from an art essentially different from the strategy which has been unjustly attributed to the function of the Seminar. Socrates' 'Know thyself', seemed to rediscover its source haphazardly in this subjective situation to which certain commentators reduced Lacan's teachings. At first, the originality of this teaching could give rise to such a confusion. It is true that, like Socrates, Lacan exerted an extraordinary seduction on his listeners. This was accomplished as much by his penetrating intelligence as by his sometimes vulgar expression followed by arguments of great subtlety. Moreover, like Socrates, Lacan dispensed an unorthodox teaching to those who wished to hear him. He also excelled in the art of raising futile subjects to the dignity of essential truths. In regard to his listeners, he portrayed — like Socrates — the talent which consisted in making his interlocutor meet the truths which he unconsciously possessed. He had the genius of being able to 'deliver minds' in the manner of this maieutic which Socrates borrowed from his mother's art, the midwife Phenaretes who delivered bodies. All these oratory devices were of a nature to bribe a few souls in the audience ready to succumb to the illusionary charm
of the Master's charismatic inspiration. The secret story of the Seminar is moreover the most significant testimony to these vestiges of Lacan's supposed charisma: whether it is a question of the enigmatic edification of transcriptions, or their clandestine circulation and hermetic commerce maintained in regard to the exegesis of the text; or even still the fetishisation of taped recordings and their fervent consultation in a seraphic ritual. Nothing is lacking in any way to confirm the best tradition of esoteric teaching.

As to the rest, concerning this cult, Lacan regularly worked at throwing off the yoke under which his herd of fanatics jubilated. Invectives rained down, in turn caustic and provocative. Sometimes, the remarks became more sibylline. In any case, what was important was to wake up the drowsy followers from their charismatic sleep, by using some shock formulae: 'I the truth, I am speaking'. 'Don't give up your desire'. 'There is no such thing as a sexual relation'. 'Woman does not exist' and so on. Beyond this magic of the verb and charismatic turpitudes, Lacan's teachings nevertheless remained an analytical teaching from beginning to end. It can even be said that it was a model of its kind which metaphorised, to the nearest point, the disconcerting dialectic of the unconscious processes and their arcana. In failing to recognise the principle which regulates the course of inter-subjective relation of speech, certain 'do-gooders' remain insensitive to the analytical efficacy of Lacan's discourse. The incidence of this teaching did not come into play for everyone at the same time. Nor did it produce the same effects. But Lacan's discourse always asked questions which were unexpected. This constantly renewed interpellation in the secret garden of the listener does not result from magic, nor from charisma but, at the most, from the ordinary dimension of transfer which is inaugurated as soon as one subject addresses another subject. At the start of his teaching in 1953, in Les écrits techniques de Freud, Lacan was already insisting on the analytical efficacy of the act of speaking: 'Each time a man talks to another in a full and authentic way, there is, in the proper sense, a symbolic transfer — something happens which changes the nature of the two beings present'.

There is no doubt that Lacan always endeavoured to take the path of such authentic discourse. Where some heard only the discourse of the Master others, on the other hand, perceived the principle itself of the process of inter-subjective communication set forth by Lacan in this lapidary formula: 'The speaker always receives his own message in an inverted form from the receiver'. In their blindness, some drew from this teaching only the stigmata of a charismatic mastery whereas others, more attuned to the obscure detours of the unconscious, therein discovered the essence of a style. It was not a question of a style such as the canons of rhetoric have accustomed us to sanction the use, but a style such as Lacan had marked the subjective anchorage in a relation of dependence on the other: 'The style is the man, shall we only rally to the formula if we lengthen it: the man whom we are addressing?'

Thus we can see the importance that Lacan gave to the incidence of speech on the message addressed to the other. Rather than subscribe to the effects of poses and mastery, Lacan confided his teaching to the ordinary fortunes of speech, to its metonymic sinuosities, to the ambiguity of significant homophones, to the punctuation which scans the articulation of the unexpected sentences.

If the teaching of psychoanalysis supposes, for the least, that it be transmitted, it is not to the extent of the discourse of the Master that this transmission can be accomplished. On the contrary, it is because the unconscious is structured like a language that the analytical transmission primarily results from a transmission of style. Lacan never evaded the exigency of such a transmission. Up to his last moments he assiduously dispensed the substance of his teaching by exposing it to the variants of the spoken word. We see proof of this in his long and fierce resistance to the publication of his own Seminar. Proof is also seen in the reshaping he never failed to effect when he thought he was unjustly challenged as Master: 'Giving oneself to teaching, the analytical discourse leads the analyst to the position of analysand, that is to say, to produce nothing masterable, except as a symptom'.

This clarification had no other object than to recall, in regard to all discourse, the unyielding dimension of the barred subject which
Impromptus cannot avoid, whether he be teacher or analyst. Only the Master, in the imaginary omnipotence of his Knowledge, succeeds in deluding himself that he is transmitting something while discoursing in the name of truth. That is why a pupil, subjugated by the charismatic discourse of the Master, cannot help believing of this truth, that the Master says it whole. The experience of the unconscious led Lacan to constantly remind his audience that from the point of view of truth, on the contrary, the speaking subject can only mid-speak it. It is therefore not surprising that he wished to place his Seminar under the sign of this mid-speech while pinpointing, through this choice, the precedence of the word over the discourse. If the word and the discourse are always linked in the speaking subject, the remarks of the Master, as for them, illustrate in an exemplary way the existence of a ‘discourse without word’. (Lacan)

On different occasions, Lacan had to neutralise this spectacular misunderstanding, especially during his adventure at the University of Vincennes in 1968. The transition of his Seminar from the Ecole Normale Supérieure where it was held, to the University of Vincennes, illustrates well the confusion in which, without knowing it, certain students were floundering in regard to the teaching of psychoanalysis. Inspired by the militant and contesting virtues that were the rule during this ‘revolutionary’ period, Lacan’s students suspected him of restoring a teaching worthy of the best tradition of university charismatic mandarism. Lacan had to very quickly enlighten these students who had imprudently mixed up ‘discourse without word’ and the precedence of word over discourse.

Out of the four scheduled conferences — which were to be assembled under the title Analyticon — Lacan only held two. During these two sensational interventions, he had to ceaselessly instruct the contesting horde on the blindness which was theirs. Without ever departing from his position of analysand, Lacan had to underscore the occasion of not mixing up with impunity the discourse of the Master and an authentic psychoanalytic teaching. This anecdotal illustration, the traces of which remain with us under the name Impromptus de Vincennes, is only of interest because of the blind spot which subverts it. The nature of this ambiguity is not foreign to the banner which Lacan constantly laid siege to all through his teaching: the Cartesian cogito and the foreclosure of the divided subject it supposes. As much as the discourse of the Master and its favourite variation the discourse of the University can only be deployed within the walls of the Cartesian subject the practice of the unconscious clearly shows the effect of the imaginary mastery proper to these discourses because of the division of the subject.

Armed by this experience, Lacan’s fantastic audacity is to have continually attempted to preserve the texture of his analytical teaching from the province of a cartesian teaching. His prodigious performance is that he succeeded. Moreover, should we fully reflect on these few wise remarks that he recalled to his pupils at the close of a congress on the teaching of psychoanalysis: ‘It is not because of teaching that someone declares that he has been taught. It can be brought about by all sorts of things, by a gesture, by an act, by more than one category’. A few moments later, Lacan went on in these terms: ‘I do not say wherever there is the barred subject there is teacher: but I do say, it can only be there’.

Notes
1. The original text of this paper was published in La Razon Psicologica, Buenos Aires, 5 April 1987, pp. 1-4 (El Seminario de Lacan: Ensenanza carismat-ica o analytica).
3. A play on the words poubelle (rubbish-bin) and publication.
5. Ibid.
Papers of The Freudian School of Melbourne

Freudian School of Melbourne, 1980, PIT Press, Melbourne, p.106.

10. 'the subject as a speaking being'.
11. Lacan's *mid-dire*.
12. Lacan's *mi-dit*.

The Structure of the Ego and the Psychoanalytic Institution

Ivan Corrêa

Heraclitus of Ephesus criticised Homer for having made the following wish: 'That all discord among the gods and men would disappear!' Heraclitus gave this reason for his criticism: if this wish were to be realised, 'everything would perish'. Can it be that it is this struggle not to perish, a struggle against Todestrieb, paradoxically present at the core of the dissensions, which is at work in the interior of psychoanalytic institutions? Or, on the contrary, could this be the very death drive in action? Or just purely and simply

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the work of the Empedoclean opposition between *philia* and *neikos*? From where does this splitting and reproducing force come, which is opposed to the *Vereinigung*, envisioned by Eros, and surrendering itself entirely to the *Dektruktionsstrieb* which leads, not to multiplying unions, but to the deceptions and mutilations of death? What is this 'lethal factor' which is recounted along the length of the 'Hundred Years War'? Could it be that it is discord (*neikos*) which sustains the psychoanalytic institution, just as it sustained the gods and the men of Heraclitus?

For Freud the main question is to know what is the work of the life drive and what is the work of the death drive. What is subject to one and what is subject to the other. Weissman authorised him to affirm: that which dies for the individual, which is separated from him, is what makes life eternal. To summarise, is it death which produces life or is it that the aim of all life is death itself?

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud investigates the form of protection against internal excitations. Against external ones there is no difficulty because there is a 'protective shield' which the cortex provides. But against internal excitations, the subject discovers himself impotent and unprotected.

... A particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations which produce too great an increase of unpleasure: there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation as a means of defence against them. This is the origin of *projection*, which is destined to play such a large part in the causation of pathological processes.3

This 'projection' of the internal excitations to the exterior, in order to treat them as though they come from outside, is closely related to what Lacan has said about 'paranoiac knowledge', as the structure of the ego: one doesn't know what is going on oneself, on the inside. One knows the self first on the outside, in the other, as though one were the other.

How much effect can this basic equivocation have on the misunderstandings and on the disagreements which reign in the difficult social relations of institutions? The subject is constituted in the field of the Other. On this equivocation the traces of the ideal ego are marked. In spite of this, it is also from this that the ego of the subject is sustained with its narcissistic image, for this place is the support of the imaginary. Could it be that this is the font of discord which produces disagreements?

Lacan begins his thesis *About Paranoiac Psychosis in its relations to Personality* with the following citation from Spinoza: ‘Quilibet unius cujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt’.3 Spinoza was the first of modern thinkers to define personality as history, a 'significant history' rather than a system of 'traits'. It is personality itself that is envisioned by the term 'essence'. The individual is essentially desire, affirmed the Dutch philosopher. 'Desire is the very essence of man'. Spinoza shows that we do not desire something because it is good (desirable) but, on the contrary, something is said to be desirable because we desire it.4 Here we find the rupture which would influence Freud and find its repercussion again in Lacan, where it is desire which is in the origin of its object. Without a doubt, this fact caused Lacan to inscribe this epigraph as a sign, signalling that reflection on desire should be the fundamental concern of the analyst. The doctrine of Spinoza is presented in Lacan's thesis as the 'only concept' capable of explaining paranoiac psychosis not as a deficiency but as a fact of discord with what would be the normal development of the personality. Spinoza speaks of two individuals. Lacan refers to two states of the same individual, pointing out the discordance of the paranoid with what would be the normal personality. To move from inter-individual discordance to the intra-individual means to put in the place of individuality not one but two desires, just as discordant as between two individuals. Between his 1932 thesis and *The Mirror Stage* (1936, re-edited in 1949), Lacan moves from Spinoza to Hegel. This justifies
the change in formula from desire as no longer individual, but as desire of desire.

In 1946, Lacan's *Propos sur la causalité psychique* gave rise to the 'more general formula of madness' starting from the metaphor of the belle âme which does not recognise its being in the chaos of the world that it denounces, neither in the inverted image of this same world, nor in the law of its heart. The mechanism of psychosis is thus pointed out as the misrecognition of an identification. 'Doctor and psychiatrist, we introduce under the title of paranoiac knowledge some results of a method of clinical exhaustion of which our medical thesis was the result'. This is the inaugural self-nomination of Lacan, in speaking of his 'antecedents'...to delimit the 'place where we entered into psychoanalysis'.

It is also in his *Ecrits* that we find the following references to paranoiac knowledge:

...my study of the characteristic phenomena of what I called 'the fertile moments' of delirium led me to a phrase which is shocking, 'paranoiac knowledge'.

We understand by this phrase a fundamental structure of these phenomena, signalling, if not ambiguity, at least a relationship with a form of relation to the world through a very particular dimension.

What I have called paranoiac knowledge is shown therefore to correspond in its more or less archaic forms to certain critical moments that mark the history of man's mental genesis, each representing a stage in objectifying identification.

The 'paranoiac structure of the ego' is a corollary to the mechanism isolated by Lacan as the misrecognition of an identification. Everything which discloses this misrecognition has a dimension of persecution. But the objectifying identification does not necessarily produce a persecution of the object. There must also be a 'resolving identification' which not only would fail to nourish but rather would neutralise the paranoiac impulse. As identification it is alienating, but at the same time it inhibits the effects of paranoiac discord, introducing a new discordance which solves the previous one. Lacan's reference to the scheme L which distinguishes the imaginary relation a-a' from that which comes to the subject of the unconscious A-S, provides the possibility of a mediation of the imaginary relation.

This scheme introduces as writing essential elements susceptible of allowing another orientation of analytic practice, being a way of 'how not to make the patient paranoid'.

What are the relations between psychoanalysis and paranoia? What is the difference between the interpretation of the analyst and the interpretation of the paranoid? Freud was very enthusiastic about President Schreber, considering him a true colleague, and he interpreted his 'Memoirs'. In a letter to Ferenczi he states that he had had good success where the paranoiac would have failed. Lacan made his psychiatric debut with a thesis about paranoia. From the beginning, his psychoanalytic writing elaborated the notion of paranoiac knowledge as the structure of the ego. The paranoid and the analyst interpret. Paranoiac knowledge is an attribute of the ego and is common to all. It is not only found in the delirious. We have the front and back of the same thing. How can we separate them, how can we learn what they have in common? Freud observed that the paranoid tends to make a rigorous interpretation of the unconscious of others, allowing himself to be led by his knowledge of the unconscious and directing to the unconscious of the other the attention he has withdrawn from his own unconscious. The paranoid possesses a power of divining that which comes from the primordial Other and he gives to this interpretation the force of truth which is reinvoked by the analytic interpretation: '...Madness is experienced completely in the register of meaning'. The paranoiac interpretation is part of a totality of sense: everything is invaded by meaning. '...the field of interpretations is unlimited: there is a delirium of personal meaning'. The paranoiac process finds meaning in everything: '...In psychoanalysis it is not the effect of sense which operates in the interpretation, but the
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It is not separable from the conditions in which it operates. The analyst only occupies a place which allows for interpretation, if he knows how to subtract himself from the imaginary places where the transference tries to locate him. It is the function of the Other as place, witness to truth, site of the word, which provides the dynamic in the encounter between paranoia and psychoanalysis. The lacking Other is disconnected from the subject, himself the very §. This Other barred (A) is not a common place for psychoanalysis and paranoia.

This is what Freud indicated in his letter to Ferenczi: '... I no longer have more need of this total opening of the personality. . . After the case with Fliess which you helped me to overcome, this need has terminated. A part of the homosexual investment has been withdrawn and used for the growth of the ego. I was successful where the paranoid failed'. The desire for rupture is no longer attributed only to Fliess, but recognised by Freud as also his own. This the point that Freud presents as his success. The failure of the paranoid, on the contrary, consists in the total misrecognition of this 'internal change'. 'If we forget it [this change], and if we are left with only the leg of the syllogism that leads outwards, then there we have paranoia, with its overvaluation of what people know about us and of what people have done to us. What do people know about us that we know nothing about, that we cannot admit?'

In expressing this ambiguity between the interior and the exterior, Freud echoes what in antiquity was expressed in logic as a true 'Janus bifrons'. If this stopped at verbal or symbolic formulae, it was only while it was considered manifest in an interior discourse. Aristotle, recapturing the Platonic distinction, declared it expressively; 'It is not the exterior discourse which the syllogism and demonstration deal with, but what is produced in the soul!' For him, the business of logic is, above all, the virtue of thought; the expression through language was a mere consequence.

In modern times, Port-Royal presents logic as the 'art of thinking' or 'the art of well conducted reason in the knowledge of things'.
and clearly emphasises the character of reason as both reflective and regulating:

Since men are mistaken sometimes in their judgements and sometimes not; since they reason either well or poorly and after having reasoned poorly are capable of recognising their error; since they may be observed reflecting on their thoughts, what method they follow when they reason well and what was the cause of their error when they were mistaken; thus rules may be formed about these reflections in order to avoid being surprised in the future.19

Leibniz does not think differently from the Cartesianism of Port-Royal: 'I understand logic or the art of thinking as the art of using one's intelligence, that is, not only in order to judge that which is apparent, but also to discover what is hidden'.20 This is only a recapitulation of Boeocio: 'Est autem finis logicae inventio judiciumque rationum' — 'the purpose of logic is to discover and to judge argument'.

The 'internal change' of Freud, 'not to remain only in the part of the syllogism which leads outwards', Aristotle's 'exterior discourse' in opposition to what 'is produced in the soul', the logic of Port-Royal warning about the method for 'reasoning well' and the 'cause of error when they were mistaken', and the art of Leibnitz of 'not only judging what is apparent but also discovering what is hidden', lead to a phenomena of structure, of the same structure, the structure of the ego in its form of cognition/misrecognition which Lacan named paranoiac knowledge. How does this ego and its cognition/misrecognition behave within the subject who constitutes psychoanalytic institutions? How does this ego function which fails to recognise fault in its being and projects it onto the exterior, on to the other 'as though it were outside' or regards itself as the ideal ego, thus constituting a fundamental and irreducible moment of alienation. The ideal ego in topological terms tries to seal over the hole in the centre of the torus, as though the defect were with the object and not the subject. This is the same hole by which the fundamentally lost object escapes and which the object a comes in an imaginary way to plug. It is an illusionary plug, because there is a primordial repression S(A) indicating a latent nomination which cannot pass into speech. The object is always lost for the one who is engaged in the play of the signifier.

In relation to the institution, every analyst one day finds himself, either more or less sharply, before the alienating 'vel', before the structure of forced choice: your purse or your life, 'independence or death', 'liberty or the institution'. In this choice, the connector 'or' is neither recognised by the logician nor formalised in mathematics. But it exists. It is neither the inclusive 'or' which permits one or the other pole of an alternative, or the two simultaneously; nor is it the exclusive 'or' which excludes the simultaneous truth of two parts of an alternative. This is a third 'or' which is present in language, in grammar, and which is the source of all logic. Lacan observed that in phrases such as 'liberty or death', in both cases we have two things. These choices allow a particular factor to intervene, which he called the 'lethal factor'. That is, the death of the subject. Forced to chose liberty, we denounce its absence so that the only proof of liberty in such a choice is exactly to choose death, in order to prove the liberty of choice. Is this the liberty which is at play in psychoanalytic institutions which do not cease to let the Tödeweb act in the illusion of the triumph of the Bemächtigungstrieb, the drive for control, of dominion. Dominion over what, possession of what? Of the object a which escapes through the centre of the torus, and not finding its specular image, inscribes itself as a flaw in the image of the ideal ego?21 The misrecognition of this flaw maintains the illusion of the completeness of this image. The subject remains without access to the connection to the symbolic for not admitting the permanent incision of castration, which stabilizes and provides direction for the phallic signifier φ.

Can it be that the only worthy function of a psychoanalytic institution is to confirm the paranoiac structure of the ego? Or, through the 'internal change' expressed by Freud, can we have success where the paranoid has failed? Perhaps this is the only way of
liberating us from the empire and control of the imaginary and the real (impossible to be said) so as to guarantee the primacy of the symbolic and the subsistence of the analytic in the institution which wants to be analytic. Only thus may the alienating vel over the forced choice, the death of the subject, be transformed into an inclusive 'or': 'liberty and/or the institution'.

Translated by: Sidney Pratt, Jucy Pessoa Barbosa

Notes
1. Heraclitus
2. Freud, S.
3. Spinoza
4. Spinoza
5. Lacan, J.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Lacan, J.
9. Freud, S.
10. Lacan, J.
11. Sérieuz and Capgras
12. Lacan, J.
13. Sérieuz and Capgras
14. Ibid.
15. Lacan, J.
16. Lacan, J.
17. Freud, S.
18. Aristotle
19. Port Royal
20. Leibniz
21.

20. Leibniz Letter to Gabriel Wagner, 1696.
The hole in the torus does not exist. We attribute the hole to it. Because it does not exist, the object which escapes from it cannot have a specular image.
Freud's affirmation according to which 'the processes of the Ucs system are timeless' has been a source of misunderstanding. It has strengthened a fallacious conception of time as unidimensional and measurable in duration, justifying the practice of the duration of sessions being preset. Such a conception prevents access to the synchronic seizure of the unconscious within the beating of a scansion, the eclipse of consciousness, the lightening-like dash of the un-known (Un-bewusste). By this affirmation Freud signifies that unconscious processes do not undergo the wear of time and

that desire is indestructible. But how can something be said to be indestructible and at the same time, in the name of that indestructibility, escape time as duration? To answer this question, and in order to define the temporal structure of the indestructibility of desire, there is cause for distinguishing dimensions of time other than duration. Nobody cleared this path as Lacan did.

To appreciate the value of this clearing, one can first take into account the temporal structuration of symptoms. Indeed, not in order to make a phenomenology of lived time but to specify in what way the symptom as such expresses more or less directly a relation of the subject to several objectifiable temporal coordinates.

Let us think, for instance, of the symptoms of *déjà vu* (already seen) and *déjà dit* (already said). In these symptoms the adverb *déjà* stands at the point of division of the saying and the said. It represents a mark of enunciation in relation to a statement (*énoncé*) which has not been said. The *déjà* of the *déjà dit* reminds us that the problem comes from not having said at the time when the subject has to say.

In every act of speech engaging the subject there is a temporal dimension that is very important to consider. This temporal dimension is inherent to the symbolic. The case of fetishism reported by Freud, of the shine on the nose (*Glanz auf der Nase*) represents in its own way another miscarriage of the accomplishment of the temporal function. The *auf der Nase* is a set spatial transformation of a temporal datum pertaining to the 'instant to see' since it comes from a glance *auf die Nase* (glance on, [at] the nose).

The most explicit denial of the statement that Ucs processes 'have absolutely no relation with time' is supplied by Freud himself with the notion of *après-coup* (*Nachträglichkeit*) (after-stroke) which he uses to explain the formation of hysterical symptoms. It is not the events in themselves that have a traumatic action, but the second stroke constituted by their revival in the shape of phantasy, after the subject has reached sexual maturity.

Lacan took up again and generalised the Freudian schema of the after-stroke. First he articulated in terms of signifiers the two different strokes (events) in Freud, where indeed there was a disparity between the first time (event) — designated now as experience, memory-trace, impression, perception — and the second one, designated by the term of representation. By formalising the schema of the *après-coup* with the graph, Lacan turns the *après-coup* in a time-event of retroaction of one signifier on another. This step is decisive, for it separates the logical order of language in which the retroaction occurs from the order of things. In addition, it rules out the prevalence of the diachronic function of phylogensis, known to be Freud's bent, since he traced back the first time (event) of trauma to the beginning of the history of humanity, thus confirming *de jure* a priority of the first time (event) of the *après-coup*.

Putting it in terms of signifiers allows, on the contrary, to keep the *après-coup's* specificity — that is, the synchronicity of its functioning in the retroaction of time two, which brings time one to existence (a definition of repetition). Lastly, by generalising this temporal scheme Lacan doesn't reserve it any more for the formation of the hysterical symptom but converts it into an explanatory scheme of signification. The beginning of a sentence meets its signification only when this sentence reaches completion. It follows that the one designated by the subject as his ideal support is the he imagines beforehand, in the future perfect, as the one who will have spoken.

Lacan does not limit the foundations of the temporal structuration of subjective experience to the resumption of the *après-coup's* scheme. He also drew up the plan of the temporal coordinates of the field of the Other, within which this scheme functions, namely the 'instant to see', the 'time (required) to understand', and the 'moment (when) to conclude'. The Wolfman is a case Lacan often took as an example in order to show in what way those three dimensions have been distorted. The Wolfman, who at the end of his life still painted postcards of the dream which gave him his case-name, is somehow fixated to an 'instant to see' that has not found its 'time (required) to understand', because the 'moment (when) to
conclude' has been anticipated by the analyst, and he thus remained in 'the alienation of his truth'.

If the symptom has indeed the signification of a return of the subject's truth, it is also because there is an hour of truth for the subject. Hamlet hangs on the other's hour of truth. He does not kill Claudius because his time — his hour of truth — has not yet come. If, in perversion, the fantasm suspends the relation to time, the neurotic seeks to read his hour of truth in the object of his fantasm, when, beyond demand he seeks to retrieve what was lost by entering the discourse of the Other: the obsessional's procrastination is based on the fact that he anticipates too late, the hysterical repeats a 'too soon' of his trauma. In the same way that the subject anticipates the one he designates as ego (me) in the identification through the image in the mirror, there is, at the very bottom of the fantasm, a 'he will have wanted it'. At the bottom of the fantasmatic answer there is a relation of the subject to time which is stated in the future perfect, from the locus of the Other.

Since logic attends to truth values, this relation of truth to time justifies the fact that Lacan sought to knot logic with time. He has done this as early as 1945 in a text, *Logical time and the anticipated assertion of certitude*, where he gave a decisive place to a new temporal dimension — haste — to be added to those already listed — succession and synchrony. Here is the argument of what he will call 'my little personal sophism'. In order to benefit from a discharge measure, three prisoners must guess the colour of the disk, chosen among three white disks and two black ones, which the prison warden fastened on their backs. After 'a certain amount of time' the three prisoners hurry to the exit and give separately an identical answer:

I am white, and here is how I know it. Seeing that both my fellows were whites, I thought that if I were black, each one of them could hence have inferred that if I were black too, the other one thereby having to acknowledge immediately that he is white, would have gone out right away, therefore I'm not black. And both would have gone out together convinced that they were white. If they were doing nothing of the kind, it's because I was white, like them. Thereupon I went out to let my conclusion be known.4

This conclusion has the rigour of a logical solution, providing, says Lacan, it integrates the value of two suspensive scissions where the prisoners question the validity of the solution and repeat, each time, the same conclusion. These scissions have the value of signifiers. They verify the subject's precipitation to conclude in haste, within a moment of eclipse wherein, realising his reasoning is one step behind time, compared to the one of the others, he becomes afraid that if he should not conclude right away, if he should let the others get ahead of him, he wouldn't be able then to be sure anymore that he isn't black.

The subject's certitude — here identical to the subject of certitude — is carried by an act of anticipated assertion of certitude. In this logical process of the temporal structure of the relation between oneself and the other, it is from the other and from the Other (taken as the locus of the logical process), that the subject receives his own message:

Each one intervenes in this ternary only by right precisely of this object a that he is under the regard of the others (...) They are three but actually they are two plus a, and it is indeed in this that this two plus a, from the point of the a, is reducible not to the two others, but to a One plus a. You know that regarding this, I already made use of these functions to try to represent the inadequacy of the ratio between the One and the Other, by giving to this a, as a support, the irrational number that is the number called nombre d'or:5

'Instant to see' and 'time (required) to understand' are times of (pertaining to) the other. The subject's 'moment (when) to conclude' anticipates the other's. Moreover, the spring of this articulation is the lack. The instant to see is a lack in seeing (two blacks), the time
not by mere chance that *Logical time* is joined together with *Intervention on transference*, in Chapter Three of the *Ecrits*. In this last text, Dora's analysis is interpreted by Lacan in terms of three dialectical reversals followed by developments of the truth. ‘Transference is nothing real in the subject’, Lacan asserts, ‘but the apparition in a moment of stagnation of the analytical dialectic of the permanent modes according to which he constitutes his objects’. In *Position of the unconscious*, Lacan says that ‘transference is essentially linked with time and its handling’. In this regard, the scanned session represents ‘the most efficient mode of analytic intervention and interpretation’.

Lacan prescribes that the desire of the analyst must limit itself to the void, to the cut, to this place that we leave for desire to be situated in. What happens at the end of each scanned session is immanent to the whole situation itself. The scansion doesn't necessarily take place at the end of a session — it may supervene at the beginning, or at the end of several sessions. By this act the analyst engages physically in an operation which makes present the cut as such, and as a fully fledged temporal dimension (there is more than just one time) for himself and for the analysand. He refuses to shelter behind a so-called duration contract, which lures the analysand over the obtaining of a due. With this mode of intervention, the analyst shows his availability for the word, and wagers on enunciation. He goes by the gap between the saying and the said (stating and stated) and puts himself in the position of $\$\$ who sees a: 'The question is whether, in transference, in order for us to enter ourselves for the passive subject in this fantasm at the level of $\$\$, it supposes that in a certain way we really be this $\$\$, that we be in the last term the one who sees a, the object of the fantasms, that we be capable in any experience whatsoever, and even the most extraneous experience to ourselves, to finally be this see, the one who can see the object of the other's desire, whatever the distance this other might be from himself.'

Session scansion, like logical time scansion, takes time as a signifying event and not as the locus of a measurable duration containing statements. This handling of the time of the session knots repetition...
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to remembering; the actuality of the word that reinscribes in the locus of the Other the non-identity to themselves of the words of the subject's history, allow him to accede to that which constitutes his desire's indestructibility.

If it is true that there is a temporal structuration of the symptom's truth, the analyst must have the means to act on the times according to the logic which presides over that structuration. Thereby he gives the analysand a chance to pass through the plane of the identification with the 'subject supposed to know'. For, in scanning the sessions, the analyst puts himself in a position of refusal of total knowledge, he deprives himself willingly of the ideal of an accumulated knowledge. His analytic desire functions within the gap between the ego ideal and the object a. He sets the analysand on the way to fall from his fantasm, the bottom and the remainder of which is made up of some 'he will have wanted it'. As the prisoners in logical time, the subject can, after the scansions, get to renounce waiting to be seen by the other, and to assert his existence. He can renounce the quest for a knowledge as already there. The idea that 'the other will have wanted it' is replaced by the expression of a 'the Other will have wanted it'.

Session scanning is like a parapraxis that liberates signifiers. It has been necessary for someone to forget the keys of his apartment, to realise that 'apartment' sends back (refers), for him, to appurtenance. The annulment of the thing, the apartment — by the act of forgetting — gave rise to the signifying nature of the word 'apartment'. In the session's cut there is such a dimension of parapraxis which, breaking the link of language to the thing, connects the words to other words, to produce a subject effect. That is why it is often in the 'after-stroke' of the session that the find, latent during the session, comes and that the subject feels a haste to come back to his session to make there the connection with the preceding session's signifiers.

Translated by Thierry Beaujin

Notes
1. Temp is translated here by 'time' or 'stroke' when part of a scanned process. 'Stroke' is also a translation of coup in après-coup.

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